

PRIME MINISTER AND CORE EXECUTIVE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY:  
PROCESS, OUTCOME AND QUALITY OF DECISION

By

STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY  
Department of Political Science

DECEMBER 2004

To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of  
STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

---

Chair

---

---

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have been fortunate to receive a great deal of support during the process of completing this project. Social Science Automation graciously provided a one-year academic license for the 'Profiler Plus' textual analysis computer program. My doctoral committee of Andrew Appleton, Lance LeLoup, and Tom Preston (Chair) were a constant source of advice and encouragement. Each brought a different perspective to the project and I always enjoyed discussing the work with them separately and collectively. My mother and father were supportive personally, intellectually and inevitably given the perilous nature of graduate school, financially. My fiancée Brianna Lawrence was a great companion and source of love.

PRIME MINISTER AND CORE EXECUTIVE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY:  
PROCESS, OUTCOME AND QUALITY OF DECISION

Abstract

by Stephen Benedict Dyson, Ph.D.  
Washington State University  
December 2004

Chair: Thomas Preston

While much attention has focused upon the impact of institutional features of governments and individual characteristics of their leaders as separate determinants of foreign policy decisions, relatively little work has combined the two approaches. This is somewhat surprising given the danger of reductionism in studying institutions absent explanations of individual agency, and conversely, of studying important individuals without consideration of the institutional context within which they act.

In this study, I investigate the impact of institutional factors and Prime Ministerial leadership characteristics on the process, outcome, and quality of decision making in British foreign policy. To measure individual characteristics, the universe of Prime Minister responses to foreign policy questions in the House of Commons from 1945-2004 were collected and analyzed by means of computer assisted content analysis. Institutional factors were operationalized through an application of the “core executive” framework developed for the study of British central government. The resulting conceptual model was tested through content analysis of primary source decision making documents concerning the crises involving Korea (1950), Suez (1956), and the Falklands (1982).

Complementary qualitative and quantitative methods were used. The dissertation makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to studies of British and comparative foreign policy, British and comparative executives, elite political psychology, and international relations.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.....	iv
LIST OF TABLES.....	viii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	ix
CHAPTER	
1. INSTITUTIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND FOREIGN POLICY.....	1
Institutions: The Foreign Policy Core Executive.....	3
Individuals: Characteristics of the Prime Minister.....	13
Process, Outcome, and Quality of Decision Making.....	17
Conclusion and Plan of Study.....	20
2. RESEARCH DESIGN FOR A MULTI-METHOD INQUIRY.....	26
Case Selection.....	27
Data Sources.....	29
Qualitative Investigation.....	30
Quantitative Investigation.....	32
Hypotheses.....	41
3. RECOVERING INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS FROM RESPONSES TO PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS... 45	45
The Importance of Leaders.....	46
Leadership Trait Analysis.....	49
Data.....	52
Results.....	54
Conclusions.....	59
4. THE KOREAN CRISIS.....	62
Analytical Narrative of the Crisis.....	66
Explaining the Key Decisions.....	88
Quantitative Analysis.....	91
Conclusion.....	99
5. THE SUEZ CRISIS.....	106
Analytical Narrative of the Crisis.....	110
Explaining the Key Decisions.....	158
Quantitative Analysis.....	163
Conclusion.....	170
6. THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.....	180

Analytical Narrative of the Crisis.....	185
Explaining the Key Decisions.....	206
Quantitative Analysis.....	211
Conclusion.....	219
7. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	228
Discussion and Conclusions.....	250
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	259
APPENDIX	
A. CODE BOOK WITH VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATIONS....	268

## LIST OF TABLES

1. Number of Occasions for Decision by Case.....	41
2. Hypotheses Linking Institutional and Individual variables to quality of decision making.....	42
3. Trait Conceptualization and Coding Rules.....	51
4. Characteristics of Word Files.....	54
5. British Prime Ministers and Reference Group of World Political Leaders.....	55
6. Mean Trait Variable Scores by Prime Minister.....	56
7. One Way ANOVA with Prime Minister as Grouping Variable.....	57
8. Orthogonal Comparisons of Prime Ministers: <i>t</i> -scores.....	59
9. Trait Scores: Clement Attlee.....	64
10. The Core Executive Institution in the Korean Crisis.....	93
11. Impact of Prime Minister in the Korean Crisis.....	95
12. Quality of Decision Making in the Korean Crisis.....	98
13. Chronology of Korean Crisis.....	100
14. Trait Scores: Anthony Eden.....	108
15. The Core Executive Institution in the Suez Crisis.....	164
16. Impact of the Prime Minister in the Suez Crisis.....	166
17. Quality of Decision Making in the Suez Crisis.....	169
18. Chronology of the Suez Crisis.....	171
19. Trait Scores: Margaret Thatcher.....	183
20. The Core Executive Institution in the Falklands Crisis.....	213
21. Impact of the Prime Minister in the Falklands Crisis.....	215
22. Quality of Decision Making in the Falklands Crisis.....	218
23. Chronology of the Falklands Crisis.....	220
24. Cross Case Comparison of Variables.....	229
25. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Quality of Decision Making Factors (Model 1, Tables A-C).....	239
26. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Quality of Decision Making Factors (Model 2, Tables A-C).....	242



## LIST OF FIGURES

1. Prime Minister, Core Executive, and British Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework.....	20
2. Egypt Committee.....	113
3. ODSA: The Falklands 'War Cabinet'.....	194

## CHAPTER ONE: INSTITUTIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

A divide is often posited between individual and institutional modes of analysis in political science. Individualists attribute great importance to the personal characteristics and motivations of prominent actors within the political process. Institutionalists, by contrast, argue that configurations of formal political organizations and informal norms shape and structure interests, behavior and outcomes. This divide has been prevalent in most sub-fields of the discipline, and has certainly been influential in shaping studies of decision making in the British central government. Individualist perspectives informed the long-running and ultimately inconclusive debate concerning the relative distribution of power between Prime Minister and Cabinet, and in particular the question of whether apparent increases in Prime Ministerial power had transformed the British central government into a pseudo-Presidential system<sup>1</sup>. Many of these arguments were centered on the personality and performance of specific Prime Ministers. The “rediscovery of institutions” which swept political science from the mid 1980s onward refocused the debate from the influence of individuals and onto their relative insignificance when set against organizational structures, values and practices which were transmitted from government to government<sup>2</sup>. The strongest version of this argument suggests that political life can be understood as "a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals"<sup>3</sup>.

However, there have been prominent arguments which suggest taking

simultaneously an individual micro perspective and an institutional macro perspective approach to the study of executives and decision making<sup>4</sup>. Many individualists now recognize the significance of institutional factors, and argue that these should be incorporated explicitly into conceptual models. Indeed, Paul 't Hart suggests that a consideration of factors such as institutional norms and structured interactions is critical to a credible account of central government decision making:

Social and political psychologists cannot afford to ignore the broader institutional forces that govern the perceptions, calculations, and behavior of real-world policy makers. They do so at the risk of arriving at reductionist explanations and identifying all sorts of biases, irrationalities, and information-processing pathologies, whereas seasoned observers of organizational and political behavior, who are more aware of meso-level considerations and constraints, and of paradigms of governance that do not accord a central place to its problem-solving and information-processing functions, would find these conclusions to be both overly-simplistic and normatively crude<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, many institutionalists are aware of the converse dangers of structural determinism, and stress that while organizational structures and informal norms constrain actors, these constraints are contingent and partial, and therefore provide opportunities for individual agency<sup>6</sup>. Indeed, March and Olsen indicate a preference for a theory sensitive to "a rather complicated intertwining of institutions, individuals, and events"<sup>7</sup>.

Additionally, as Burch and Holliday argue:

(It is important to) avoid either of the extreme positions which state on the one hand that the individual is the key determinant of political outcomes and on the other that structural factors are decisively important...Individuals occupying positions and having access to resources...operate in structured situations within which constantly shifting opportunities for significant action arise. The key task is to identify the conditions under which individual action can be significant<sup>8</sup>.

This perspective is the basis for the current study. In institutional terms, I adopt the core executive approach to the study of the British central government which has recently come to prominence<sup>9</sup>, specifying the particular form it takes in foreign policy matters. In order to avoid structural determinism, I conceptualize the importance of the

Prime Minister as an individual through an application of “leadership trait analysis”, which identifies individual characteristics with relevance to political decision making. The study investigates the manner in which particular institutional and individual factors shape political processes and outcomes, and add to or detract from the quality of decision making during specific foreign policy episodes<sup>10</sup>.

### **Institutions: The Foreign Policy Core Executive**

The core executive approach conceptualizes the British central government as an interactive and dynamic group of Prime Minister, Ministers, civil servants, advisers, and departments, each constrained by constitutional and situational structures, and each possessed of certain resources and with agency to use them in varying ways. From this perspective, decision making is ill explained by abstractions such as ‘Prime Ministerial’ or ‘Cabinet’ government, as “power is everywhere and understood through the language of dependence, networks, governance, and choice”<sup>11</sup>. In the following, I define the core executive approach more precisely, and elaborate a model of structure, resources, and agency within the area of foreign policy decisions. I argue that while the core executive approach is a highly useful macro-perspective, it requires supplementation with a theory explaining differential strategies of individual agency in order to realize its full explanatory potential.

#### *The Core Executive Defined*

Rhodes defines the core executive as

the complex web of institutions, networks and practices surrounding the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Cabinet committees and their official counterparts, less formalised ministerial ‘clubs’ of meetings, bilateral negotiations and interdepartmental committees. It also

includes coordinating departments, chiefly the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the law officers, and the security and intelligence services<sup>12</sup>

The various parts of the core executive have fluid relationships to one another. Crucially, each has resources (information, authority, control of an organization, finance), but none has the resources to achieve their goals unilaterally. This means that the core executive is characterized by an irreducible mutual dependence. The dependence-dynamics and wider operation of the executive are determined by three factors: the *structure* of the interaction between parts of the core executive; the *resources* possessed by each part of the executive; and the manner in which the various actors exercise individual *agency*, both in using their resources and acting to increase them<sup>13</sup>. Crucially, there is not one constant core executive but rather "a differentiated model in which the relevant executive varies over both time and policy area"<sup>14</sup>. Determining the composition and the dynamics of the core executive in each policy area is therefore a crucial task.

Previous studies of the British core executive have focused primarily on domestic policy. However, a significant body of recent research within the field of foreign policy analysis has successfully applied an essentially institutionalist approach to foreign policy making in several political systems<sup>15</sup>. This suggests that an adaptation of the core executive approach to British foreign policy making should be fruitful. The foreign policy core executive in Britain is composed of different actors and exhibits different resource-distributions than the domestic policy core executives. Firstly, we would expect Prime Ministerial prominence in the foreign policy core executive<sup>16</sup>. The nature of foreign policy, especially during crisis periods, imbues Prime Ministers with a degree of control unequalled in routine domestic policy matters<sup>17</sup>. However, the foreign policy core executive will still exhibit the fundamental dependence-relationships of other issue-areas,

as the Prime Minister is in all events "dependent on others for advice, information, assistance and support in making policy"<sup>18</sup>. The crucial relationship in terms of authority will be between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, both, in core executive terms, "resource-laden individuals". Exploring the foreign policy core executive in greater depth requires addressing questions of structure, resources, and agency.

### *Structure*

The structure of the core executive includes both its constituent organizational parts and a series of formal and informal rules and norms. These structural factors shape the resources available to core executive actors and condition the options which can be employed in their service. They therefore act both to constrain and to enable.

The primary organizational forums for foreign policy core executive decision making are the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet committees. The treatment of issues varies according to which of these bodies considers the issue and which is the ultimate site of decision. The full Cabinet is populated by actors of independent political stature, representing divergent interests within the government<sup>19</sup>. Consequently, we should expect the organizational influence of extensive discussion and decision making in the full Cabinet to be felt in the presence of a variety of views and the possibilities of policy outputs being the result of compromises between powerful core executive actors. Sub-Cabinet committees are, however, empowered to take many decisions in their own right. Cabinet committees are smaller forums for policy analysis and decision, and their size, composition, and remit is often decided, or at least heavily influenced, by the Prime Minister<sup>20</sup>. As Giddens notes, Cabinet committees are "a useful management tool for the

Prime Minister, whose responsibility it is to decide which committees shall be established, what shall be referred to them and, perhaps most crucially of all, who is to serve on them and by whom they will be chaired"<sup>21</sup>. The organizational influence of extensive discussion and decision making in sub-Cabinet level committees is likely to be a greater homogeneity of views and specialization of membership, perhaps allowing for more focused deliberations, but which considers a narrower range of viewpoints and interests.

A range of organizations also exist within the core executive whose primary focus is not primarily policy decision making, but rather the gathering of information, the generation of options, and the monitoring of decision implementation. The Prime Ministers' office is an informational and procedural hub at the center of the core executive<sup>22</sup>. The Prime Minister's office is comprised of a small cadre of civil servants responsible for gathering information from the various departments of government, transmitting the wishes of the premier into the Whitehall machine, and advising the Prime Minister on policy matters<sup>23</sup>. The office is made up of four sections: the press office, responsible for media relations, the political office, responsible for party relations, the private office, with responsibility for Prime Ministerial communications with the departments, and the policy unit, intended to provide the Prime Minister with advice on policy issues percolating within the government. The latter two (private office and policy unit) are of particular interest here. The private office organizes the flow of information to and from the Prime Minister. Information coming from the Cabinet office and directly from the departments is filtered and selected for Prime Ministerial attention, and, once reviewed, the Prime Minister's views on the material are transmitted. Further, the private

office, and particularly the principle private secretary, fulfill a 'gatekeeper' function in deciding (within certain limits) who gets to see the PM and when<sup>24</sup>. The policy unit was formally established by Harold Wilson in 1974 in order to provide the Prime Minister with personal advice independent from both other ministers and the civil service per se<sup>25</sup>. Prime Ministers have latitude to appoint special advisers within the policy unit on the basis of a particular competence or a close personal relationship, and these advisers generally have access to the information available to the Prime Minister<sup>26</sup>.

The Cabinet office is to the Cabinet as a whole as the PM's office is to the Prime Minister personally. As such, the Cabinet Office organizes the flow of information into the Cabinet and its committees, and records and transmits the decisions of the Cabinet back to the rest of government<sup>27</sup>. However, although responsible to the Cabinet as a whole, the Cabinet Office is most closely tied to the chair of the Cabinet- the Prime Minister. The Cabinet secretariat, divided into sections responsible for major policy areas, provides a further opportunity for the Prime Minister to gather information and transmit preferences<sup>28</sup>. The difference between the private office and the Cabinet Office is that the Prime Minister receives support as an individual through the private office, and receives support as a manager of government business through the Cabinet office<sup>29</sup>. In terms of organizational influences, these institutions offer important resources of analysis and monitoring. Therefore, when policy proceeds openly through these institutional mechanisms, we should expect a greater degree of professional analysis, a more thorough consideration of alternatives and consequences, and a greater degree of contingency planning and monitoring procedures to be developed.

Core executive relations are also structured by the formal and informal rules and



norms of the central state<sup>30</sup>. These rules are a central feature of institutional analysis, and not only constrain in negative terms but also structure action in a positive sense, as they are internalized by actors through processes of socialization<sup>31</sup>. As Burch and Holliday note, "like other established institutions, the British central executive has developed accepted modes of behaviour, which limit options available to individuals". Although these modes of behavior "shape and steer" core executive operations, however, a space for individual agency is reserved: "rules are always partial, and the process of applying them is always compromised. Scope for individual initiative always exists"<sup>32</sup>. The Prime Minister is constrained in general terms to secure Cabinet consent to major foreign policy actions, although this could consist of a spectrum of actions ranging from full consultation and acceptance of Cabinet will to the use of Cabinet as merely a rubber-stamp on decisions made elsewhere. The support of the parliamentary party is desirable but not immediately essential, although the Prime Minister will pay a political price in the future for unpopular or ill-fated foreign actions<sup>33</sup>.

More specifically, several important norms are associated with the British core executive, and are stable features of its operation. When these norms are regarded as particularly relevant and are invoked either tacitly or explicitly, they can have a substantial effect on the nature of decision making. Crucially important is the norm of central state secrecy<sup>34</sup>. When this norm is strongly in evidence, decision making takes on a more closed character, consultation is more narrow, and access to information becomes restricted to only a few core executive actors. Secondly, the norm of collective Cabinet responsibility can be extremely important in shaping decision making. This practice holds that while disagreement between ministers over policy is legitimate in private and prior to

a decision point, the decision that emerges cannot be dissented from in public or in Parliament - ministers must either support the decision or resign<sup>35</sup>. This norm, when prominent, leads in the happiest scenario to a genuinely unified government policy, but also has the potential to hinder the reconsideration of a failing policy and compel ministers to subsume their private doubts beneath a facade of consensus.

In external terms, the world situation acts as a constraint on Prime Ministerial freedom of action. Domestically, the preferences of extra-governmental actors towards foreign policy may have to be considered<sup>36</sup>. The relative power of the Prime Minister's state<sup>37</sup>, the distribution of power within the international system<sup>38</sup>, the threats facing the state<sup>39</sup>, binding treaty or institutional commitments<sup>40</sup>, and accepted norms of behavior in international society<sup>41</sup> all shape the range of the possible and the desirable.

### *Resources*

While structure conditions the Prime Minister's relationships with the core executive and their range of options, it is not determinative<sup>42</sup>. Indeed, the structure of the British core executive provides the Prime Minister with a great reserve of resources to utilize as they will. As Shell notes, "the office itself has no formal definition, as might be provided by a written constitution...There are certain duties a Prime Minister must carry out, but beyond that the job is very much what they make of it- and what their colleagues will allow them to make of it"<sup>43</sup>.

The relative resources of core executive actors vary according to the issue area under consideration<sup>44</sup>. In foreign policy as in other areas, the Prime Minister is the most "resource-laden" core executive actor. Of course, the Prime Minister is the beneficiary of

the organizational capacity offered by the PM's office and the Cabinet office. However, institutions of the central government provide important bureaucratic capacity to all prominent core executive actors, differentially advantaging the Prime Minister but also providing resources to other Cabinet Ministers. In particular, the Foreign Secretary has a large specialized foreign policy bureaucracy at his disposal as well as the normative presumption that he will be involved in foreign policy decisions.

A series of additional resources are available to the Prime Minister in foreign policy terms. Firstly, they have the right to intervene directly and take control of foreign policy matters, or to allow the Foreign Secretary and Cabinet to make most policy. As Shell notes, Prime Ministers have large discretion in determining their degree of activity versus passivity:

On the one hand, they can choose to become 'workaholics', attempting to inform themselves about everything and intervening in as many decisions as possible...On the other hand, a Prime Minister could conceivably sit back and let ministers get on with reaching decisions, while as Prime Minister fulfilling a head of government role, making ministerial appointments and chairing Cabinet<sup>45</sup>

Sir Philip de Zulueta, a former private secretary to three Prime Ministers, attributes this discretion to the earlier noted lack of a formal 'job description' for the office: "...while not directly responsible for anything, they are indirectly responsible for everything, and can meddle in anything they choose"<sup>46</sup>.

The Prime Minister also possesses resources deriving from patronage, in particular the power of appointment over key ministries. A Prime Minister can appoint a political ally in a key position in order to exert influence over policy in that area, or, alternatively, appoint a 'weak' or deferential minister likely to exercise limited independence from the Prime Minister. However, discretion in appointments is limited as

Prime Ministers' also have to take into account a basic level of ministerial competence and the independent political bases which certain individuals will have accrued, giving the individual concerned leverage in picking their posting and acting somewhat autonomously once in Cabinet<sup>47</sup>.

A further resource available to the Prime Minister is to attempt to determine the location and composition of the primary decision making group. As noted earlier, Prime Ministers can either use the Cabinet as a genuine decision making body, have major discussions on significant issues with all its members, and abide by the consensus views of the Cabinet, or else reach decisions in smaller groups or individually with the responsible minister, thereby reducing Cabinet to the role of providing a 'rubber stamp'<sup>48</sup>. However, Prime Ministers do not have an entirely free hand in these matters, and are usually compelled to involve the Foreign Secretary and key Cabinet colleagues even when the Prime Minister is in a politically powerful position.

Due to the irreducible mutual dependency of core executive relations, wherein every actor has some resources but none has sufficient resources to achieve their goals unilaterally, the question of the precise distribution of resources and the manner in which they are used during a particular episode is a crucial variable in understanding decision making. We would expect a politically strong Prime Minister to operate much more independently of other core executive actors in comparison with a weak Prime Minister more immediately dependent on the support of others. The presence, in the foreign policy core executive, of two heavily resource-laden actors (the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary) makes the relationship between the two significant. A Foreign Secretary at odds with the Prime Minister in policy terms and with independent resources can act as

an important influence on the decision making process, compelling the Prime Minister to compromise or generating a more conflictual policy dynamic. However, all core executive actors have some resources, and so the potential exists for manipulation, alliance forming, tactical information sharing/ withholding, and other intensely *political* core executive maneuverings<sup>49</sup>.

### *Agency*

While the core executive perspective attributes a large role to structurally-given resources and structural constraints, it also allows a significant role for individual agency. Indeed, the manner in which a Prime Minister chooses to deploy the resources available to them in coordinating the core executive is crucial to understand. As Smith states, even "when faced with what are seen as irreducible structural forces, there is still room for maneuver, and structural forces provide opportunities as well as constraints"<sup>50</sup>. Prime Ministers employ different strategies and tactics as they utilize their resources in a given structural situation. Indeed, differences in Prime Ministerial usage of resources are observable even on casual analysis. As Smith notes: "the three most recent Prime Ministers have had very different strategies and tactics. Thatcher's strategy was generally interventionist, Major was more collectivist, and Blair's appears directive"<sup>51</sup>. This perspective accords with other accounts of the British executive. King comments that "the Prime Ministership is a highly dynamic office. The people who hold it vary wildly in operating style, and in the purposes to which they wish to put the office"<sup>52</sup> and, as J.M. Lee notes, "similar situations are dealt with differently by different Prime Ministers"<sup>53</sup>. Moreover, Prime Ministers, as "reflexive agents", can actually change the structure around them and create

new structures for their successors- as one Prime Minister's agency translates into the next's structure<sup>54</sup>.

The place reserved for individual agency within the core executive perspective allows, as illustrated in depth below, the application of the body of work in foreign policy analysis concerned with making the case that "who leads matters"<sup>55</sup>.

### **Individuals: Characteristics of the Prime Minister**

The core executive perspective requires supplementation with a theory explaining variation in individual agency, in short: an individualist perspective. The danger absent this is that core executive accounts of agency are either reductionist or narrative and ad hoc, preventing the approach from realizing its full potential. Indeed, there is recognition from core executive scholars that the approach can benefit from an application of theories focused on the characteristics of individuals: "The systematic analysis of leadership influences is still in its infancy in the UK....There is no equivalent to the sophisticated analysis of how leadership personality transmutes into characteristic institutional and policy styles which figure large in accounts of the US presidency"<sup>56</sup>.

The field of elite assessment has sought to incorporate psychological theory into the study of political behavior, usually although not exclusively in foreign policy decision making contexts<sup>57</sup>. Winter has distinguished three main lines of research in this approach to political "personality"<sup>58</sup>. Firstly, "traits" are "the public, observable element of personality, the consistencies of style readily noticed by other people"<sup>59</sup>. Secondly, "motives", which "involve anticipation and pursuit, over time, of goals or desired end

states", or avoidance of undesired end states<sup>60</sup>. Finally, "cognitions" consist of "a wide variety of mental representations, schemas, models, categories, beliefs, values, and attitudes"<sup>61</sup>.

Eschewing single-variable approaches, Margaret G. Hermann has developed a multivariate scheme of elite political propensities<sup>62</sup>. Hermann argued that several different motivational, cognitive, and trait variables could be combined into assessments of political "personality". This approach was chosen as the basis for the assessment of individual influences in this study for three reasons. Firstly, the approach utilizes insight from studies of individuals *qua* individuals (based in psychology), but does not import these insights directly into political science. Rather, the categories and concepts suggested by psychological studies were refined by Hermann to relate directly to essentially political questions of choice propensity, information need, and prioritization of goals. Secondly, there is a large base of research literature employing this approach which has established the validity of the theoretical scheme<sup>63</sup>. Finally, as introduced in chapter three, a content analysis measurement scheme accompanies the theoretical framework, providing reliable, quantified data relating to Hermann's variables. Hermann specified seven variables of interest which broadly determine a leader's individual political identity. *Belief in ability to control events* refers to the leader's cognitive representation of the political world as amenable to manipulation versus driven by broad impersonal forces<sup>64</sup>. Political leaders who believe they can control events tend to formulate policy in a proactive manner, seeing a utility payoff in doing so. *Conceptual Complexity* refers to "the degree of differentiation an individual shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things"<sup>65</sup>. Those higher in conceptual

complexity are more sensitive to multiple policy dimensions and complex value trade offs than those lower in this trait. They are also more attentive to contextual information concerning a political situation, and will seek information from a wider range of sources than those lower in complexity. *Distrust of others* indicates the degree to which an individual suspects the motives of others in the political world. Individuals higher in distrust of others are prone to developing non-falsifiable enemy images<sup>66</sup>, and are also more susceptible to an acute form of the fundamental attribution error, wherein the actions of others are attributed to their unconstrained choices rather than situationally-determined imperatives. *In-Group Bias* draws from group theory the presumption that certain individuals relate very strongly to a particular group, often the nation, and elevate this group to high levels of morality and achievement, with an accompanying denigration of "out groups". Those higher in this trait identify more closely with the relevant in group and are prone to developing political viewpoints revolving around out group machinations and scape-goating. *Need for Power* "indicates a desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups"<sup>67</sup>. Political leaders higher in need for power have been found to prefer a more hierarchical decision making process, and maintain a greater degree of personal involvement throughout policy making than leaders lower in need for power<sup>68</sup>. *Self Confidence* indicates an individual's sense of efficacy in relation to the tasks they are expected to perform<sup>69</sup>. Political leaders higher in self confidence trust their own judgment over that of others, and may persist in a failing course of action for longer than leaders lower in self confidence. Finally, *Task Orientation* measures the degree to which leaders are motivated by completion of the task at hand versus maintenance of harmony among colleagues<sup>70</sup>.



Several studies have sought to link these variables to political outcomes in terms of leader orientation to foreign policy and executive leadership style. Margaret G. Hermann specified a framework for linking combinations of her seven-trait scheme to the foreign policy orientation of the individual leader, which, if the leader was sufficiently powerful, would find expression in the actual foreign policy pursued by the state. Hermann argued that foreign policy orientation was characterized by three factors: 'responsiveness to constraints' (determined by 'need for power' and 'belief in ability to control events' scores); 'openness to information' (determined by 'conceptual complexity' and 'self confidence' scores) and 'motivation for leadership' (determined by 'task focus' scores). Hermann's aim was to develop a leader characteristics to policy outcome linkage, arguing that combinations of these variables would determine the goals and strategies of the foreign policy of the state<sup>71</sup>.

Thomas Preston found that several of Hermann's variables predicted leadership style in policy decision making contexts<sup>72</sup>. Preston argued that measurement of the conceptual complexity and need for power scores of leaders, when combined with a measure of political experience, allowed for a composite typology of leader impact on executive operations to be developed. The degree of centralization of decision making, receptivity to information, and level of policy conflict within 'inner circles', were hypothesized to be impacted by leadership style defined in these terms. Preston found support for his typology in a study of crucial decision making episodes in modern American Presidential administrations.

The underlying presumption of this individualist approach is that in political affairs, actors vary in decision propensities, information needs, and goal rankings, and

that this variation is significant to political processes and outcomes. As Fred I. Greenstein succinctly states, "different individuals, in the same situation, act differently", a condition referred to as "actor dispensability". Greenstein continues with a qualification termed "action dispensability": For this variation to be of interest to political explanation, the individual has to be important to the political phenomena in question<sup>73</sup>. The desirability of combining the institutional and individual approach is that institutional factors structure problems and decisions, and additionally provide opportunities for individuals to be causally significant, while individual factors determine whether and how these opportunities are taken. Separately, the institutional approach directly addresses the issue of "action dispensability", but fails to address the question of "actor dispensability". The reverse is true for the elite assessment approach.

### **Process, Outcome and Quality of Decision Making**

This study posits that institutional factors delineated by the core executive approach combine with the characteristics of the Prime Minister to determine processes, outcomes, and quality of decision making in British foreign policy. In terms of processes and outcomes, conceptual linkages with institutional and individual factors were elaborated above and are operationalized more fully in chapter two.

In terms of quality of decision making, several studies have identified key tasks of decision making<sup>74</sup>. Patrick Haney has specified a compound, simplified model of these decision making tasks, which draws heavily on Irving Janis' work. Haney suggests several key tasks to be fulfilled: 1) *A survey and specification of objectives the policy is designed to meet*. Is there an explicit consideration of the importance of clear objectives


and an effort to specify them? Are the range of objectives shared with all relevant parties, including the leader, or are some objectives kept secret or left implicit? 2) *Canvassing alternative policy responses*. How full are the range of alternatives considered? Does a consensus form quickly around a single alternative to the point where other reasonable options do not receive attention? Do initially rejected options receive reconsideration? 3) *Information Search*. Is there reliance on a single source of information or multiple sources? Is there an attempt to search out new information, or a satisfaction with a limited amount of information? 4) *Acceptance of new information*. Is there an effective response to new information, updating evaluations of the situation and existing policies? Or is information processed in a biased fashion, whereby information congruent with existing perceptions is accepted readily, but information at odds with existing perceptions is discounted? 5) *Evaluate the costs, risks, and implications of the preferred policy choice*. Is a favored option subject to stringent cost/ benefit analysis, with full recognition of its undesirable aspects? Is there a conscious and systematic attempt to predict the implications of the policy choice?

These categories recommend themselves as being mutually exclusive and largely exhaustive, based in existing studies of quality of decision making, and having intuitive links to the institutional and individual factors introduced earlier. For example, consider the bureaucratic capacity afforded by the Prime Minister's office, Cabinet office, and Whitehall machinery. With extensive use made of this civil service machinery, one might expect professional and impartial consideration of a full range of policy objectives and alternatives, a full and thorough information search, an unbiased and explicit evaluation of the costs and risks associated with policy options, and the development of appropriate

implementation, monitoring, and contingency mechanisms. However, as illustrated in the conceptual discussion, there are several institutional and individual factors which may prevent full use of this bureaucratic capacity being made, or may prevent the usage of options and information generated in an optimal fashion.

## Conclusion and Plan of the Study

FIGURE 1: PRIME MINISTER, CORE EXECUTIVE, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.



The perspectives drawn together in this chapter compliment one another: The core executive approach provides a macro-framework, highlighting the importance of actors in situations of mutually-dependent interaction, structured by formal and informal rules and norms, which both constrain and condition behavior and provide resources which are at the disposal of actors. However, the core executive approach allows that structures and rules are always partial, and that substantial potential exists for individual agency. The elite assessment approach offers a theoretical account and measurement procedure for understanding and recovering evidence of differential strategies of individual agency, thereby adding to the explanatory precision of the core executive approach. The resulting

model indicates the manner in which institutional factors and individual traits shape the process, outcome, and quality of decision making (Figure 1).

The remainder of this study seeks to elaborate and test this framework. *Chapter two* develops a research design for a multi-method inquiry into these conceptual relationships. A qualitative design is specified for illuminating the linkage between institutions, individuals, processes and outcomes. A quantitative design is specified for measuring the relationship between the institutional and individual factors and quality of decision making variables. *Chapter three* applies Hermann's LTA technique to post-1945 British Prime Ministers, utilizing responses to Parliamentary foreign policy questions in order to generate data on their individual characteristics. These data provide a basis for empirical study of the impact of the Prime Minister on decision making in the subsequent chapters, as well as representing a substantial application of the technique in and of itself. *Chapter four* is an empirical application of the conceptual framework and data on individual characteristics to decision making during the Korean war crisis. *Chapter five* examines decision making during the Suez crisis, and *Chapter six* examines core executive and Prime Ministerial performance during the Falklands crisis policy making episode. Finally, *Chapter seven* reports a cross-case analysis of the data generated in the previous chapters, highlights the major findings, and specifies implications of the study for the analysis of foreign policy and potential avenues of future research.

---

<sup>1</sup> For Prime ministerial dominance, see Richard H. S. Crossman, *The Myths of Cabinet Government*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). Phillip Madgwick, *British Government: The Central Executive Territory*, (London: Phillip Allen, 1991). For Cabinet government, see Phillip Norton, "Prime Ministerial Power". *Social Studies Review* 3 (1988): 108-115. A. H. Brown, "Prime Ministerial Power (Part I)", *Public Law* (1968a): 28-51; A. H. Brown, "Prime Ministerial Power (Part II)", *Public Law Review* (1968b): 106-118; Harold Wilson, *The Governance of Britain*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976).

<sup>2</sup> James P. March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: Free Press, 1989. Terry M. Moe, "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory", in *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, eds G. Edwards, J. Kessel, and B. Rockman, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 337-385; Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective". *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1988): 66-94.

<sup>3</sup> James P. March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life". *The American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 741.

<sup>4</sup> Anthony King, "Executives" in *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol.5, ed. F. Greenstein and N. Polsby. (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975): 173-255; Pika, Joseph. "Moving Beyond the Oval Office: Problems in Studying the Presidency" *Congress and the Presidency* 9 (1981-1982): 17-36; Edwards, George C. and Wayne, Stephen J. *Studying the Presidency*. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983); R.A.W. Rhodes, "From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive", in *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive*, eds R.A.W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, (London: Macmillan, 1995): 11-37.

<sup>5</sup> Paul t'Hart, *Groupthink in Government*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994), x.

<sup>6</sup> Michael J. Hill, *The Sociology of Public Administration* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972).

<sup>7</sup> March and Olsen, "The New Institutionalism", 740.

<sup>8</sup> Mark Burch and Ian Holliday, *The British Cabinet System*. (New York: Prentice Hall 1996), 150

<sup>9</sup> Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W Rhodes, "Core Executive Studies in Britain". *Public Administration* 68 (1990): 3-28. R.A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, *Prime Minister, Cabinet, and Core Executive*. (London: Macmillan, 1995); Martin J. Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, (London: Macmillan, 1999).

<sup>10</sup> Patrick J. Haney, *Organizing for Foreign Policy Crisis*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Irving Janis and Leon Mann, *Decisionmaking*. (New York: Free Press, 1977); Gregory M. Herek, Irving L. Janis and Paul Huth, "Decision Making During International Crisis: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (1987): 203-26.

<sup>11</sup> Smith, xv

<sup>12</sup> Rhodes, 1995: 12

<sup>13</sup> Smith, 1-6.

<sup>14</sup> Rhodes, 1995: 26; Burch and Holliday, 5.

<sup>15</sup> Mark Bovens and Paul t'Hart, *Understanding Policy Fiascoes*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1996; t'Hart, *Groupthink in Government*; Uriel Rosenthal, Paul t'Hart and

---

Alexander Kouzmin, "The Bureaupolitics of Crisis Management". *Public Administration* 69 (1991): 211-233; see also symposium edited by Eric Stern and Bertjan Verbeek, "Whither the Study of Governmental Politics", *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42 (1998).

<sup>16</sup> Dunleavy and Rhodes, 13; Smith, 77.

<sup>17</sup> William Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975); Burch and Holliday, 146.

<sup>18</sup> Smith, 77

<sup>19</sup> see Burch and Holliday; Peter Hennessey, *Cabinet*. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

<sup>20</sup> Smith, 169.

<sup>21</sup> Phillip Giddens, "Prime Minister and Cabinet" in *Churchill to Major: The British Prime Ministership since 1945*, ed D. Shell and R. Hodder-Williams (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 43.

<sup>22</sup> Norman Fowler, *Ministers Decide: A Personal Memoir of the Thatcher Years*, (Chapman, London, 1991); Nigel Lawson, *The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical*, (Bantam: London, 1993); James Prior, *A Balance of Power*, (Hamish Hamilton: London, 1986); Hugo Young, *One of Us*, (Macmillan: London, 1991).

<sup>23</sup> J.M. Lee, G.W Jones and June Burnham, *At the Centre of Whitehall*, (London: Macmillan, 1998), 41-68

<sup>24</sup> Burch, *The Prime Minister and Whitehall*, 115-117.

<sup>25</sup> see David Willetts, "The Role of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit", *Public Administration* 65 (1987): 443-452; Lee, Jones and Burnham, 100-130

<sup>26</sup> Smith, 173; Lee, Jones and Burnham, 101

<sup>27</sup> Lee, Jones and Burnham, 154-185

<sup>28</sup> Smith, 162-166

<sup>29</sup> Lee, Jones and Burnham, 25

<sup>30</sup> Smith, 79; Burch and Holliday, 48-64

<sup>31</sup> see March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*.

<sup>32</sup> Burch and Holliday, 48-49

<sup>33</sup> Burch and Holliday, 135-141

<sup>34</sup> John F. McEldowney, *Public Law*, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994), 275; Clive Ponting, *Whitehall: Tragedy and Force*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986); Peter Hennessey, *Whitehall*, (London: Fontana, 1990).

<sup>35</sup> Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure for Ministers*, (London: HMSO, 1992).

<sup>36</sup> Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

<sup>37</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946).

<sup>38</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979).

<sup>39</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

<sup>40</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

<sup>41</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

<sup>42</sup> Smith, 83.



- 
- <sup>43</sup> Donald Shell, "The Office of the Prime Minister" in *Churchill to Major: The British Prime Ministership Since 1945*, ed D. Shell and R. Hodder-Williams, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 16
- <sup>44</sup> Burch and Holliday, 46
- <sup>45</sup> Shell, 16-17
- <sup>46</sup> quoted in Richard Rose, "British Government: The Job at the Top" in *Presidents and Prime Ministers*, ed. R. Rose and E. Suleiman, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980): 33; see also Burch, *The Prime Minister and Whitehall*, 106.
- <sup>47</sup> Burch, *The Prime Minister and Whitehall*, 108
- <sup>48</sup> see Hennessey, 1986; Patrick Gordon-Walker, *The Cabinet*, (London: Cape, 1972): 87-89.
- <sup>49</sup> Paul D. Hoyt and Jean A. Garrison, "Political Manipulation Within the Small Group: Foreign Policy Advisers in the Carter Administration" in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking*, ed. P. t'Hart, E.K. Stern, and B. Sundelius, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
- <sup>50</sup> Smith, 85
- <sup>51</sup> Smith, 88
- <sup>52</sup> Anthony King, "Introduction: The Textbook Prime Ministership" in *The British Prime Minister*, ed A. King, (London: Macmillan, 1985): 6.
- <sup>53</sup> Lee, 241
- <sup>54</sup> Smith, 80.
- <sup>55</sup> Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980); Thomas Preston, *The President and His Inner Circle*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); see more generally Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization*, (Chicago: Markham, 1969).
- <sup>56</sup> Rhodes, 1995: 23.
- <sup>57</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*. (New York: Free Press, 1962) Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Man-Milieu Relationships Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965)
- <sup>58</sup> David G. Winter, "Personality and Political Behavior" in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds D.O. Sears, L. Huddy and R. Jervis, (New York: Oxford, 2003): 115-116.
- <sup>59</sup> see Lloyd Etheridge, "Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory", *American Political Science Review* 72 (1978): 434-451; Robert R. McCrae and Phillip T. Costa, Jr. "Personality Trait Structure as a Human Universal", *American Psychologist* 52 (1997): 509-516. 1997; for elite assessment using trait-based concepts.
- <sup>60</sup> see David G Winter, "What Makes the Candidates Run?", *Psychology Today*: 46-49; Winter, "Leader Appeal, Leader Performance, and the Motive Profiles of Leaders and Followers: A Study of American Presidents and Elections", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (1987): 196-202; Winter, "Presidential Psychology and Governing

---

Styles: A Comparative Psychological Analysis of the 1992 Presidential Candidates” in *The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing and the Psychology of Leadership* ed. S.A. Renshon, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995): 113-134, for elite assessment using motive-based concepts.

<sup>61</sup> see Robert Axelrod, *The Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Drawing Policy Implications from the “Operational Code” of a ‘New’ Political Actor: Russian President Vladimir Putin”, *Policy Sciences* 34 (2001): 329-346; Stephen G. Walker, “The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger’s Operational Code and the Vietnam War”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21 (1977): 129-168, for elite assessment using cognition-based concepts.

<sup>62</sup> Margaret G. Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders”, *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (1980): 7-46; Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis” in *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, ed. J.M. Post (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003): 178-214.

<sup>63</sup> See Stephen Benedict Dyson and Libia Lorena Billordo, “Using Words as Data in the Study of the French Political Elite”, *French Politics* 2 (2004): 111-123 for a review.

<sup>64</sup> Alexander L. George, “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Leadership and Decision-Making”, *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (1969): 190-222.

<sup>65</sup> Hermann, *Assessing Leadership Style*, 195

<sup>66</sup> Ole Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy” in *Enemies in Politics*, eds D. Finlay, O. Holsti and R. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962): 25-96.

<sup>67</sup> Hermann, *Assessing Leadership Style*, 190.

<sup>68</sup> see Preston, *The President and His Inner Circle*.

<sup>69</sup> Robert C. Ziller, *The Social Self* (New York: Pergamon, 1977)

<sup>70</sup> Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style”, 197-198.

<sup>71</sup> See Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style”.

<sup>72</sup> see Preston, *The President and His Inner Circle*.

<sup>73</sup> Greenstein, 47.

<sup>74</sup> George, *Presidential Decisionmaking*; Herek, Janis and Huth, *Decisionmaking During International Crisis*; Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982) and Janis, *Crucial Decisions*, (New York: Free Press, 1989); Janis and Mann, *Decisionmaking*.

## **CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN FOR A MULTIMETHOD INQUIRY**

This chapter presents a research design for measuring institutional and individual effects on the process, outcome, and quality of foreign policy decision making in Britain. The research design is multi-method, involving both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis proceeds according to Alexander George's method of "structured, focused" comparison of cases, and allows for the 'process tracing' of individual and institutional variables to policy outcomes. The quantitative analysis relies upon the generation of multiple observations within each case by a division of the case into sequential units and the collection of data for each one. The quantitative analysis is focused more closely on establishing multivariate causal linkages with quality of decision making variables, and allows for cross-case analysis. However, while the focus of the two approaches differs slightly, the qualitative and quantitative analyses are complementary, providing greater depth of analysis than a mono-method quantitative design and greater precision in multivariate estimation than a mono-method qualitative design. This chapter firstly establishes the aspects of research design which are held in common across the two methods: conceptual framework, case selection, data sources. Secondly, the qualitative mode of investigation is specified. Thirdly, the procedures allowing for quantitative investigation are detailed.

### **Conceptual framework**

Both aspects of the study have a common focus: the conceptual framework developed in chapter one. Expressed more precisely as a research question, this study seeks to establish *the relative causal weight of institutional factors of the British foreign policy core*

*executive and individual characteristics of the British Prime Minister on the process, outcomes, and quality of foreign policy decision making in Great Britain.*

### **Case selection**

The three policy decision episodes selected for investigation are the decision to support US intervention in Korea, 1950; the decision to launch military operations against Egypt following the nationalization of the Suez canal, 1956; and the decision to forcibly reverse the Argentinean occupation of the Falkland Islands, 1982.

To select these decision making episodes, a deliberative, rather than random, case selection procedure was adopted. Indeed, under the circumstances of this study, with an  $n$  of 3 for the qualitative section and an  $n$  of  $< 100$  for the quantitative section, a random selection procedure can lead to more validity problems than a careful, deliberative approach<sup>1</sup>. Researchers working under these circumstances have specified several important case selection criteria, and I shall endeavor to show that these were followed to the best possible extent in case selection for this study:

1) Selection should allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable: Causal inference is impossible without letting the dependent variable vary<sup>2</sup>. In some respects, this poses a problem for our case selection, at least as it relates to the policy outcome variable: Korea, Suez and the Falklands all involved some military action on the part of the United Kingdom. However, in most crucial respects, these cases differ considerably on many dimensions. Korea involved a reluctant UK agreeing to military action largely for reasons based upon the pressure of others (particularly the US); Suez and the Falklands were instances of the UK launching action disapproved of, to various

degrees, by others (again, especially the US). Suez involved a long diplomatic phase, Korea and the Falklands involved committing forces very shortly after the crisis began and in some senses the subordination of diplomacy to an operational timetable. Suez was considered a fiasco, the Falklands a success, and Korea varied between triumph and disaster over the course of the crisis. Moreover, the cases vary much more considerably in terms of the other dependent variables. Process was very different in the Korean crisis, dominated by open, Cabinet level decision making, than in the Suez crisis, which became dominated by increasing secrecy, and the Falklands crisis, managed largely through a small “War Cabinet”. Further, the quality of decision making can be expected to (and indeed, did) vary across the cases.

2) Selection should be made to ensure variation in key explanatory variables. As King, Keohane, and Verba note, “the best intentional design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable without regard to the values of dependent variables”<sup>3</sup>. In this study, the cases were selected to ensure variation in one key set of explanatory variables: the individual characteristics of Prime Ministers. The precise values of the institutional explanatory variables could not be ascertained prior to the investigation of the cases themselves, and so variation in that set of factors was assumed rather than guaranteed.

3) Pragmatic considerations of availability of evidence must be taken into account<sup>4</sup>. The evidence required to determine the values of the key variables in this study is quite detailed. As explained below, primary source archival documents relating to the policy process are the most valuable source of evidence, but these are available only after 30 years under British secrecy laws, and in any case require supplementation with secondary

source accounts of events. This necessitates that foreign policy episodes be selected which have received extensive attention in the research literature, and upon which multiple sources of evidence are available. This desiderum is best satisfied by a selection rule which dictates the choice of only important foreign policy episodes which have received an amount of scholarly attention. Such is certainly the case in the Korean, Suez, and Falklands cases.

### **Data Sources**

The most valuable source of data for this project are primary source inner government documents such as Cabinet minutes, papers of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and civil service reports. Unfortunately, under the thirty years rule these types of documents are not available for cases after 1974 as of the time of writing. However, the case selection rule of only choosing important foreign policy episodes ensures that a substantial body of secondary source materials, detailed in accounts of central government decision making, exists. Data sources for the study are therefore a mix of primary source documents, collected from the Public Records Office (PRO) in Kew (London), and secondary source accounts.

Primary source documents were collected during an extended summer 2003 research trip to the Public Records Office. Preparation for the trip involved the construction of detailed chronologies of the policy cases to be studied, allowing basic investigator familiarity with the events. This allowed for the more efficient identification of relevant documents during the limited time available on site at the Kew archives. Additionally, correspondence with PRO archivists prior to the trip allowed the

identification of key series of documents which would bear directly on the research questions. Across the cases, Cabinet minutes; papers of the Prime Minister; and papers of the foreign office were found to contain evidence of the individual and institutional dynamics of decision making. Where a sub-Cabinet committee was involved in decisions, records of its meetings were also collected. Consultation with archivists established that most other PRO series, such as Ministry of Defence papers, would be primarily operational in nature and thus little help in estimating the political dynamics which are the subject of this study.

There is some precedent for utilizing secondary sources in order to supplement primary archival documents and in order to extend the range of cases which can be included in a case survey design<sup>5</sup>. The secondary sources used here were selected in order to be authoritative accounts of the political aspects of the episode under consideration. Multiple sources were selected for each case, allowing for cross-checking and corroboration. Memoir sources were not excluded, as they often afford an unparalleled degree of insight into central government decision making. However, they were also not accepted uncritically, due to the potential for self-serving reinterpretations of events by the participants.

### **Qualitative Investigation**

The first track of investigation is the qualitative approach, which distinguishes itself from the second, quantitative track in this study in two primary ways: First, this investigation is primarily 'within case' in nature. This is due to the well-known strengths and weaknesses inherent in qualitative work - much detail can be provided on specific instances of a

phenomena, but there are tremendous concerns when observations across phenomena are made due to the dangers of concept stretching, the difficulties of rigor involved in qualitative work, and the small number of observations often used to make links between cases and broader theory. Secondly, the qualitative investigation focuses more closely on linking institutional and individual factors to policy processes and outcomes, whereas the quantitative work is concerned with the link between institutional and individual factors and the quality of foreign policy decisions. This division of labor is determined by the difficulty in quantifying policy outcome variables given the small number of choices actually made within the sample - it is a more valid approach to seek to establish these links qualitatively.

The qualitative investigation proceeds according to the method of structured, focused comparison of cases developed by Alexander George<sup>6</sup>. Structured, focused comparison methodology requires the investigation of cases chosen for their importance to theory development and their applicability to the research objective<sup>7</sup>. The method is structured in that the same general questions are asked of each case. The method is focused in that it selects only certain aspects of the case as relevant<sup>8</sup>. Both the delineation of the general questions and the selection of which aspects of the case are relevant must be determined by theoretical concerns: the questions must be developed in order to provide theory-relevant evidence, and the aspects of the cases studied must be appropriate to the theoretical concerns of the project<sup>9</sup>.

In this study, specific questions asked of each case are:

- *What was the distribution of resources (prestige, formal authority, experience, personal relationships, independent standing within the political party / country)*



*among core executive actors?*

- *What was the background of the crisis in terms of policy commitments, international environment and other relevant factors?*
- *What are the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister (see Chapter three)?*

An 'analytical narrative' of the case is then reconstructed. The analytical narrative considers the following questions:

- *What policy positions were adopted by members of the core executive?*
- *What were the major and secondary decision making groups?*
- *What strategies did core executive actors utilize in order to influence policy?*
- *How did the distribution of resources condition the policy process?*
- *What major environmental constraints were important?*
- *Was the core executive generally in agreement or in conflict over policy?*

The goal of the analytical narrative is to allow for the 'process tracing' of the impact of institutional and individual variables upon the process and output of policy. Process tracing, as defined by George, "attempts to identify the intervening steps or cause-and-effect links between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable"<sup>10</sup>. In order to make the results of the process tracing explicit, a section 'explaining the major decisions' follows the analytical narrative of each case.

### **Quantitative Analysis**

The second investigative track focuses on developing quantitative evidence of the impact

of institutional and individual variables. This requires that the variables be operationalized in a manner which makes them amenable to quantification. Because of this consideration, the primary dependent variables for the quantitative analysis are concerned with the quality of decision making, as developed conceptually in chapter one. The individual, institutional, and quality of decision making variables were operationalized in a manner which allowed for observations of a categorical, dichotomous nature to be collected. This determined that the cross-case, multivariate analysis (chapter seven) would involve logistic regression procedures. The operationalization of the variables is reported below.

#### *Operationalizing Institutional Variables*

Chapter one detailed the core executive framework as a conceptual basis for isolating institutional factors in foreign policy making.

Specific variables were operationalized as follows:

- Decision taken in Cabinet?

*Sometimes referred to as “full Cabinet” in order to distinguish it from sub-Cabinet committees. Issue not only raised and discussed in Cabinet, but decision taken.*

- Decision taken in Cabinet committee?

*In foreign policy cases, these will often be referred to as the “War Cabinet”, or “...committee” (i.e. Egypt Committee, Overseas Defence Committee etc). Issue must not only be raised and discussed, but a decision must be taken.*

- Decision taken in other location?

*Something of a residual category. Most commonly, these will be bilateral conversations/ meetings between decision makers, or multilateral ad hoc meetings.*

- *Civil Service challenges Ministers?*

*Any member of the civil service, or document/ idea originating with them, goes against the interpretation/ wishes/ orders of any minister. Delaying tactics or other types of behavior to frustrate ministers' wishes also should be coded yes.*

- *Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information?*

*The British government has a long tradition of restricting information, even within high government circles, to the point that there is said to be a norm of central state secrecy. Any one of Prime Minister, ministers, civil servants, etc make some reference to need for secrecy and use it to withhold information from some other core executive actor.*

- *Norm of collective Cabinet responsibility stifles policy doubts?*

*The norm of collective responsibility refers to the convention that government ministers either support an agreed upon policy of the Cabinet or resign. This leads to a situation where commonly a great degree of sometimes heated debate will occur prior to a policy decision, but once that decision has been taken in Cabinet, ministers are obliged not to reopen the debate, or do so at some risk. A major or controversial decision will often be brought to Cabinet as a “debate ending” tactic- where ministers are bound to the policy, and policy doubts become stifled.*

- *Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary disagree?*

*As the best resourced core executive actors in foreign policy, the policy positions of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are crucially important. Code yes when evidence of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary viewing the issue differently, having*

*different objectives, favoring different policies to reach the same objectives is found.*

- Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary?

*Prime Minister makes some effort to prevail against the Foreign Secretary- lobbying other ministers, utilizing persuasive techniques, using sticks and carrots, basically deploying any of the authority and advantages of being Prime Minister against the Foreign Secretary.*

- Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister?

*As above with PM and FS roles reversed.*

- Core executive members use resources against one another?

*As above for other ministers, civil servants, senior military officials.*

### Operationalizing Individual Factors

The individual characteristics of the Prime Ministers are recovered by procedures reported separately in chapter three, and are associated here with behavioral indicators linked to those individual characteristics. The behavioral indicators associated with the individual characteristics were developed from a review of the literature on leadership traits (see Chapter one), and selected for their relevance to the current study. From the suite of seven trait variables available, five were selected for further analysis. Two (in-group bias and distrust of others), were discarded. This decision was taken in part due to their relatively poor performance in validity tests of the technique (see chapter three), and in part due to the difficulty in specifying behavioral effects associated with these traits which complemented the conceptual framework of this study. The five remaining variables are linked by deductive procedure to hypothesized behavioral effects below. Chapter seven returns to these deductive specifications in light of the evidence generated

through the case studies:

- *Belief in Ability to Control Events* is hypothesized to stand in a positive relationship with a proactive approach to foreign policy making. Proactive policy making involves the taking of initiatives and specification of objectives.
- *Conceptual Complexity* is hypothesized to stand in a positive relationship with the perception of multiple viewpoints and aspects of an issue, and the desire to seek multiple sources of information concerning issues and policy options. Individuals high in conceptual complexity are also hypothesized to be more readily able to change views on an issue in light of new evidence.
- *Need for Power* is hypothesized to stand in a positive relationship with the desire to control people and be heavily involved in policy processes, and a preference for a more formal and hierarchical decision making structure. Leaders high in need for power are expected to behave more ‘competitively’, exhibiting concern for their personal prestige and authority.
- *Self Confidence* is hypothesized to stand in a positive relationship with willingness to challenge the interpretations and recommendations offered by others, even when those others are experts in the policy area under consideration.
- *Task Orientation*, when higher (i.e. problem rather than relationship focused), is hypothesized to stand in a positive relationship with a concern with the task at hand and an absence of concern with maintaining harmony and achieving consensus with others.

Investigation of the causal effects of the individual characteristics therefore involves ascertaining whether the hypothesized behavioral effect of an individual variable is

present or absent in each observation. For example, a higher *Belief in Ability to Control Events* has been hypothesized to cause an individual to be more proactive in policy making. The empirical investigation records individual Prime Ministerial proactiveness, and therefore allows the testing of the link between a score on an individual variable and the hypothesized behavioral effect, in addition to the congruence between a certain value of the individual behavioral (explanatory) variable and a certain value of the quality of decision making (dependent) variable.

The individual behavioral variables were operationalized as follows:

- Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue

*Prime Minister personally initiates or proposes to initiate a cause of action not in reaction to events but in order to “make something happen”. Additionally, answer yes if the Prime Minister personally seems impatient with progression of policy, wants “everything now”.*

- Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of issue

*Prime Minister personally refers to multiple viewpoints / interpretations / considerations to be taken into account, displays a differentiated or sophisticated understanding and approach to the policy situation. Answer no if the Prime Minister personally seems to have a “black and white”, one track approach.*

- Prime Minister changes views

*The Prime Minister personally makes a major change in their interpretation of the situation, proposes a major change in the direction of policy. Answer no if the Prime Minister displays continuity with their previous views / policy / interpretation.*

- Prime Minister displays competitive behavior, a concern for personal prestige or

authority

*Prime Minister moves to preserve their authority by isolating / removing dissident colleague, seeking support of colleagues, avoiding consideration of damaging issue / information, 'reminding' others of some aspect of their formal or informal authority.*

- Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation / policy recommendation of others

*Prime Minister rejects or challenges the views, interpretations, or recommendations of others. Answer no if Prime Minister concurs or makes no mention / effort to disagree with others on policy issue.*

- Prime Minister attempts to maintain harmony among colleagues

*Does the Prime Minister make explicit mention of the need to sooth or manage other core executive actors. Does the Prime Minister seem to be making an effort to ensure that other actors are happy with policy course and process, or at least do not enter into open revolt?*

### Operationalizing Quality of Decision Making

The conceptual framework for investigating the quality of decision making is specified in chapter one. Specific variables derived from this framework were operationalized as follows:

- *Are objectives of policy specified?*

Is explicit mention made of the goals which the policy is designed to secure, or do these goals remain implicit, or indeed is there evidence of a lack of consideration of what the policy is designed to do (i.e. action for the sake of action)?

- *Is more than one policy considered?*

Do any members of the core executive individually or collectively show evidence of considering more than one policy action?

- *Is a previously rejected policy reconsidered?*

Do any members of the core executive seek to revisit or reopen consideration of a course of action which had been previously rejected, regardless of whether this reconsidered policy is actually adopted?

- *Are additional sources of information actively sought?*

Do any members of the core executive actively solicit additional information in order to make a decision / better understand the situation. Answer yes if there is active evidence of solicitation of information, not merely the receipt of multiple sources?

- *Is policy making responsive to new information*

I) Does some new evidence suggest that the policy course which is being followed is failing, or inappropriate given new developments, or that a situation which was being monitored but not acted upon now requires greater attention? II) If information does in fact suggest a change in policy is this in fact undertaken, or is the information ignored and the old course of action persisted with? The variable is therefore coded '1' when policy is changed due to the receipt of new information, '0' when new information suggests change but policy remains the same, and as missing data when no information suggesting policy change is received.

- *Specification of costs, risks, and implications of policy choice*

Do members of the core executive consider what may be the results of their actions, particularly in terms of what hazards they may be exposing themselves to, what may be



the “knock on” effects for other policies in other parts of the world and so on? Or, is there a lack of attention to consequences and dangers?

*Unit of Observation: 'Occasion for Decision'*

To conduct a meaningful quantitative analysis, the unit of analysis must be reconsidered: an n of 3 (cases) will not suffice. King, Keohane and Verba offer useful advice in this regard. They suggest that, where it is necessary to increase n size, an alternative to the prohibitively costly collection of more observations at the same level of analysis (i.e. more cases), is to reexamine the existing observations at a different level of analysis. Therefore, instead of regarding Korea, Suez and the Falklands as one unit of observation, these cases were partitioned in order to generate multiple observations. The manner of case partition is suggested by Hermann and Hermann's concept of an 'occasion for decision'. They explain the occasion for decision concept in the following terms: "In responding to a foreign policy problem governments often are involved in a sequence of decisions. Each time policy makers formulate a question about a recognized foreign policy problem that needs answering and arrange for someone or somebody to do something about it, we have an occasion for decision"<sup>11</sup>.

These procedures vastly increase the number of observations and allow for some multivariate analysis. Table one indicates the number of occasions for decision by case, while the appendices of chapters four, five, and six provide specific information concerning how each case was partitioned. For each 'occasion for decision', a code book was completed collecting information on the institutional, individual, and quality of decision making variables as operationalized in this chapter. A sample code book, which

also contains coding examples, can be found in the appendix.

TABLE ONE: NUMBER OF OCCASIONS FOR DECISION BY CASE.

Korea	Suez	Falklands
21	36	28

### **Intercoder reliability**

In order to reduce the possibility of investigator bias, additional coders, who were unaware of the research focus, re-coded portions of the material. Six of the Occasions for Decision (three from Suez, three from Falklands) were analyzed by a second coder with no knowledge of the research hypotheses, and no special expertise with the cases themselves. Inter-coder agreement was achieved in 127 of 156 coding decisions, for an agreement ratio of .81, above the .80 standard level.

### **Hypotheses linking institutional and individual variables to quality of decision making variables.**

A deductive procedure was employed in order to estimate the causal impact of the institutional and individual explanatory variables on the quality of decision making variables. These hypotheses were developed through a review of the literature on the core executive and the impact of individuals on policy decision making (see chapter one). The relationships were conceptualized as positive or negative, with a residual 'unclear' category where deductive procedures proved indeterminate. These hypotheses are necessarily tentative in nature, but serve as a useful starting point for analyzing the results

of the study (see chapter seven). The hypothesized relationships are presented in Table 2.

TABLE TWO: HYPOTHESES LINKING INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES TO QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING.

Predictor	objspec	multpol	prevrej	addinf	respinf	costspec
Decision taken in Cabinet	+/-	+	+/-	-	+/-	+
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee	+	-	-	+	+/-	+
Decision taken in other location	-	-	+/-	+/-	+/-	-
Civil Service challenges Ministers	+	+	+	+/-	+/-	+
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norm of collective Cabinet responsibility stifles policy doubts	-	-	-	-	-	-
Prime Minister/ Foreign Secretary disagree	+/-	+	+	+/-	+/-	+/-
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary	+/-	+	+	+/-	+/-	+/-
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister	+/-	+	+	+/-	+/-	+/-
Core executive members use resources against one another	+/-	+	+	+/-	+/-	+/-
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue	+/-	-	+/-	-	+/-	-
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/dimension of issue	+/-	+	+	+	+	+/-
Prime Minister changes views	+/-	+	+	+/-	+	+/-
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior	+/-	-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation	+/-	+	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-

## Conclusion

This chapter has presented a research design for a multi-method inquiry into the

institutional and individual determinants of the process, outcome, and quality of foreign policy decision making in the British core executive. Two tracks of inquiry have been specified. The qualitative investigation focuses primarily on within case analysis. The linkages which are investigated here are between institutional and individual factors and process and outcome of decision making. The quantitative analysis allows for more explicit cross-case analysis of variables. The linkages which are investigated are between institutional and individual factors and quality of decision making.

---

<sup>1</sup> Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

<sup>2</sup> King, Keohane and Verba, 129.

<sup>3</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba, 140.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Preston, "The President and His Inner Circle". Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1996: 56-57.

<sup>5</sup> Preston, *The President and His Inner Circle*; Herek, Janis and Huth, "Quality of Decision Making"; Haney, *Organizing for Foreign Policy Crisis*.

<sup>6</sup> Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development" Paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, October 15-16 1982; Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci" in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* ed C. Elman and M.F Elman (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001)

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, "Research Design Tasks in Case Study Methods". Paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, October 17-19 1997: 10

<sup>8</sup> Bennett and George, "Research Design Tasks, 2.

<sup>9</sup> George, "Case Studies", 240.

<sup>10</sup> George, "Case Studies", 232.

<sup>11</sup> Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry" *International Studies Quarterly* 33: 361-387.

### **CHAPTER THREE: RECOVERING INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS FROM RESPONSES TO PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS**

While Prime Minister watchers continue to operate on the assumption – implicit or explicit – that the individual characteristics of occupants of No.10 Downing Street are significant to the political process, there have been few efforts to systematically measure these characteristics. In part, this is due to the formidable obstacles involved in such a task, in particular, the lack of direct academic access to the political elite. However, it is also due to a failure to apply state of the art methodological techniques to publicly available data sources on the Prime Minister. This chapter focuses on one such data source – Prime Ministerial responses to Parliamentary questions – and suggests that the application of a content analysis technique which recovers individual characteristics of leaders from the text of their verbal output can mitigate several problems in the study of the Prime Minister as individual. Recent advances in the power of desktop computers and software design have made possible the automation of this content analysis scheme, greatly increasing the volume of text which can be processed and so greatly reducing reliability and validity concerns associated with the sampling research designs commonly used in textual analysis. To take advantage of these developments, the universe of Prime Ministerial responses to foreign policy questions in the House of Commons from 1945-2004 are collected and processed according to M. G. Hermann's content analysis-based "Leadership Trait Assessment" framework. Analysis of the resulting data shows that the approach robustly measures individual differences, allows the comparison of Prime Ministers with one another and with political leaders worldwide, and can be used with existing conceptual frameworks linking leader characteristics to political outcomes. In

addition, the approach can potentially be utilized and adapted to pursue a wide range of research questions concerning the nature and impact of Prime Ministerial differences on the political process. However, the immediate value of the data developed here is in linking it to the conceptual framework developed in chapter one.

### **The importance of leaders**

As established in chapter one, political leaders differ in the way they perceive problems, evaluate options, and take decisions<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, it is widely accepted that, under certain conditions, these individual differences can exert a significant causal effect on political outcomes<sup>2</sup>. Even many scholars who adopt an institutionalist perspective to explaining politics, which can appear to deny the relevance of individual idiosyncrasies<sup>3</sup>, concede that "rules are always partial, and the process of applying them is always flawed. Scope for individual initiative always exists"<sup>4</sup>. Studies of the British Prime Minister concur with this line of reasoning. King comments that "the Prime Ministership is a highly dynamic office. The people who hold it vary wildly in operating style, and in the purposes to which they wish to put the office"<sup>5</sup>, and Lee notes that "similar situations are dealt with differently by different Prime Ministers"<sup>6</sup>. However, Rod Rhodes suggests that the generation of reliable data on individual differences between Prime Ministers has yet to be satisfactorily accomplished: "The systematic analysis of leadership influences is still in its infancy in the UK...There is no equivalent to the sophisticated analysis of how leadership personality transmutes into characteristic institutional and policy styles which figure large in accounts of the US presidency"<sup>7</sup>.

Indeed, scholars attempting to conduct such an analysis face several problems. Firstly, a lack of access to elites precludes many direct data gathering techniques which

could allow for the isolation and measurement of their individual characteristics. Political elites are generally guarded about precisely what they are doing and especially the processes by which decisions are reached, and are certainly not inclined to grant academic researchers the kind of unfettered access they may desire. Charles Taber notes that "we elite decision theorists have virtually no direct access to our subjects, who are not wont to complete surveys, rarely give interviews to academic researchers, and with disheartening frequency are dead"<sup>8</sup>. Secondly, studies of political leaders face a fundamental 'small n problem'. Using the individual leader as the unit of analysis, there have simply been too few Prime Ministers to allow for a sufficient number of observations to give the investigator a reasonable chance of correctly rejecting a null hypothesis on all but extreme relationships<sup>9</sup>. The lack of access and small n issue face scholars of political elites *sui generis*. A further issue is said to present a barrier to the study of the British Prime Minister in particular. Anthony King suggests that the secrecy of the British central state, and the absence of British equivalents to American laws on dissemination of governmental information, are particular impediments to Prime Ministerial studies<sup>10</sup>. Rod Rhodes concurs to some degree, but argues that the problem is compounded by a failure to make use of those public domain information sources which *are* available. To demonstrate that some systematic analysis should be possible, Rhodes lists the following potential sources of information on the British Prime Minister and central state:

- *Hansard* (Parliamentary debates and questions);
- White papers, green papers, and other official publications (including official statistics);
- Media reports, including television documentaries as well as newspaper reports and investigations;



- memoirs, autobiographies and diaries
- biographies;
- interviews with past and present ministers and officials;
- seminars under Chatham House rules;
- Cabinet papers, available after 30 years;
- other secondary sources, whether written by participants, journalists, or academics

Rhodes concludes that "the choice of methods has been too conservative in the past. Available sources have not been fully exploited. Secrecy and restricted access may be a problem, but there is still a great deal of work that can be done"<sup>11</sup>. The argument here is that new methodological techniques of computer assisted textual analysis can be applied to the available public domain source materials in order to generate reliable data on the individual characteristics of the British Prime Minister. Indeed, while this study adopts a textual analysis technique grounded in political psychology, the use of public domain texts as data and automated content analysis techniques has recently gained currency across the discipline. In a recent high profile article, Laver, Benoit and Garry state that

Political texts are the concrete by-product of strategic political activity and have a widely recognized potential to reveal important information about...their authors. Moreover, they can be analyzed, reanalyzed, and reanalyzed again without becoming jaded or uncooperative. Once a text and an analysis technique are placed in the public domain, furthermore, others can replicate, modify, and improve the estimates involved or can produce completely new analyses using the same tools. Above all, in a world where vast volumes of text are easily, cheaply, and almost instantly available, the systematic analysis of political text has the potential to be immensely liberating for the researcher<sup>12</sup>.

This chapter takes advantage of these developments in order to generate data which recovers the individual characteristics of the last 11 British Prime Ministers. The universe of Prime Minister responses to foreign policy questions, available through the *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* series, are collected and analyzed. The specific analytical scheme utilized is Margaret G. Hermann's "Leadership Trait Analysis" framework. The textual analysis software routine "Profiler Plus", developed specifically

for use in conjunction with Hermann's technique, is utilized to conduct the actual content analysis. Below, I introduce the conceptual framework and measurement scheme developed by Hermann. Secondly, data collection processes and research design are elaborated. Thirdly, recovered characteristics of Prime Ministers are presented. Analysis of these data shows that the approach robustly measures individual differences, allows the comparison of Prime Ministers with one another and with political leaders worldwide, and can be linked with the conceptual framework developed in this project.

### **Leadership trait analysis**

As Rod Rhodes correctly noted, systematic analysis of leadership styles and characteristics of individuals occupying the US presidency have become well established, while studies of British Prime Ministers in these terms have been far fewer. As stated in chapter one, one of the aims of this study is to apply of Margaret G. Hermann's "Leadership Trait Analysis"<sup>13</sup> to post 1945 occupants of the office of Prime Minister. Hermann suggests that trait, motivational and cognitive variables can be combined in an overall profile of an individual's leadership style and orientation toward the political realm, and specifies seven characteristics of leaders as of particular importance: (1) Belief in Ability to Control Events; (2) Conceptual Complexity; (3) Distrust of Others; (4) In-Group Bias; (5) Need for Power; (6) Self Confidence; (7) Task Orientation.

A content analysis scheme accompanies this conceptual framework. The scheme is a theoretically-driven content analysis of a leader's verbal output. More specifically, "an assumption is made that the more frequently leaders use certain words and phrases in their interview responses (and other verbal behavior) the more salient such content is to them...At issue is what percentage of the time when leaders could exhibit particular

words and phrases they are, indeed, used"<sup>14</sup>. This procedure consists of an identification of opportunities within a leaders' text for exhibiting verbal behavior associated with the trait variables, recording whether this opportunity was taken and whether the words used are indicative of a positive or negative score on that trait based on the coding dictionary developed with the technique, and the summing of all such instances within the piece of text. Finally, a ratio "trait score" (0-100) for that leader is calculated. Table 3 summarizes the conceptualization of each trait variable, as well as the associated coding rules.

TABLE THREE: TRAIT CONCEPTUALIZATION AND CODING RULES

Trait	Description	Coding
<b>Belief in Ability to Control Events</b>	Perception of the world as an environment leader can influence. Leader's own state is perceived as an influential actor in the international system.	Percentage of times verbs are used that reflect action or planning of the leader or relevant group.
<b>Conceptual Complexity</b>	Capability of discerning different dimensions of the environment when describing actors, places, ideas and situations.	Percentage of frequency of words related to either high (i.e. "approximately", "possibility", "trend") or low (i.e. "absolutely", "certainly", "irreversible") complexity.
<b>Distrust of Others</b>	General feeling of doubt and wariness of others.	Percentage of times words indicating distrust of other persons or group is present.
<b>In-group Bias</b>	Perception of one's group as holding a central role, accompanied with strong feelings of national identity and honor.	Percentage of times a reference to the group is favorable (i.e. "successful", "prosperous", "great"), shows strength (i.e. "powerful", "capable") or a need to maintain group identity (i.e. "decide our own policies", "defend our borders").
<b>Need for Power</b>	A concern with gaining, keeping and restoring power over others.	Percentage of times verbs are used that reflect actions of attack, advise, influence on the behavior of others, concern with reputation.
<b>Self-Confidence</b>	Personal image of self-importance, in terms of the ability to deal with the environment.	Percentage of times pronouns are used such as "my", "myself", "I", "me" and "mine".
<b>Task Orientation</b>	Relative focus on problem solving versus maintenance of relationship to others. Higher score indicates greater problem focus.	Percentage of frequency of words related to instrumental activities (i.e. "accomplishment", "plan", "proposal") versus concern for other's feelings and desires (i.e. "collaboration", "amnesty", "appreciation").

Initial studies employing the Leadership Trait Analysis framework involved manual hand-coding of texts. These procedures were labor-intensive and time consuming, and raised inter-coder reliability concerns and validity concerns over the necessarily small samples of text used<sup>15</sup>. However, developments in computer processing capabilities and software design have allowed for the automation of Hermann's technique, with content analysis conducted by desktop computer. This eliminates inter-coder reliability concerns as the computer perfectly replicates the coding results for a given piece of text each time. Additionally, vastly greater volumes of text can be coded given the improvements in the speed of processing in moving from hand to automated coding<sup>16</sup>.

## **Data**

For this study, the universe of Prime Minister responses to foreign policy questions in the House of Commons between 1945-2004, available through the *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* series, were collected. Unlike previous studies using the leadership analysis technique, therefore, a sampling procedure for selecting texts was not used. This allows greater confidence in the reliability of the trait data, which rests on analysis of over 1 million words spoken by the Prime Ministers, and constitutes population, rather than sample data.

Prime Ministerial responses to questions in the House of Commons are appropriate materials for the generation of trait scores: they are from a single source, eliminating differential audience effects which might bias estimates, and are relatively spontaneous, reducing the risk that they are pre-prepared and thus more indicative of the trait orientation of an aide or speechwriter than the subject in whom we are interested<sup>17</sup>.

Collection of the responses of Prime Ministers involved several steps. The responses easiest to collect were those given after 1989- these are available on the website of the House of Commons by means of a searchable database (<http://www.publications.Parliament.uk>). Responses between 1945-1989 were collected from the bound version of Hansard. This involved obtaining a set of volumes, identifying within each volume pages which contained relevant text, and photocopying these pages. In order to render the text into machine readable form for the automated analysis, a digital scanning device was used. However, in most instances the photocopies were of relatively poor quality, necessitating substantial manual correction of the electronic file. In a frustrating number of instances, the scanner output was so inaccurate as to be unusable, necessitating that those sections of Hansard were entered into a word processing package by hand. This is to say that, while automated coding is less labor-intensive than hand coding, it is not without its costs in terms of time and resources. Once in machine readable form, the responses were divided into quarter year sections, with a separate electronic file created for each. The decision was taken to divide the text into quarter year sections for two substantive reasons:

- 1) This procedure creates many observations: i.e. instead of Thatcher's premiership constituting one observation of her individual characteristics, the division into quarter year sections allows for 47 separate measurements. This substantially mitigates the small n problem by shifting the level of analysis from the Prime Minister to a unit of time within the premiership<sup>18</sup>.
- 2) The quarter year unit is large enough that the individual characteristic scores rest upon a reasonable number of words. As Mahdasian has demonstrated, sub quarter year units

(days and weeks) display instability in scores from one unit to another, due to the small number of words upon which the analysis rests<sup>19</sup>.

Characteristics of the data files are reported in table four.

TABLE FOUR: CHARACTERISTICS OF WORD FILES

N	Minimum # of words	Maximum # of words	Mean # of words
221	68	19379	3959.28

### Results

Mean scores for the 11 Prime Minister group are reported in table five. This table also reports data on a comparison group of 51 world political leaders. Based on this some tentative observations about British Prime Ministers as a subset of world political leaders can be made. The data indicate that British Prime Ministers are lower than the world political leaders group in belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, distrust of others, in-group bias, need for power and self confidence. British Prime Ministers are higher in task orientation (more problem focused). This suggests some socialization effects of the British political system upon its leaders, although the heterogeneous nature of the 51 world leader reference group, which contains leaders from many different countries, makes firm comparative assertions a little risky.

TABLE FIVE: BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS AND REFERENCE GROUP OF WORLD POLITICAL LEADERS.

<i>Trait</i>	<i>Mean trait scores of 11 British Prime Ministers</i>	<i>Mean trait scores of 51 world political leaders</i>
Belief in ability to control events	32	35
Conceptual complexity	53	57
Distrust of others	8	12
In-group bias	7	9
Need for power	23	24
Self confidence	39	41
Task orientation	68	63

The data disaggregated by individual Prime Ministers is shown in table seven. Whereas table three permits cross-national comparison of individuals, table four allows within-country comparison of Prime Ministers. These data allow comparisons of Prime Ministers on multiple dimensions of individual characteristics which have associated behavioral implications. For instance, the conceptual complexity score of Margaret Thatcher is the lowest of the post second world war Prime Ministers, suggesting that she would view political life in absolutist, 'black and white' terms. Her predecessor, James



Callaghan, would be expected to have a more nuanced view of the political world due to his substantially higher complexity score.

TABLE SIX: MEAN TRAIT VARIABLE SCORES BY PRIME MINISTER

<b>Prime Minister</b>	<b>Number of Quarter Year Units</b>	<b>Total Number of Words Analyzed</b>	<b>bace</b>	<b>cc</b>	<b>dis</b>	<b>igb</b>	<b>np</b>	<b>sc</b>	<b>task</b>
<b>Attlee</b>	24	56247	32.5	55.7	10.3	4.7	21.5	41.3	73.5
<b>Churchill</b>	13	48325	33.2	56.5	8.3	5.7	19.3	41.7	70
<b>Eden</b>	7	36377	38	55.9	6.7	6.1	22.3	45.9	67.6
<b>Macmillan</b>	25	131911	32.8	60.5	7.4	6.5	22.3	47.4	72.3
<b>Home</b>	4	21880	36.5	58.8	6.5	5.8	21.8	46.5	71.5
<b>Wilson (1)</b>	18	167268	32.8	54.6	10.2	6.6	20.7	41.4	68.8
<b>Heath</b>	14	40244	27.9	56.9	2.4	7.7	20.6	37.6	75.3
<b>Wilson (2)</b>	7	16782	33.2	55.4	7.1	5.3	18	40.4	71.6
<b>Callaghan</b>	11	36758	29.6	59.8	6.9	7.9	21.5	37	69.3
<b>Thatcher</b>	47	119059	26.8	47.5	6.7	9.4	23	32	63.6
<b>Major</b>	26	57871	26.7	50.8	7.4	7.7	21.3	32.9	58.6
<b>Blair</b>	26	142278	44.8	50.6	9.8	7.9	30.1	38.8	66.2

(BACE = belief in ability to control events; CC = conceptual complexity; DIS = distrust of others; IGB = in-group bias; NP = need for power; SC = self confidence; TASK = task orientation).

The data can also be analyzed from the perspective of testing the validity of the technique. The null hypothesis in this case would be formulated along the lines of "the

technique does not measure systematic differences between Prime Ministers, but rather is the average of a set of random or situationally determined observations". One test of this hypothesis is to conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA), using Prime Minister as the grouping variable. With each Prime Minister assigned a categorical value (Attlee=1, Churchill=2 etc), the ANOVA routine can determine the degree to which the values of the quarter year measurements of trait variables are associated with the categories (i.e. technique robustly measures individual differences between Prime Ministers) or are random (i.e. technique does not robustly measure individual differences between Prime Ministers). The higher the  $f$  score for each trait variable, the more confident we can be in rejecting the null hypothesis for that variable. Results of the ANOVA test are reported in table seven.

TABLE SEVEN: ONE WAY ANOVA WITH PRIME MINISTER AS GROUPING VARIABLE.

	Belief in Ability to Control Events	Conceptual Complexity	Distrust of Others	In-Group Bias	Need for Power	Self Confidence	Task Orientation
$f$	11.229***	8.438***	2.633**	1.572	4.631***	6.741***	6.744***

\*\*  $p = \leq .05$ , \*\*\*  $p = \leq .01$

Each of the variables passes the test at the  $<.01$  level, except distrust of others (which passes at the  $<.05$  level), and in-group bias (which does not prove able to reliably discriminate between individuals in this data set). The substantive importance of the ANOVA results is that each of the six remaining variables robustly measures characteristics upon which individual Prime Ministers differ from one another.

While the ANOVA test indicates significant differences between categorically-measured variables where there are more than two categories, it does not in and of itself

provide us with information concerning individual Prime Ministers. The mean trait scores reported in table six provide one cut at this data. A second way in which to generate comparative insight is to engage in orthogonal comparison of each Prime Minister with the rest of the group as a whole. To accomplish this, a dummy variable was created for each Prime Minister, whereby the Prime Minister in question was assigned the value 1 and all other Prime Ministers assigned 0. A *t* score was calculated to report statistically significant differences from the group for each Prime Minister on each trait variable. The *t* statistic also indicates direction (higher or lower) of these differences. Table eight reports these results. These data are perhaps a more systematic way of addressing the individual level data than the mean scores as they do not rely on “eyeballing”, but introduce a test of whether differences are statistically significant. However, both means and t-scores offer comparative insight.

TABLE EIGHT: ORTHOGONAL COMPARISONS OF PRIME MINISTERS *t*-SCORES.

	<b>bace</b>	<b>cc</b>	<b>dis</b>	<b>igb</b>	<b>np</b>	<b>sc</b>	<b>task</b>
<b>Attlee</b>	.277	1.354	2.294**	-2.573**	-.812	1.430	3.139***
<b>Churchill</b>	.492	1.356	.376	1.135	-1.741*	1.154	.869
<b>Eden</b>	1.751*	.749	-.487	-.591	-.112	1.946*	-.041
<b>Macmillan</b>	.433	4.798***	-.317	-.830	-.225	4.855***	2.560**
<b>Home</b>	.981	1.295	-.442	-.593	-.242	1.585	.782
<b>Wilson I</b>	.369	.545	2.012**	-.582	-1.235	1.243	.480
<b>Heath</b>	1.742*	1.567	-3.751***	.295	-1.132	-.365	3.058***
<b>Wilson II</b>	.625	.529	-.251	-.535	-2.038***	.601	1.220
<b>Callaghan</b>	-.904	2.670***	-.499	.384	-.555	-.512	.573
<b>Thatcher</b>	-4.510***	-6.393***	-1.453	3.084***	.533	-5.249***	-3.362***
<b>Major</b>	-3.207***	-1.922*	-.264	.431	-.942	-3.069***	-5.384***
<b>Blair</b>	8.698***	-2.056**	1.973*	.628	6.583***	.105	-.829

\*  $P < .10$ , \*\*  $P < .05$ , \*\*\*  $P < .01$

(BACE = belief in ability to control events; CC = conceptual complexity; DIS = distrust of others; IGB = in-group bias; NP = need for power; SC = self confidence; TASK = task orientation).

### Conclusions and future research

This paper has suggested that the application of automated content analysis techniques – in this case M. G. Hermann's leadership trait analysis – to publicly available political text – in this case Prime Ministerial responses to questions in the House of

Commons – is a viable research approach. Data on individual characteristics of Prime Ministers recovered in this way can be used to compare Prime Ministers with political leaders worldwide and with each other, and can be ‘plugged in’ to existing conceptual frameworks, thus providing a link with political outcomes. The use of public domain texts as political data can be tremendously beneficial to studies of the British political elite, expanding both the scope of research questions which can be addressed and the quality of evidence which can be brought to bear upon them.

The immediate purpose, however, is to utilize these data as measurements of the individual characteristics of Prime Ministers, to be ‘plugged in’ to the conceptual framework developed in chapter one, and investigated through the research design specified in chapter two.

- 
- <sup>1</sup> See George, *Presidential Decisionmaking*.
- <sup>2</sup> See Greenstein, *Personality and Politics*.
- <sup>3</sup> March and Olsen, "The New Institutionalism", 741.
- <sup>4</sup> Burch and Holliday, 48-49.
- <sup>5</sup> A. King, "The Textbook Prime Ministership", 6
- <sup>6</sup> Lee, 241.
- <sup>7</sup> Rhodes, 1995: 23
- <sup>8</sup> Charles Taber, "Problems of Empirical Inference in Elite Decision Making", *The Political Psychologist* 5 (2000): 6.
- <sup>9</sup> Gary King, "The Methodology of Presidential Research" in George Edwards, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman, *Researching the Presidency* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
- <sup>10</sup> A. King, "The Textbook Prime Ministership, 2.
- <sup>11</sup> Rhodes, 1995: 32.
- <sup>12</sup> Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit and John Garry, "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Text Using Words as Data", *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 311-331.
- <sup>13</sup> See Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior"
- <sup>14</sup> Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style" 186
- <sup>15</sup> Karen A. Rasler, William R. Thompson and Kathleen M. Chester, "Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability Problems", *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (1980): 47-66.
- <sup>16</sup> Michael D. Young, "Automating Assessment at a Distance", *The Political Psychologist* 5 (2000): 17-23.
- <sup>17</sup> Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior; Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style"; Dyson and Billordo, "Using Words as Data"; Mark Schafer, "Issues in Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance", *Political Psychology* 21 (2000): 511-527; Stephen G. Walker, "Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance", *Political Psychology* 21 (2000): 597-601.
- <sup>18</sup> King, Keohane and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*.
- <sup>19</sup> See Sarkis A. Mahdasian, "State, Trait, or Design? A Critical Examination of Assumptions Underlying Remote Assessment". Ph.D. diss. Washington State University, 2002.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE KOREAN CRISIS**

This chapter applies the conceptual framework and data developed in the proceeding chapters to core executive decision making during the Korean crisis of 1950-51. During this crisis a somewhat reluctant core executive committed British troops to an American led United Nations force with the initial goal of repulsing North Korea's invasion of the South. However, with the success of General MacArthur's landing at Inchon, the aims of the intervention became somewhat more ambitious, leading to UN forces crossing the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel into North Korea, and provoking the large scale intervention of China. The Korean case is a compelling application of the framework of this study: the individual characteristics of Attlee, who was not personally inclined to assertive leadership in foreign affairs, combined with institutional factors, in particular the high personal standing of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin which translated into resources available to him to influence policy, in order to shape process, outcome, and quality of decision making. Firstly, the distribution of resources among core executive actors during this crisis is considered. Secondly, the individual characteristics of Prime Minister Clement Attlee are reported. Thirdly, an analytical narrative of the crisis process-traces the linkages between individuals, institutions, and process and outcome of decision making. The quantitative data on the institutional, individual, and quality of decision making variables is reported, and conclusions presented.

### **Distribution of resources**

Several aspects of the distribution of resources during the Korea case are salient. Firstly, the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was unusually well-resourced. He was accorded great respect both within the political elite and the country as a whole for his accomplishments

as Foreign Secretary from 1945 onwards. Indeed, in contrast to Attlee, Bevin had developed experience and prestige in foreign policy during Churchill's wartime 'National Government'. While nominally not in a foreign policy post, he had involved himself in these matters in contrast to the domestic policy focused Attlee. The caveat to this is that Bevin was a terminally ill-man at the time of the Korean crisis, which somewhat diminished the energies he could devote to his post.

The second salient factor concerning the distribution of resources is the relatively weak position of Attlee himself. Firstly, his government had won only a narrow victory in the 1950 general election, and the perception was that Attlee would shortly be forced to call a further election, which he was unlikely to win. Secondly, the Cabinet of 1945-51 contained an unusually high number of strong personalities with independent political bases. Bevin's ascendancy as Foreign Secretary has already been sketched, but he was far from the only major figure. In particular, the Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan had designs on the leadership of the party, and was popular among its left wing. The Lord President of the Council Hugh Gaitskell had similar designs, as did the Lord President of the Council Herbert Morrison. Differences between these actors would be significant during the Korean crisis, as Bevan became skeptical as to the wisdom of following US policy in Korea and especially of bowing to US demands for increased defense spending from her allies.

### **Individuals: Characteristics of the Prime Minister**

Table 9 shows the shows the individual characteristics of Clement Attlee as reported in chapter three. Only those variables included in the research design developed in chapter



two are reported.

TABLE NINE: TRAIT SCORES: CLEMENT ATTLEE

	Belief in Ability to Control Events	Conceptual Complexity	Need for Power	Self Confidence	Task Orientation
Mean Score	32.5	55.7	21.5	41.3	73.5
Difference from post 1945 Prime Ministers ( <i>t</i> score)	.277	1.354	-.812	1.430	3.139***

We can associate these data with predictions as to how Attlee would be expected to behave in decision making contexts. His belief in ability to control events score is not significantly different from the group. We would therefore expect him to be neither especially proactive nor predominantly reactive in terms of approach to policy. His complexity score is higher than the group, but not significantly so. We would therefore expect him to be able to discern and act upon several broad dimensions of the situation, and change views when the situational imperative to do so is clear. His need for power score is lower than the group, but again not significantly so. He can therefore be expected to only on occasion display competitive behavior. His self confidence score is higher than the groups, but the difference is not significant. We would therefore expect him to challenge the interpretations/ recommendations of others to a moderate degree. Finally,

his task orientation score is significantly higher than the groups: We would expect him to rarely show concern for maintaining harmony among his colleagues.

### **Background to the crisis**

It is important to understand the wider cold war context of the crisis. Firstly, this is manifested in the dynamics of the alliance between the US and the UK. The Attlee government had by 1950 grown extremely concerned about the potential Soviet threat to Western Europe, which had only just begun to recover economically from the Second World War and had devoted a relatively small amount of what were very scarce resources to rearmament. Concern had increased with the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, and with the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949. The Attlee government was fully aware that Europe could not be defended without American help, and so had set as its fundamental foreign policy priority the safeguarding of the alliance between America and Europe, codified in the recently signed "Western Union" agreements.

That said, it is also important to understand that British and American policies towards Asia were based on fundamentally different assumptions and interests. Britain's major interest in Asia was the stability of the newly independent India and the maintenance of commercial ties with China, largely through the British colony of Hong Kong. The British viewed the government of Mao Tse-Tung in Peking as the legitimate government of China, had accorded it diplomatic recognition, and sought to have the Peking government take China's seat on the UN Security Council. By contrast, United States policy was to support the government of Chiang Kai-Shek, in exile on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). Bitter recriminations within the United States had followed the "loss" of China to communism, and had made Asia an extremely volatile domestic political

issue for the weakened administration of Harry S. Truman. These different policy principles would lead to clashes between the US and the UK over the importance of Korea, the degree to which the North Korean aggression was directed from Peking and/or Moscow, and the wisdom of bellicose militarism in the region. The tension between the British perception of American policies as unwise and dangerous, and the British need to maintain an American commitment in Europe, was a crucial situational factor confronting the core executive.

### **Analytical narrative of the crisis**

The proximate cause of the crisis was the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25th June 1950. Later the same day, the United Nations Security Council passed by a margin of 7-1 (in the absence of the USSR representative) a United States sponsored resolution calling for the withdrawal of North Korean troops. The British core executive first formally considered the issue in a full Cabinet meeting at 11am on the morning of Tuesday 27th June. Cabinet had before it the draft of a statement by President Truman committing US forces to the defense of South Korea. The Cabinet took the fundamental policy decision to support United States' actions, with only Nye Bevan in real disagreement. The Cabinet took the view that the North's invasion of the South was clear cut aggression under the United Nations charter, and that the willingness of America to resist this should be supported. However, there was much less agreement over the tenor of Truman's proposed statement, in which he attributed the North Korean invasion to "centrally-directed Communist aggression", and sought to link the Korean question with the disputed island of Formosa. Many in the Cabinet, in particular Bevan but also other

senior figures such as Hugh Dalton, felt that the first assertion was unproven and the second unwise. The statement was seen as carrying a great danger of widening the confrontation in ways disadvantageous to the Western allies. Foreign Secretary Bevin, whom Attlee had visited in hospital in order to determine his views, agreed that the US statement was unwise, but thought it would be worse to publicly upbraid the Americans on this matter, and that, given the precarious position in Europe, the British "would not wish to discourage that Government from helping us and...resisting Communist encroachments"<sup>1</sup>. It was agreed instead that the British government would publicly support the American position, but would seek privately to impress upon the US the dangers of provoking a wider war through intemperate statements and actions. This was an early indication of the dilemma which would face British decision makers in the Korean crisis. Korea was of no strategic significance to Britain, nor did the British government believe that the North's invasion of the South was a "first move" in the plottings of a monolithic Communist-bloc. Indeed, they believed the Korean war to be a nationalist war of unification, which only peripherally interested the Chinese, who were themselves more nationalist regime than Soviet puppet. They also believed the United States to be ignorant of these matters, smarting from the "loss" of China in 1949, and American policy to be beholden to a hawkish and injudicious minority of political and public opinion. However, the British *were* directly concerned with the strategic situation in Europe, where the weakened west depended upon American security guarantees and military aid in the face of Stalin's Red Army. The problem, therefore, was how to restrain America from provoking a major conflagration in Asia without imperiling US-UK relations and so jeopardizing the American commitment to Europe.

Attlee's visit to Bevin in hospital was not mere etiquette. In spite of Bevin's illness, Attlee was loath to remove a senior figure whom he trusted from the Foreign Secretary post. The undesirability of such a change was amplified by Attlee's own lack of interest in foreign affairs. During the Korean crisis, Attlee consistently deferred to the judgement of Bevin, and afforded every opportunity for his ailing Foreign Secretary to play the major part in handling British foreign policy. For much of the crisis Bevin was unable to attend Cabinet meetings, but his views on the matters under consideration were always canvassed. When this could not be achieved in advance, Attlee allowed Bevin to retroactively assert an influence, such as on 4th July when Bevin learned Cabinet had deferred a decision to impose economic sanctions on China. At the next meeting of the Cabinet, Attlee responded that "the Foreign Secretary was disturbed at the possible consequences of the decision", which was promptly overturned<sup>2</sup>.

Bevin was by this first week of July well enough to direct Foreign Office business from his hospital bed, and sought to put the Cabinet's policy into effect by communicating directly with US Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Bevin argued that the US could not count upon UN support for their policy towards Formosa, and urged Acheson to consider that negotiations over Korea with China were impossible while the US made hostile statements and, more importantly, refused to allow the Peking government to occupy China's seat on the UN Security Council. While Bevin had intended this as a gentle word of caution from an old friend, Acheson reacted very forcefully, characterizing the British position as "appeasement" and instructing his messenger Lew Douglas to leave Bevin "in no doubt of the seriousness with which I view implications of his message and their possible effect on our whole future relationship"<sup>3</sup>.

This was not an auspicious beginning for the British policy of restraint, and there were immediate efforts to bolster the complementary plank of their policy - support for the US - by placing UK naval forces in Asia at the disposal of the Americans<sup>4</sup>. However, the British Chiefs of Staff at this stage were strongly against the commitment of UK ground forces to Korea, and the politicians accepted this advice<sup>5</sup>.

A major problem faced by the British was ascertaining precisely what the state of American decision making was, and, especially, in understanding the policies of the United States Commander in Korea, General MacArthur. With these problems in mind, Attlee suggested to Truman on 6th July that talks be held between representatives of the US and the UK, the British delegation being headed by the War Office's Director of Military Operations, Lord Tedder<sup>6</sup>. Attlee reported to the Cabinet that while "there was every disposition to avoid fettering the discretion of the United States Commander in the military operations in Korea", there was a necessity for the powers which had supported the UN resolution authorizing intervention "to appear to be exercising some measure of control over the forces which were operating in the name of, if not formally on behalf of, the United Nations"<sup>7</sup>.

On the question of the UK contribution to forces in Korea, and particularly the issue of ground troops, members of the British core executive disagreed. From an operational point of view, the Chiefs of Staff believed such a contribution would be "military unsound", given that the only available forces would have to be withdrawn from the vulnerable colonies of Malaya and Hong Kong<sup>8</sup>. Politically, the Defence Committee on July 14th heard a detailed argument from Bevin's deputy, Kenneth Younger, for distancing Britain from what was shaping up as a "protracted and considerable

operation". America was becoming fully committed in Korea and would be "less well placed for lending active assistance in other areas where danger might develop". The linking of Formosa with the Korean crisis had "brought about a dangerous and difficult political position", and Britain should push hard on the Americans to restrain themselves as regards China as it was "imperative that the Chinese Government should not be pushed firmly and finally into the embrace of the Soviet Union"<sup>9</sup>. However, this position did not take account of the necessity of maintaining good US-UK relations, and in particular not alienating the Americans from the issue of the defense of Europe. Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to the United States, intervened on this side of the ledger. Writing to Attlee on the 15th, and noting that the pro-American Bevin was "off on holiday" and so perhaps the intervention was necessary, Franks wrote "I feel that the Americans will to some extent- and I know this to be true of the Defense Department, test the quality of the (US-UK) partnership by our attitude to the notion of a token ground force". Franks urged Attlee to offer such a force quickly, suggesting that the United States would push so hard that Britain would have to accede eventually, and that:

Too often in the past we have taken our time to make a decision with the result that often, when we have done what was in line with American ideas, we have got no credit for it: the decision has followed when it seemed to be extracted from us by the massive discussion, criticism and pressure that has been built up in the US. Should we decide a token ground force is possible, for these reasons I hope we do it quickly.<sup>10</sup>

With this in mind the British made a further attempt to resolve the conflict before it developed into a deeper or wider war. On July 17th, Bevin made a confidential approach to the USSR as to under what circumstances it would use its influence over North Korea to stop hostilities<sup>11</sup>. The Soviets responded that they would be happy to discuss the matter through the United Nations, with the condition that the Peking government be admitted to

the Security Council. There was little chance of the US acceding to this proposal, which did not promise a ceasefire but merely set preliminary conditions for the opportunity to discuss one<sup>12</sup>. It was clear to the British that Moscow was not at this point interested in negotiations, and to compound British embarrassment, the Soviets made the approach public. It should not have surprised British decision makers that the USSR was not interested in seeking to stop the fighting, at it was going so badly for the US forces. Cabinet on the 17th heard a dire report from the Chiefs of Staff, stating that "the best the Americans could now hope to achieve was to hold a bridgehead around Pusan (in the deep South) until they were reinforced. But some weeks must elapse before reinforcements could arrive; and this would undoubtedly be a critical period"<sup>13</sup>. Neither military reverses nor British diplomacy had improved the American temper, and during the staff talks which Attlee had requested, which took place in New York from 20th-24th July, the Americans leaned heavily on the British to provide a ground force. An additional demand was now introduced: With the US deeply involved in what was now certain to be a long and costly commitment in Asia, the European allies were told to sharply increase their own defense efforts if they wished America to maintain its promise of aiding in the continent's defense<sup>14</sup>. This was not at all Britain's desired agenda for the talks, which had been intended as a direct way of impressing upon the US the dangers of its wider Asian policy. However, US pressure was so strong that the British government acceded to both requests. Attlee, who was open to new information during the crisis and willing to change policies in light of it, took the lead in arguing for granting the American requests on both counts. As regards ground troops, Attlee told the Defense Committee on Monday July 24th that, "though he fully understood there were strong military reasons



for not sending land forces to Korea, there were now strong psychological reasons for reviewing the situation...the United States authorities had hinted very strongly that even small land forces would be very acceptable". As regards increases in the defense budget, "We must...give a lead to the countries of the Western Union and the Atlantic Treaty. The existing situation was a test for these countries. He had seen the United States Ambassador that day and had understood from him that the United States might be prepared to increase their assistance to Western Union countries if they were satisfied that Western Union countries were doing all they could to help themselves"<sup>15</sup>. Eventually, a rearmament program of some 3400 pounds sterling would be proposed by the government. The crux of the matter was that the Prime Minister and crucial parts of the core executive, especially the Foreign Secretary, felt that the costs of providing land forces and increasing the defense budget were outweighed by the benefits of maintaining American support for European defense, and of retaining an ability to influence and restrain American foreign policy. Others in the core executive, such as Lord President of the Council and future Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, were instinctively pro-American. However, these decisions did not find general agreement within the government. The Chiefs of Staff maintained the view that America was overcommitted in a strategically unimportant region of the world<sup>16</sup>. They had also begun to be concerned by the independence and bellicosity of the Commander of UN forces, General MacArthur. It was, however, the increases in the defense budget which caused the most immediate core executive conflict.

Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, was immensely troubled by this militarization of the cold war and the associated implications of increased defense

spending for social programs in the European countries. He sought to point out to Cabinet on August 1st that the defense increases could only come at the cost of other economic priorities, and that this represented a fundamental change of cold war strategy: previously the best defense against Communism had been taken to be the promotion of stability in European countries through social and economic improvement<sup>17</sup>. Michael Foot records that Bevan "could not help but be fascinated by the way the parsimonious treasury would vote money for arms, but for nothing else"<sup>18</sup>. The norm of collective Cabinet responsibility prevented a fracturing of the government on this issue: Bevan became embroiled in a confrontation with the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Norman Brook, over the crucial matter of how the conclusions of the Cabinet, which were in effect statements of policy, should be expressed. Bevan wished to express his "opposition" to the increases in defense expenditure. Brook replied that since this was the decision of the Cabinet, Bevan could not oppose it and stay in post: his choice was acquiescence or resignation. Bevan had not yet reached this point (although he would over substantially the same issue within a year), and so settled for the phrase "grave misgivings"<sup>19</sup>. Simply put, Bevan did not have the resources at this point to prevent the two key concessions to the US of ground troops and increased defense expenditure. While a majority of the core executive thought these policies unwise purely on the merits, they were compelled to adopt them due to the environmental constraints of British dependence on American military aid and protection.

Indeed, on both scores the Americans were able to extract further concessions almost immediately. Direct talks between the US-UK Chiefs of Staff resulted in an American plea for an immediate small land force in addition to the larger force which

would take some time to assemble. In this light, the Chiefs of Staff recommended to Attlee that the garrison at Hong Kong be dispatched to Korea, as the Americans had urged that "a platoon now would be worth more than a company tomorrow"<sup>20</sup>. During talks between foreign ministers in New York in mid-September, the Americans also brought up the delicate question of raising a German army to contribute to European defence. British policy was not in favor of this, but such pressure was exerted on Bevin in New York that he recommended the Cabinet accede, "in view of the stakes involved"<sup>21</sup>. Indeed, the US made it clear that future military aid to Europe would be dependent upon German rearmament. It is important to recognize that the issue of the Korean crisis was, for the British, inextricably linked with issues of wider Asian policy, European defense and rearmament, and US-UK relations generally. The core executive had given ground on many of these points in order to generate some currency to influence other events. Indeed, prior to leaving for New York, Bevin had outlined his strategy in these terms to the Cabinet on 4th September. Bevin stated that:

It was his aim to induce the United States Government to look at Asia as a whole and to pay due regard to the desire of Asiatic countries to avoid any appearance of domination by the west. The United Kingdom government had recognized the emergence of new forces in Asia...but the United States had been much slower to recognize the new spirit of independence...A steady influence must be brought to bear on public opinion in the United States in order to reduce the risk of conflict between the United States and China over Formosa<sup>22</sup>.

The instrument by which to accomplish this, Bevin stated in a separate paper for Cabinet consideration, should be a resolution of the United Nations. Bevin's thinking on this matter is crucial in regards to the question of the wisdom of crossing the 38th parallel into North Korea, and the degree of international support for such an action. Bevin, first noting that "on any realistic view, it is difficult to be optimistic about the future of Korea", suggested that the United Nations would have to pursue their "declared objective

of working for the establishment of a unified and democratic Korea"- the simple restoration of the South Korean regime of Syngman Rhee would not suffice. However, this created a policy dilemma, creating a unified and democratic Korea required crossing into the North, not merely expelling the invaders from the South. Although Bevin protested that "a resolution on the above lines would not necessarily commit the United Nations to the view that United Nations forces should eventually pass beyond the 38th parallel and occupy the whole of North Korea"<sup>23</sup>, it was difficult to see how one could be accomplished absent the other. As Bevin wrote the memo, such questions appeared purely hypothetical in nature given the near rout of US forces in Korea. However, while Bevin was in New York, the military situation changed dramatically. MacArthur, who had managed to stabilize the front in the South, executed on September 14th a spectacular amphibious landing far behind enemy lines at Inchon. The North Korean forces were taken by surprise, and, facing encirclement, began a headlong retreat. These developments prompted a flurry of telegrams between Bevin in New York and Attlee in London. Attlee cabled Bevin on 21st September that

The reports from Korea seem to me to indicate the possibility of the collapse of the North Korean forces operating in South Korea. This makes the consideration of what is to happen next a matter of urgency...It is, I think, important that the United Nations Organisation should be considered the deliverer, not the destroyer, of Korea. There is much to be said for some kind of declaration that the United Nations Organisation will take the responsibility for the rehabilitation of the whole country<sup>24</sup>.

Attlee felt that the only way for the United Nations to do something positive in Korea, and hence not enflame the entirety of Asia, was to portray itself as on a mission of liberation. To the United States, of course, the goal was somewhat different: the "roll-back" of Communism to atone for, and perhaps reverse, the "loss" of China. The difficulty was that these goals for the United Nations required the crossing into North

Korean territory, as Bevin pointed out in his reply: "The really tricky thing is whether the United Nations forces are to go north of the 38th parallel. Clearly they must do so if the unification of Korea is to be achieved. Our resolution seeks to cover this contingency, though admittedly in veiled terms"<sup>25</sup>.

As MacArthur advanced, however, the contingency loomed ever closer. Cabinet on the 26th September considered the issue. In many respects, Cabinet felt they had little choice: any positive outcome in Korea seemed to require a UN occupation of the entire country, and, if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel, "it would not be practicable to stipulate that United Kingdom forces should not go with them"<sup>26</sup>. However, there were intimations of trouble along the lines of which the British had previously warned the Americans. Cabinet on 28th September was told that the "Indian Ambassador in Peking had reported that the Chinese People's Government had become more hostile to the United States because of the American attitude towards Chinese complaints and Chinese representation in the United Nations, and that the possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea could not be excluded". Remarkably, Cabinet had only a cursory discussion of this prescient warning and did not seriously consider a change of policy. Significantly, Bevin was absent from this meeting (in New York), and Attlee deferred to him to such a degree in foreign affairs that he did not push Cabinet to a more thorough consideration. Instead, policy remained firmly in the hands of the absentee Bevin, as Cabinet "Agreed that the Foreign Secretary should handle the alleged stiffening of the Chinese attitude towards the Korean problem"<sup>27</sup>.

Bevin, having secured some American security guarantees for Europe in return for his concessions on rearmament, was in a positive frame of mind on his return from

New York. In a report to the Cabinet on his trip, he stated that American policy was showing signs of becoming more moderate, although had not yet arrived at a satisfactory point:

Though the attitude of the United States Administration towards the problems of Chinese representation in the United Nations, Korea and Formosa was much as I had expected, it soon became clear that the series of representations which had been made in the preceding months had not been without their effect. The landings at Inchon in Korea, which took place three days after my arrival in New York, and the brilliant successes which followed, no doubt had their mellowing effect upon American opinion, and thus rendered easier the development of a more moderate attitude on the part of the Administration towards the problems which were exercising our minds in the United Kingdom. Be that as it may, I am able to record that, as a result of our discussions in New York, definite progress has been made<sup>28</sup>.

Bevin felt that the resolution he had drafted had cleverly finessed the issue of the North/South Korean border at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, which had become "an obsession in people's minds" and "in fact has never had any international recognition as a boundary". His response to Cabinet's invitation to deal with the apparent growing Chinese concern over American policy was to suggest that Britain would be best to lay low and not express concern or admonishment to the United States- an approach which to Bevin's mind had maintained UK-US relations thus far:

It is not to be expected that United States policy will undergo any dramatic change in the near future, but if one looks back over the past three months, it becomes clear that the United Kingdom has in fact exercised a steadying influence upon the United States...I am satisfied that our own influence, if it is to be maintained, must continue to be unobtrusive. The fact that we have avoided criticism of the United States in public has enabled us the more readily to express our views in private...It is clear therefore that the tactics which we have been pursuing in regard to Far Eastern questions since the Korean conflict began have been the right tactics<sup>29</sup>.

The resolution passed the United Nations on October 7th. Calling for "all appropriate steps to be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea...elections should be held for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea"<sup>30</sup>, the resolution clearly required the crossing of the 38th parallel in order to be put into effect, but this was never quite

made explicit. In Cabinet on 9th October, as the first of MacArthur's forces crossed the parallel, Bevin repeated his conviction that the Indian warning about Chinese intervention could be dismissed: "He believed that there was insufficient foundation for their apprehension that China or Russia might thereby be provoked into active intervention"<sup>31</sup>. The Chinese, who were deeply unhappy at the US blocking their representation on the Security Council, and increasingly threatened by the drive towards their border of MacArthur's forces, first appeared in Korea on 31st October. Chinese intervention at this stage seemed to be limited, indeed the Chinese government claimed that those of its nationals in Korea were "volunteers". This gave hope to the core executive that the conflict could be limited. Bevin composed a memo on Chinese intervention to the Cabinet on 10th November. He suggested that the early indications were that China did not wish to become involved in a full-scale war in Korea, but that there were great dangers that hasty or ill-considered actions on both sides would widen the conflict. However, China's policy was unclear: "I hesitate to guess at their intentions without more evidence than is at present available to me". Bevin felt that British policy should remain fundamentally the same towards China, and that Britain should continue to support Chinese claims for a seat at the UN Security Council: "Only the Chinese know why they have intervened in Korea, and the only way to ascertain their motives is to give the Chinese a chance to explain them"<sup>32</sup>. The British Chiefs of Staff were firm in conveying their estimation of the dangers of the current situation. They told Cabinet on Monday 13th November that "it was no longer practicable, without risking a major war, to attain the original objective of occupying the whole of North Korea and placing it under a United Nations regime". The Chiefs of Staff had argued from the beginning against the

whole operation on strictly military grounds, and had seen their recommendations against becoming involved in Korea (which was, to their thinking, "of no strategic importance to the democratic powers"), overruled on the political grounds of maintaining amicable relations with the United States. Their position now was that:

    further operations there (Korea) should now be conducted with a view to preventing any escalation of the conflict and avoiding any lasting commitment in this area. With this in view the Chiefs of Staff Committee favoured the withdrawal of United Nations forces to a shorter line across the neck of the country, running from Chongju to Tokchon, roughly along the 40th parallel. In addition to being a much shorter line to defend, this would have the great advantage of leaving a buffer area to the north, on the Korean side of the Manchurian frontier.

Bevin agreed that this accorded with his political objectives of restraining both sides and in particular of "prevent(ing) the United States government from being led by their military advisers into policies which would provoke further intervention by China"<sup>33</sup>. The British reaction to the initial Chinese incursion demonstrates, contra Bevin's optimistic assessment on his return from New York, how far apart the United States and the United Kingdom were in their fundamental policies in Asia. The US analysis did not admit any uncertainty as to Chinese motives nor did it allow for any inductively derived explanation of them: Chinese motives were attributed to the same "centrally-directed communist aggression" which Truman had labeled the North's invasion of the South. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff proposal for a UN line across the 40th parallel may have been militarily sound, but would have required MacArthur to withdraw some distance from his current position, which he was likely to bitterly resist and which would have been politically suicidal for Truman.

Bevin's analysis was acute, however, in the dangers of the US government's "military advisers" provoking an escalation of the conflict. A November 21st memo from the Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister expressed grave concern over the conduct of



General MacArthur, who seemed determined to provoke a major war. The British had long been puzzled by the wide latitude given MacArthur to disagree with official policy and act in an entrepreneurial fashion. Attlee had been personally amazed at the spectacle of Truman flying to meet MacArthur to discuss the Korean War at Wake Island, rather than having MacArthur report back to Washington. This, Attlee remarked, “appeared to us as a curious relationship between government and a general”<sup>34</sup>. After the initial, small scale Chinese intervention, MacArthur appeared to believe that he had sufficient forces available to launch a “final offensive” by November 24th. To the British Chiefs of Staff, this “offensive policy being followed by General MacArthur can only lead to a clash with Communist China and thus to an extension of the conflict in the Far East”. While they accepted Bevin’s analysis that the American government had a declared policy of limiting the conflict, “it seems that for political reasons and due to the personalities involved, the Americans are not able to give practical effect to this policy”. Their recommendation was that British views on the folly of MacArthur’s actions must be put to the American government “in the most forcible and unequivocal terms”<sup>35</sup>. Indeed, MacArthur's "final offensive" sat ill with the British response to the Chinese intervention, which centered on Bevin's thinking that "there would be advantage to making a direct approach to the Chinese People's Government so that they might be left in no doubt about the objectives which the United Kingdom Government were pursuing in the Far East, and that any misapprehensions which they might entertain about our intentions might be removed"<sup>36</sup>. British fears were realized when MacArthur's "final offensive" was repulsed by a massive Chinese force, which MacArthur himself estimated at 200000 men. Cabinet on the 29th considered the consequences of this. Bevin began by arguing that British

goals in this situation remained the same: the limitation of the conflict. In this regard, it was especially important to ensure that the US government would not give MacArthur the authority he was seeking to launch air attacks on targets within China. Attlee concurred, and added the acerbic aside that as "General MacArthur had been over-optimistic about the course of the campaign...the check which he had suffered might lead him to exaggerate the strength of this Chinese attack". Cabinet then began a rather heated reconsideration of the merits of Britain's support of US policy. An unnamed minister, likely to have been Bevan or possibly Dalton, suggested that patience with MacArthur and the American lack of control over him was now exhausted. "Public opinion in this country was distrustful of General MacArthur's intentions...The United States Government seemed unable to exercise close control over him, and the other Governments which had contributed contingents to the United Nations forces in Korea had no effective means of influencing his conduct of the military operations". In reply it was pointed out, perhaps by the pro-American Morrison, that MacArthur had "won great credit in this country for the speed with which he had routed the North Korean forces after he had broken out from the perimeter at Pusan", besides which "governments could not expect to intervene in the day-to-day conduct of military operations...It was easy to criticise the military commander; but were we prepared to ask the United States government to relieve General MacArthur of his command?". Debate then turned to a new front: the unwillingness of the United States to consult with and take heed of the warnings given by those countries who had contributed to the forces in Korea. Again, however, other voices in the Cabinet disagreed:

It was unreasonable to blame the United States for the situation which had now arisen in Korea. We had fully supported the proposal that the United Nation's forces should

advance beyond the 38th Parallel, despite India's warning that this would provoke Chinese intervention. We, as well as the Americans, had taken the risk of proceeding on the assumption that the Chinese would not in fact fulfil their threat. Finally, any strong divergence of policy between ourselves and the Americans over the Far East would involve a risk of losing American support in Europe. The ultimate threat to our security came from Russia, and we could not afford to break our united front with the United States against our main potential enemy.

The conclusion of this divided Cabinet meeting again illustrates the degree to which Attlee had ceded control of foreign policy to Bevin. Abjuring the opportunity to sum up in a definite fashion and thus take a policy decision, Attlee instead made it clear that Bevin would make the final judgment on how to handle the situation. The minutes record that the Cabinet "Invited the Foreign Secretary to consider, in the light of their discussion, what representations he should make to the United States Government regarding the conduct of the discussions in the Security Council on China's intervention in Korea"<sup>37</sup>.

Events quickly forced Attlee to take an uncharacteristically personal control of foreign policy, however. In a press conference on November 30th Truman made a hash of responding to a question concerning American nuclear doctrine with regard to Asia. Not only did he seem to suggest that active consideration was being given to using the bomb in Korea, but he also left the impression that the final decision on this would be left to the "commander in the field"; i.e. MacArthur. There was a howl of protest in Britain, both within Parliament and the Cabinet. Attlee was petitioned by Labour MPs to visit Truman immediately to clarify the situation, and within Cabinet Hugh Gaitskell, Hugh Dalton, and Kenneth Younger made similar pleas. Dalton wrote to Attlee on the evening of the 30th: "the latest events, so full of the gravest possibilities - including Truman's statement today on the atomic bomb - have convinced me that you ought to fly out to Washington at once"<sup>38</sup>. While Attlee would usually have entrusted such a task to Bevin, the latter's ill-

health made it impossible for him to travel, and so Attlee had to take his place. Attlee flew to Washington on 4th December in an attempt to influence American policy on several fronts: to seek immediate clarification of American nuclear doctrine in Asia, emphasize the dangers of a wider war with China, and resolve differences over policy regarding negotiation with China in terms of Korea, Chinese admission to the United Nations, and Formosa. By all accounts, the Prime Minister conducted his negotiations with the President skillfully. Dean Acheson certainly worried as to how successfully Attlee seemed to manipulate Truman during their early meetings. Acheson, who harbored no affection but a certain grudging respect for Attlee, commented later that "he was a far abler man than Winston Churchill's description of him as a 'sheep in sheep's clothing' would imply". Acheson continued that

Mr Attlee's method of discussion was that of the suave rather than the bellicose cross-examiner. He early noticed a tendency of the President to show concurrence or the reverse in each statement of his interlocutor as he went along. Framing his statements to draw Presidential agreement with his exposition, he soon led the President well onto the flypaper. At the second meeting, I stepped on the Presidents' foot and suggested that it might be helpful to the Prime Minister to let him complete his whole statement without interruption. It was far from helpful to the Prime Minister, as his glance at me indicated, but we fared better<sup>39</sup>.

The balance sheet of Attlee's visit was mixed. On the positive side, he received the reassurances sought by the British that American nuclear doctrine had not changed, and that, in Acheson's words, "alarm over the safety of our troops would not drive us to some ill-considered use of atomic weapons"<sup>40</sup>. More substantially, Attlee impressed upon Truman and Acheson the firm British opposition to the idea of "limited war" with China being canvassed by MacArthur and some of the more hawkish elements of the administration. Attlee succeeded in registering the point that "limited warfare would tend to be unlimited, especially if it was extended from Korea to the perimeter of China"<sup>41</sup>. However, he was much less successful on several other fronts. Truman and Acheson

would not give way either on negotiations with China over Korea nor on the question of Chinese admission to the UN Security Council. Attlee had pointed out that the Korean war was originally intended as "an assertion of the authority of the United Nations", that the Chinese "resented their exclusion from the United Nations and there was perhaps also a great deal of fear in their attitude", and that as a "young nationalist movement" it was somewhat unlikely that they were acting as a puppet of the USSR<sup>42</sup>. The solution to the current problems, in his view, could be found in negotiations at the UN with the Chinese government seated at the Security Council. This would, after all, only be to recognize "the fact that this Government has control of China and the Chinese people"<sup>43</sup>. The Americans did not agree:

Acheson's reply made it clear that there was considerable divergence between the American point of view and our own (British) as regards the interpretation of Chinese actions and intentions and of the relationship between China and Russia. He said that the central moving factor of the situation was not China, but Russia...In reply to a suggestion by the Prime Minister that the Chinese might prefer a middle position which would enable them to avoid becoming wholly dependent on Russia, Acheson insisted that China was little more than a Russian satellite<sup>44</sup>.

Attlee encountered absolutely no leeway on the issue of Formosa, but both sides accepted the issue was not as pressing as the others. On returning, Attlee proposed and the Cabinet agreed that his talks had been broadly successful: the idea of "limited war" against China seemed to have been dismissed and the alarm of America's allies over Truman's loose talk about nuclear weapons had been registered. However, this had been purchased at a price. While Attlee was in Washington, the Americans let slip no opportunity to demand that Britain increase defense spending. While Attlee had reminded the US of "the military burdens which had fallen on this country since the end of the war and the difficulty of imposing further defense expenditure on the national economy", he felt that further US

demands would be forthcoming: "it must be assumed that the United States Government would return to the subject at a later stage"<sup>45</sup>.

More immediate problems began to emerge, however. Firstly, MacArthur's behavior continued to alarm the British. His earlier proclamations of the capacity of his forces to crush the enemy had by now (early January 1951) been replaced by a policy of suspiciously rapid retreat, which had suggested that he was likely to be removed from the peninsula. The British chiefs of staff were incredulous at MacArthur's protestations that he was facing "an entirely new war", and felt that he was retreating in a headlong rather than a fighting fashion in order to secure authority to attack the Chinese mainland and provoke a general war. The Chiefs wrote on the 5th January, that

Frankly we find it difficult to believe that, with the backing of over-whelming air and sea power, the United Nations forces could not maintain a substantial hold on the Korean peninsula...General MacArthur's intelligence is not serving him and the United Nations well. We have no evidence that the Chinese forces in Korea are in fact anything like as strong as his repeated communiques make out - which frankly we find difficult to believe.<sup>46</sup>

The Foreign Office, in a covering note to Sir Oliver Franks' copy of this memo, added that "For your own information people here fear that MacArthur's tactics are being determined not by purely military considerations, but by his political sympathies"<sup>47</sup>.

Nor were the British reassured by the opening of a new front in US diplomacy. While America had reluctantly agreed to the establishment of a UN "ceasefire committee" to negotiate terms, they also began an initiative in early January to have the Security Council pass a resolution branding China as the "aggressor" in Korea. Bevin, who directed the initial British reaction to this proposal, felt that while China was hardly exerting herself to negotiate a ceasefire through the UN committee, "the dispute must eventually be settled through negotiation with the Chinese, and the chances of reaching a

settlement would be prejudiced if the United States government now insisted on introducing a resolution in the Assembly naming China as an aggressor nation"<sup>48</sup>. The decision over whether to support the US "brand China" resolution would be the last major decision taken by the Attlee government in the Korean crisis, as they would within six months be replaced by a Churchill-led conservative administration. While Bevin's health held, the core executive followed his policy of seeking to restrain the United States, while in the final analysis bowing to the necessity of maintaining positive relations. In Cabinet on 22nd January, Bevin noted with regret that "it had not proved possible to restrain the United States Government from putting forward...a resolution condemning Chinese aggression in Korea". Bevin outlined the now precarious situation: "The United States Government might prefer to withdraw their troops from Korea, and direct their attack upon the mainland of China. They might even wish to use Chiang Kai-shek's forces in hostilities on the mainland, and to foment a new civil war in China in which they would be supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communist forces". However, in the final analysis Britain would have to support America if she insisted upon it: "some means should...be found of handling that situation without any open rift between the commonwealth and the United States"<sup>49</sup>. Gladwyn Jebb, the British Ambassador to the United Nations, supported Bevin's analysis with a warning of the consequences of voting against the US resolution: "If things develop this way, then it is almost certain that American participation in the defence of Western Europe would also be gravely affected. That is what Acheson has already said in effect...(we would) therefore have to choose between subscribing to a condemnation of the Chinese aggressors and prejudicing American support for the free world"<sup>50</sup>.

Crucially, at this point Bevin's health failed for what would prove to be the final time. With the dominant Foreign Secretary removed from policy debate, those within the core executive who did not share his analysis of the situation had an opportunity to influence the decision. Attlee, summing up a Cabinet discussion dominated by Nye Bevan, who disagreed fundamentally with Korean policy, and Kenneth Younger, who favored a more assertive attitude than his immediate superior (Bevin) in dealing with the US, said "that in the discussions at the United Nations our policy must be to avoid precipitate action and to support any reasonable proposal designed to bring the Peking Government into conference"<sup>51</sup>. When efforts to have the United States withdraw or amend the resolution failed, Cabinet on the 25th reached the decision to veto the resolution:

The Government believed that the resolution as a whole represented a mistaken approach to the problem of Chinese intervention in Korea. They had already made it plain to the world that this was their view; and if, notwithstanding this, they now voted in favor of the United States resolution, it would be equally plain that they had voted, against their convictions, for the sole purpose of supporting the United States Government. They would forfeit their independence and their self-respect; and they would deprive themselves of any power to influence the United States Government on any future occasion"<sup>52</sup>.

This was the authentic voice of Nye Bevan, and Foot suggests that the absence of Bevin had amplified his ability to prevail in Cabinet<sup>53</sup>. Indeed, the minutes of the decisive meeting support this explanation: "The Foreign Secretary had indicated at an earlier stage that in his opinion the United Kingdom Government ought in the last resort to vote for the United States resolution; but it had not been possible to take his view on the present situation"<sup>54</sup>. However, Bevin's was not the only pro-American voice in the Cabinet. Immediately following the Cabinet decision of the 25th, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, went to see Attlee to impress upon him that he was "so much upset" and would have to "reconsider his position" if the Cabinet's decision was not reversed<sup>55</sup>. This



was a classic instance of a core executive actor using resources (the threat of resignation) in order to influence policy. Attlee was swayed. He announced in Cabinet the following day that, provided some minor amendments were accepted by the United States, he now thought, or rather felt "the balance of opinion in the Cabinet" suggested, that the resolution should be supported. An unnamed minister, almost certainly Bevan, made the case that "(t)he amendment of the resolution...did not affect the fundamental point that, in agreeing to it, we should be yielding to United States pressure in opposition to our own better judgment"<sup>56</sup>. The turnabout puzzled Bevan, who did not know of Gaitskell's threat to resign. Nonetheless, Gaitskell's tactics were successful, and the resolution branding China as the "aggressor" in Korea was passed, with British support, on 1st February.

### **Explaining the key decisions**

#### *The choice for war*

The choice for war was determined by macro and micro structural factors: the British reliance on American military assistance in Europe, and the resource distribution in the core executive: the pro-American Ernest Bevin was the best resourced core executive actor, and so his basic policy preference - stick to the Americans at almost any cost - prevailed.

#### *The decision to cross the 38th parallel*

The decision to support the US crossing of the 38th parallel was subsequently proven to be a major mistake. Why had the British core executive dismissed so nonchalantly the warnings that this would occur? This, after all, represented their fears as

to the consequences of America's Asian policies, of which they had themselves warned the US on several occasions. Additionally, the British had prior notice of the direction of Chinese thinking from a trustworthy source. Explanations can be found in the environmental constraints on British policy, the distribution of resources within the core executive, and the individual characteristics of Prime Minister Clement Attlee. In terms of environmental constraints, the British were, as noted, dependent upon American military aid for the defense of Europe. The US had increasingly made that aid contingent upon its allies "pulling their weight", and, in the case of Korea, supporting American policies which they believed to be ill-advised. This made it difficult to openly break with the US on the Korean issue. Secondly, the Foreign Secretary, who was more pro-American than many of his colleagues and had become committed to a strategy of low-key, behind the scenes conciliation of America in order to moderate its policies, was a very well-resourced core executive actor. Opponents of his policies, such as Nye Bevan, were unable to compete against his prestige and perceived expertise, even when Bevan was absent from deliberations for extended periods. At the crucial moment of decision over whether to support the US crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, Bevin asserted that any hint of opposition to US policies would endanger Britain's influence with the Truman administration. Much of Bevin's resource base came from the wide latitude granted him in foreign policy by the Prime Minister. As reported in Chapter three, Attlee was below average in need for power, and only average in belief in ability to control events and self confidence, meaning that he would be predicted to have a low need to maintain close personal control over policy and process – a prediction borne out by his delegation of policy making to the Foreign Secretary.

*Support for the 'brand China' UN resolution*

The core executive felt that the 'brand China' resolution was a poor way to deal with the situation in Korea, and yet still voted for it in the United Nations. Why was this so? The overarching cause was the structural imperative of supporting the United States in Korea in order that they would not lose interest in Europe. However, this structural constraint was not determinative, as was demonstrated by the fact that the core executive had reached a decision not to support the resolution before executing a spectacular reversal. What explains the original decision not to support the resolution, and the subsequent abandonment of that decision? Firstly, the absence due to ill-health of Ernest Bevin certainly gave those core executive actors opposed to the resolution a much greater chance of success. In the absence of the best-resourced core executive actor in foreign policy, Nye Bevan was able to exert a much greater influence over the direction of Cabinet debate and decision, and was able to initially prevail. This decision was overturned, and UK support given to the resolution, when Gaitskell utilized the last-resort resource of Cabinet ministers: the threat of resignation. This Bevan was not (as yet) ready to match. The importance of the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister here lies in Attlee's ceding of control of foreign policy to Bevin, which left a power vacuum when Bevin was absent, and Attlee's reticence to challenge his senior ministers due to his relatively low need for power, medium self confidence, and weak position in terms of resources. This meant that Attlee did not take a stand on his own, and so allowed the determinants of the decision to become the resources and strategies of his senior ministers.

### **Quantitative analysis**

As explained in Chapter Two, the decision making episode is disaggregated into separate "occasion for decisions". In this case, these procedures resulted in 21 separate points of observation for each of which a coding sheet addressing the variables developed in Chapter Two was completed. Analysis of these data can illuminate and sharpen the arguments made in the analytical narrative section concerning process and outcome, and provide linkages with quality of decision making variables.

#### *The core executive institution.*

The data in Table 10 show that the main site of decision during the Korean crisis was the full Cabinet. During all but two OCDs major decisions were taken in Cabinet. Civil servants challenged ministers on four occasions. Decision making on Korea was not characterized by measurable instances of secretive behavior, which is probably linked to the fact that decision making was predominantly undertaken through the full Cabinet. Finally, only on one occasion did the norm of collective Cabinet responsibility appear to stifle a policy doubt. This incident, involving Nye Bevan's doubts over what he perceived as a major militarization of anti-Communist policy, was referred to in detail during the analytical narrative.

Bevin was so well-resourced and Attlee so deferential to his foreign affairs judgment that only rarely did they disagree, and more rarely still did these disagreements result in the use of resources against one another. Resource use outside of the Prime Minister - Foreign Secretary dyad was more common, occurring on 8 out of 21 occasions. This was referred to in the account given in the analytical narrative of the policy

disagreements between Nye Bevan and the more pro-American senior ministers.

TABLE TEN: THE CORE EXECUTIVE INSTITUTION IN THE KOREAN CRISIS

	Yes	No
Decision taken in Cabinet	19	2
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee	6	15
Decision taken in Other location	9	12
Civil Service challenges ministers	4	17
Norm of central state secrecy results in restriction of information	0	21
Norm of collective responsibility appears to stifle policy doubts	1	20
Prime Minister/ Foreign Secretary disagree on policy?	5	16
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary	2	19
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister	3	18
Core Executive actors use resources against each other	8	13

*Individuals: Impact of the Prime Minister*

Table 3 displays data on the variables concerned with Prime Ministerial behavior. Attlee took a proactive approach to the policy issue on 7 out of 21 occasions, rarely displayed competitive behavior, and only infrequently challenged the interpretation of the situation/ policy recommendation offered by others. Attlee demonstrated a reasonably complex view of the situation, referring to more than one viewpoint/ dimension of an issue on 11 occasions. He changed views on three occasions. On no occasion did he show concern with maintaining harmony among his colleagues. This is consistent with his very high task orientation score (Table 11).

TABLE ELEVEN: IMPACT OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE KOREAN CRISIS.

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue	7	14
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/ dimension of issue	11	10
Prime Minister changes views	3	18
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior, a concern for personal prestige or authority	3	18
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation offered by others	5	16
Prime Minister shows concern with maintaining harmony among decision makers	0	21



### *Quality of Decision Making*

Table 12 displays data on the quality of decision making variables. The analytical narrative suggested that there was a good deal of agonizing over the degree of opposition which could be shown to US policies which were felt to be misguided. This accounts for several of the instances where multiple policies were considered and previous policy decisions were reconsidered. For the majority of the crisis, the core executive was extremely careful about specifying the dangers involved in policy (usually in the context of seeking to impress these upon US decision makers), with the major exception of the issue of crossing the 38th parallel. As table 5 shows, on the majority of occasions the objectives of policy were specified and more than one policy was considered. Additional sources of information were sought on 9 out of 21 occasions. Costs, risks, and implications of policy were specified on all but one occasion - the crossing of the 38th parallel, which was treated extensively during the analytical narrative.

In terms of institutional and individual correlates of decision making quality, the following statistically significant relationships exist:

- There is a negative relationship between 'objectives of policy specified' and 'decision taken in Cabinet committee' (-.671,  $p = .001$ ).
- There is a positive relationship between 'previously rejected policy reconsidered' and 'Prime Minister changes view' (.428,  $p = .053$ ).
- There are three relationships between 'Additional sources of information actively sought' and the explanatory variables: A strong positive relationship with 'decision taken in other location' (.611,  $p = .003$ ); a positive relationship with 'Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary' (.375,  $p = .094$ ); and a negative relationship

with 'Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation offered by others' (-.484,  $p = .026$ ).

- There is a positive relationship between 'policy is changed in light of new information' and 'Prime Minister changes views' (.520,  $p = .016$ ).

TABLE 12: QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING IN THE KOREAN CRISIS.

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Objectives of policy specified	14	7
More than one policy considered	17	4
Previously rejected policy reconsidered	10	11
Additional sources of information actively sought	9	12
Responsiveness to information (policy change / information suggests policy change)	8/15	
Costs, risks, and implications of preferred policy choice specified	20	1

## **Conclusion**

The process, outcome, and quality of decision making during the Korean crisis was shaped by the distinctive individual characteristics of Prime Minister Clement Attlee, the distribution of resources within the core executive, and the structure of core executive institutions and norms. The crisis is interesting, and perhaps unusual, in terms of the dynamics generated by a reticent Prime Minister and a heavily-resourced, assertive Foreign Secretary. In this chapter, the combination of these factors was linked to the major policy choices during the Korean crisis: the choice for war; the decision to cross the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel despite acute awareness of the risks in so doing, and the somewhat convoluted path towards the decision to support the ‘brand China’ resolution within the United Nations. The major findings of the quantitative analysis were that the main site for decision was the full Cabinet, that the crucial relationship between Attlee and Bevin was rarely characterized by conflict, that Attlee rarely acted in an assertive fashion and displayed reasonably complex information processing during the crisis, and that decision making was characterized by the consistent specification of the costs, risks, and implications of policies which the core executive felt to be unwise purely on the merits.

TABLE 13: CHRONOLOGY OF THE KOREAN CRISIS

<b>#</b>	<b><u>Dates</u></b>	<b><u>Major Events in Crisis</u></b>	<b><u>Core Executive Interaction</u></b>	<b><u>Policy Decisions</u></b>
1	6/25 - 6/27	6/25: North Korea attacks South Korea. Un Security Council passes resolution calling for South Korean withdrawal. 6/27: America commits forces to South Korean defense, British agree to support US.	6/26: Attlee and Younger visit Bevin in hospital to discuss policy. 6/27: Full Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support US policy in Korea, with reservations about wider US-Asian policy.</li> </ul>
2	6/28 - 7/4		6/28: Defense Committee meeting. 7/4: Full Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UK naval forces put at disposal of US.</li> </ul>
3	7/5 - 7/6		7/5: Defense Committee meeting. 7/6: Defence Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proposal for US-UK talks.</li> </ul>
4	7/7 - 7/16	7/7: General MacArthur placed in command of UN forces.	7/11: Defense Committee meeting 7/14: Defense Committee meeting. 7/15: Franks letter to Attlee.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Controls on exports to China tightened.</li> </ul>
5	7/17 - 7/18		7/17: Full Cabinet meeting. 7/18: Full Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bevin approaches Moscow to explore possibilities of USSR using influence on North Korea to promote a negotiated settlement.</li> </ul>

6	7/20 - 7/25		7/20: Full Cabinet meeting. 7/24: Defence Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UK, in response to urgent American request, agrees to send ground troops to Korea.</li> <li>• Shinwell proposes increase in British defence budget, again in response to American requests.</li> </ul>
7	7/25 - 8/16	8/4: UN forces close to being pushed off Korean peninsula, holding small bridgehead in Pusan.	7/25: Full Cabinet meeting. 8/1: Full Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decision to send small UK ground force, drawn from Hong Kong garrison, immediately in advance of larger force.</li> <li>• Increase in defence budget of 3600 million pounds sterling.</li> </ul>
8	8/17 - 8/31		8/17: Elliott memo to Attlee on UK contribution for Korea. 8/31: Bevin memo to Cabinet on Korea.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bevin suggests UN resolution on future of Korea.</li> </ul>
9	9/1 - 9/4		9/1: Defence Committee Meeting. 9/4: Cabinet Meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bevin outlines to Cabinet his tactics for forthcoming talks with US.</li> </ul>
10	9/5- 9/24	9/15: MacArthur lands at Inchon.	9/12: Bevin in New York to discuss Korean war 9/14: Cabinet Meeting 9/15: Cabinet Meeting 9/21-9/23: Telegrams between Bevin in New York and Attlee in London.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bevin proposes principles of UN resolution on future of Korea.</li> </ul>
11	9/25- 9/26		9/25: Cabinet Meeting. 9/26: Cabinet Meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agrees that MacArthur should cross 38th parallel.</li> </ul>

12	9/27-10/6		9/28: Cabinet Meeting. 10/6: Bevin memo for Cabinet on New York talks.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UK decides not to compel MacArthur to halt advance in spite of warnings from India of impending Chinese intervention.</li> </ul>
13	10/7/50 - 11/4/50	10/7: UN General Assembly passes resolution calling for unification of Korea and holding of elections. 10/9: Advanced elements of UN command cross 38th parallel. 10/31-11/2: Chinese "volunteers" encountered by UN forces.	10/16: Cabinet Meeting; Defence Committee Meeting. 10/25: Defence Committee Meeting 10/27: Cabinet Meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bevin tells Cabinet on 10/9 "insufficient foundation" for fears of Chinese intervention.</li> </ul>
14	11/6/50 - 11/18/50		11/6: Cabinet Meeting. 11/9: Cabinet Meeting. 11/10: Cabinet Meeting. 11/13: Cabinet Meeting. 11/16: Cabinet Meeting 11/17: Cabinet Meeting. 11/18: Cabinet Meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proposals agreed to be put to US: Ceasefire talks with China through the UN; Withdrawal of UN forces to 40th parallel.</li> </ul>
15	11/20/50 - 11/24/50	11/24: MacArthur launches "final offensive". Quickly turned back by massive Chinese forces.	11/20: Cabinet Meeting. 11/21: Chiefs of Staff memo on MacArthur.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bevin pursuing "buffer zone" idea for resolving conflict.</li> </ul>
16	11/27/50 - 11/30/50	11/30: Truman appears to suggest consideration is being given to use of atomic bomb in Korea.	11/27: Defence Committee Meeting. 11/29: Cabinet Meeting. 11/30: Cabinet Meeting (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decide to make further representations to US on seeking diplomatic resolution.</li> <li>Attlee to go to Washington to discuss atom bomb remarks and wider Asian policy.</li> </ul>

17	12/1 - 12/12	12/4-12/8: Attlee in Washington for talks with Truman.	12/4-12/8: Attlee cables to London to report on progress of talks. 12/4: Cabinet Meeting. 12/11: Cabinet Meeting. 12/12: Cabinet Meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presses Truman over China, atom bomb remarks.</li> </ul>
18	12/12/50 - 1/9/51		1/2/51: Cabinet Meeting. 1/5/51: Chiefs of Staff memo to US Chiefs of Staff expressing extreme concern over actions of MacArthur.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue exerting pressure on US to negotiate with China.</li> <li>• Make representations to US over MacArthur.</li> </ul>
19	1/9 - 1/22		1/15: Cabinet Meeting. 1/18: Cabinet Meeting. 1/22: Cabinet Meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Debate over whether to vote for or against US resolution at UN "branding" China as the aggressor in Korea.</li> </ul>
20	1/23 - 1/25		1/23: Cabinet Meeting. 1/25: Cabinet Meeting (2). 1/25: Gaitskell visits Attlee to threaten resignation over decision to vote against US resolution.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decision to vote against UN resolution.</li> </ul>
21	1/26 - 2/1	2/1: UN General Assembly passes resolution branding China as aggressor in Korea.	1/26: Cabinet Meeting. 1/29: Cabinet Meeting. 2/1: Cabinet Meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reversal of decision to vote against UN resolution.</li> </ul>



- 
- <sup>1</sup> CAB 128/17 CM (50), 39.
- <sup>2</sup> CAB128/ 18. CM (50), 44.
- <sup>3</sup> quoted in Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, (London: Heinemann, 1983):794.
- <sup>4</sup> Elisabeth Barker, *Britain Between the Superpowers 1945-1950*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1983): 204.
- <sup>5</sup> CAB 131/9 Situation in Korea: Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff, 28.6.50.
- <sup>6</sup> PREM 8/1405 Attlee to Truman, 6.7.50.
- <sup>7</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50), 43.
- <sup>8</sup> CAB 131/9 Situation in Korea: Note by Chiefs of Staff, 5.7.50.
- <sup>9</sup> CAB 131/8 DO (50), 14th Meeting.
- <sup>10</sup> PREM 8/1405 Franks to Attlee, 15. 7.50.
- <sup>11</sup> Barker, 207.
- <sup>12</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 47.
- <sup>13</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50), 46.
- <sup>14</sup> Callum MacDonald, *Britain and the Korean War*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990): 21; Bullock, 795.
- <sup>15</sup> CAB 131/8 DO (50), 15th Meeting.
- <sup>16</sup> CAB 131/8. DO (50), 15th Meeting.
- <sup>17</sup> Kenneth O. Morgan, *Labour in Power 1945-1951*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984): 294.
- <sup>18</sup> Michael Foot, *Aneurin Bevan: A Biography*, (New York: Atheneum, 1963): 308.
- <sup>19</sup> Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, (London: Richard Cohen Books, 1996): 108.
- <sup>20</sup> PREM 8/1405 Elliot to Attlee, 17.8.50.
- <sup>21</sup> quoted in Bullock, 805.
- <sup>22</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50), 55.
- <sup>23</sup> PREM 8/1405 Korea: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 31.8.50.
- <sup>24</sup> PREM 8/1405 Attlee to Bevin, 21.8.50.
- <sup>25</sup> PREM 8/1405 Bevin to Attlee, 22.8.50.
- <sup>26</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 61.
- <sup>27</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 62.
- <sup>28</sup> PREM 8/1405 New York Meetings: Developments in Far Eastern Policy, 6.10.50.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> Bullock, 813.
- <sup>31</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 63.
- <sup>32</sup> PREM 8/1405 Chinese Intervention in Korea, 10.11.50.
- <sup>33</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 73.
- <sup>34</sup> Clement Attlee, *As It Happened*, (New York: Viking Press, 1954): 281.
- <sup>35</sup> PREM 8/1405 Elliot to Attlee, 21.11.50.
- <sup>36</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 76.
- <sup>37</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 78.
- <sup>38</sup> Morgan, 427.
- <sup>39</sup> Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York: Norton, 1969): 481.

- 
- <sup>40</sup> Acheson, 479.
- <sup>41</sup> FO 37/183014 Washington to Foreign Office, 8.12.50.
- <sup>42</sup> FO 37/183014 Foreign Office to Singapore, 7.12.50.
- <sup>43</sup> FO 37/ 183014 Attlee to Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 9.12.50.
- <sup>44</sup> FO 37/183014 Foreign Office to Singapore, 7.12.50.
- <sup>45</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (50) 85.
- <sup>46</sup> PREM 8/1405 British Chiefs of Staff to General Bradley, 5.1.51.
- <sup>47</sup> PREM 8/1405 Foreign Office to Washington, 6.1.51.
- <sup>48</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (51) 1st Conclusions.
- <sup>49</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (51) 5th Conclusions.
- <sup>50</sup> Peter Lowe, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-1", *The English Historical Review* 105 (1990): 91.
- <sup>51</sup> CAB 128/19 CM (51) 6.
- <sup>52</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (51) 8.
- <sup>53</sup> Foot, 314
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup> CAB 128/18 CM (51), 9.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE SUEZ CRISIS**

The Suez crisis is regarded as perhaps the prime fiasco in post-1945 British foreign policy. Indeed, the crisis has taken on a wider symbolic meaning in that it seemed to represent, in a most sudden way, the end of Britain's standing as a genuine world power. The outcome of the crisis was precisely the opposite of what the core executive desired; instead of removing General Abdul Gammer Nasser as the head of the government of Egypt and demonstrating continued British strength, Nasser's prestige was increased greatly by his defiance of Western powers and British weakness was exposed. Additionally, the British government, and in particular Prime Minister Anthony Eden, were revealed as having taken part in a French-authored plan which was not only illegal under international law and extremely duplicitous, but also rather far-fetched. This chapter investigates the institutional and individual determinants of the decisions which brought about these results. Firstly, the distribution of resources among core executive actors during this crisis is considered, with particular focus on Eden's high prestige and the lack of resources of his subservient Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd. Secondly, the individual characteristics of Prime Minister Anthony Eden are reported. Thirdly, the analytical narrative of the crisis process-traces the linkages between individuals, institutions, and process and outcome of decision making. The quantitative data on the institutional, individual, and quality of decision making variables are reported, and conclusions presented.

### **Distribution of resources**

Eden was a very well resourced core executive actor. He was considered the foremost

authority on foreign affairs of his generation. By many measures, Eden could be considered the second most experienced Prime Minister in foreign affairs since 1945, behind only Churchill. His personal reputation for mastery of foreign affairs, developed as Churchill's wartime Foreign Secretary and cemented during his second run at the foreign office prior to Churchill's retirement, was considered a "national asset"<sup>1</sup>. Consequently, Eden's personal experience and expertise were a major resource to him during core executive deliberations on foreign policy. Eden consolidated his personal authority by replacing Harold Macmillan, the independent minded Foreign Secretary he inherited from Churchill, with the much less substantial figure of Selwyn Lloyd. Lloyd, of whom Sir Ivonne Kirkpatrick commented "his only ambition was not to get into trouble"<sup>2</sup>, neither wanted nor felt qualified to occupy the post of Foreign Secretary. Indeed, on being given his first junior foreign affairs appointment by Churchill several years previously, Lloyd commented that "I do not speak any foreign languages. Except in war I have never visited any foreign countries. I do not like foreigners. I have never spoken in a foreign affairs debate in the house. I have never listened to one"<sup>3</sup>. Lloyd, who was intensely conscious of his lack of experience and the fact that he owed his high rank to Eden personally, was slow to question the judgment of his Prime Minister, and slow to use those resources available to him as Foreign Secretary to influence policy in ways contrary to that desired by Eden. Other senior ministers were R. A. "Rab" Butler, the Lord Privy Seal who had designs on the party leadership, and Lord Salisbury, the Lord President of the Council.

While Eden had strong foreign policy credentials, however, he was vulnerable to some degree on the question of policy towards Nasser. Eden had become personally

identified with an approach of constructive engagement towards the Egyptian leader, culminating in a treaty signed in 1954 requiring all British forces to leave Egypt by 18th June 1956<sup>4</sup>. In addition, the British offer to part finance the Aswan High Dam had been unpopular within certain sections of the Conservative party. The combination of these factors meant that, by early 1956, Eden was struggling to avoid being tagged an "appeaser" with regard to Nasser, and was facing an organized group of backbench opposition known as the "Suez group"<sup>5</sup>.

### Characteristics of the Prime Minister

Table 14 reports data on the individual characteristics of Sir Anthony Eden (see chapter three)

TABLE 14: TRAIT SCORES: ANTHONY EDEN

	Belief in Ability to Control Events	Conceptual Complexity	Need for Power	Self Confidence	Task Orientation
Mean Score	38	55.9	22.3	45.9	67.6
Difference from post 1945 Prime Ministers ( <i>t</i> score)	1.751*	.749	-.112	1.946*	-.041

\*  $p \leq .10$

These data can be associated with predictions concerning Eden's behavior in

decision making situations. His belief in ability to control events score is significantly higher than the group's, suggesting he will take a proactive orientation towards policy. His conceptual complexity score is higher than the group's, but not significantly so. He should therefore be able to discern and act upon more than one aspect of the policy situation, and be able to change views to accommodate major changes in the situation. His need for power score is lower than the group's, but not significantly so. Based upon this, we would expect him to occasionally but not consistently exhibit competitive behavior. His self confidence score is significantly higher than the group's, leading us to expect that he would challenge the interpretations / recommendations of others on a regular basis. Finally, his task orientation score is marginally lower than the group's, but the difference is not significant. We would therefore expect him to occasionally but not consistently display a concern with maintaining harmony among decision makers.

### **Background to the crisis**

It is necessary to understand two important events in the months leading to the crisis: the dismissal of Glubb Pasha from Jordan, and the Aswan High Dam episode.

General Sir John Bagot Glubb ("Glubb Pasha") occupied the post of head of the 'Arab Legion'; a British force inside Jordan which was designed to maintain order within the country. Glubb served at the pleasure of the King of Jordan, Abdullah, and he gained a large degree of popularity within Britain as something of a symbolic representation of supposed British power, superiority, and benevolence within the Middle East. However, resentment of this role was growing within Jordan, and the King dismissed Glubb suddenly on 1 March 1955. The significance of this to later events regarding Suez is two-fold. Firstly, Eden was convinced that Nasser had orchestrated the dismissal of Glubb as

part of a strategy to gain pan-Arab standing, and that the King of Jordan was merely a peripheral figure in the matter<sup>6</sup>. Secondly, it has been suggested that this episode engendered within Eden a deep personal dislike and distrust of Nasser. Anthony Nutting, a Foreign Office minister who knew Eden well, contends that Eden abandoned perspective in regards to the Egyptian leader following this event<sup>7</sup>.

The second crucial background event prior to the crisis was the episode of the Aswan High Dam. The Americans and the British had agreed to help fund the dam as part of a strategy of engagement with the Egyptians, with the not insignificant benefit of freezing out Soviet influence from the region. However, congressional opposition within the United States had placed increasing pressure on the Eisenhower administration to withdraw funding for the project, which they did somewhat abruptly on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1955. The British government had similarly been looking for a way to shirk their obligations toward the project, but felt that the Americans had handled the matter indelicately. Indeed, Nasser felt this was something of a betrayal, and cited the episode as the motivation for his nationalization of the canal – he argued that the dues from the canal would replace British and American monies in financing construction of the dam.

### **Analytical narrative of the crisis**

The proximate cause of the crisis was the forcible nationalization of the Suez canal on the orders of Gamel Abdul Nasser on 26th June 1956. At 10.15pm, during a dinner with the Iraqi political elite attended by Eden and his senior Cabinet ministers, the Prime Minister was passed a note reporting Nasser's actions. An ad hoc meeting began immediately, and other senior members of the government were summoned. Eden dominated this meeting, and his framing of the situation was that Britain must take some action to prevent Nasser

from "getting away with it"<sup>8</sup>. Eden asked Lord Mountbatten, the senior service chief present, what sort of immediate military response Britain could muster. The answer was unsatisfactory. While a small force could seize part of the canal quickly, the force would be vulnerable to Egyptian counter-attack, and would leave much of the canal in Egyptian hands<sup>9</sup>. Had Eden been presented with an immediate military response, it is likely that he would have secured the assent of those present to launch it, and indeed public opinion would have been supportive of an instant operation. Eden was to have reason to regret the absence of this option at this stage, as after the initial flush of public and world indignation it would become difficult to justify the use of force against Egypt absent some further act of provocation.

In the full Cabinet meeting of the following morning, Eden announced that an immediate military response was not available. Eden argued that the issue was one of "the widest international importance" and that Cabinet should view Nasser's actions as an opportunity to achieve a "lasting settlement" of the canal issue. In the absence of an immediate military option, the Cabinet turned its attention to the manner in which the British case against Nasser could be framed and pursued effectively over the coming weeks. There was a recognition that Britain was on "weak ground...from a narrow legal point of view, his (Nasser's) action amounted to no more than a decision to buy out the shareholders". Economic sanctions alone were also considered unlikely to make Egypt yield. Instead, Cabinet agreed that maximum political pressure must be brought to bear on the Egyptians by the users of the canal. Eden pushed the discussion one step further, and argued that "the fundamental question before the Cabinet...was whether they were prepared in the last resort to pursue their objective by the threat or even the use of force".



The Cabinet agreed that they were<sup>10</sup>. This was a crucial decision. With the agreement of the Cabinet to use force, military preparations could begin and Eden could claim that any of a broad range of actions had secured Cabinet support. Of course, the crucial difference between ministers was in what constituted the "last resort". Some ministers, it would transpire, were quicker to decide that this had been reached than others. However, under the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility, it would prove to be very difficult for ministers against the military option to identify a development upon which to make a stand, given that they had assented to the "last resort" formulation.

Eden was able to manage somewhat this balancing act by the creation of a smaller decision making group, agreed to in the 27th July Cabinet meeting: the Egypt Committee (figure 2).

FIGURE 2: EGYPT COMMITTEE

<b>Politicians</b>	<b>Civil Servants</b>
PRIME MINISTER Sir Anthony Eden	FOREIGN OFFICE PERMENANT SECRETARY Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
FOREIGN SECRETARY Selwyn Lloyd	SECRETARY TO THE CABINET Sir Norman Brook
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER Harold Macmillan	CABINET SECRETARIAT B. St. J. Trend
MINISTER OF DEFENCE Walter Monckton	CABINET SECRETARIAT Major-General W. G. Stirling
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY Alec Douglas-Home	
LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL Lord Salisbury	

There are several notable features of the membership of the Egypt Committee. Firstly, its membership was fluid, with ministers periodically attending when discussions directly concerned their portfolio. It is important to note that although Rab Butler, the second ranking member of the Cabinet, is not included in the original formal list of members, he nonetheless attended almost every session. The position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was also significant. Harold Macmillan had been until recently Foreign Secretary, and had been disappointed to be moved to the treasury. Macmillan would prove to be the most hawkish member of Eden's Cabinet, and his inclusion among the regular members of the Egypt Committee meant that the use of force option had a consistent and formidable proponent. Remarkably, the Minister of Defence was the least

hawkish of the inner circle members, and the decision to use force would eventually prompt his resignation. Finally, it should be recalled that the Foreign Secretary was very weak, and did not feel he had the resources nor the right to exercise much opposition to any policy decided upon by Eden. Each of these factors was important in determining the shape of Egypt Committee decision making. The purpose of the committee was to deal with the crisis on a day to day basis. In practice, this meant that operational military planning was handled almost exclusively in the Egypt Committee, while much of the diplomatic effort was handled by the full Cabinet. This division of labor made it possible for Eden to preserve a de jure consensus within government (use of force after all other options had been exhausted) long after any real consensus had evaporated. By shielding the full Cabinet from intimate knowledge of the details of military planning, Eden could for a time hold his government together around the fundamental policy decision of the 27th.

Also on the 27th Eden made his first approach to President Eisenhower. Recognizing that American support would be crucial, Eden sought in a telegram to the President to define the Suez issue not as a "legal quibble about the rights of the Egyptian government to nationalize what is technically an Egyptian company" but as a matter upon which it is was vital for the US and the UK to take a firm stand: "If we do not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be finally destroyed"<sup>11</sup>. By the 10.30am meeting of the Egypt Committee on Saturday 28th, Eden had received a reply from Eisenhower which urged that a conference of maritime powers be called. The Prime Minister directed the Egypt Committee to consider the delicate nature of the timing and composition of such a conference, and the committee agreed that

"It was not...wise to hold such a conference immediately: it would be preferable to delay until military preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable forceful action (should this be necessary) to follow hard upon the presentation to the Egyptian government of any plan approved by maritime countries"<sup>12</sup>. This was to be a preoccupation of the British throughout the crisis: how to properly utilize international instruments in order to provide a reasonable basis for the launching of military operations, and how to avoid these operations being delayed or rendered illegitimate by such instruments. This, along with the position of the US government, would prove to be the major environmental constraint on core executive policy.

Cabinet on the 27th had agreed that representatives of the French and American governments should be invited to London to coordinate policy. Christian Pineau, the Foreign Minister of France, and Robert Murphy, of the US State Department, arrived in the UK late on the 28th. France, with its major interests in the area and belief that Nasser was aiding Algerian rebels, was unrestrained in urging military action by the western powers. The British felt that American support for any operation was essential, but that support could be achieved if the matter were presented in the correct light to the Americans. Both were to be disappointed by Murphy, who stressed that the United States could not consider military action and believed that an "impartial tribunal", such as the United Nations, should handle the matter<sup>13</sup>. The British were to underestimate the degree of US opposition to military action, and retained for some time the belief that the Americans would come aboard eventually if the issue were cast as one of international control of the canal and a matter of resisting aggression rather than a simple dispute between Egypt and two European colonial powers.

The 10.30am Egypt Committee on the 30th July revealed a major discrepancy between the public and private aims of British policy. While Britain was making a case publicly which revolved around the need to bring the Suez canal under international control, "our immediate objective", it was stated behind the closed doors of the Egypt Committee, "was to bring about the downfall of the present Egyptian government"<sup>14</sup>. This presented a problem of coordination: actions intended to achieve the private goal had to be plausibly related to the public goal. Thus, the committee intended for the maritime conference to which they had agreed to have only one purpose: to produce a note in ultimatum form which would provide a pretext for military operations if rejected by Egypt. However the US, which wanted the conference to genuinely seek a diplomatic resolution, would not submit to this perversion of its purpose. Dulles on the 30th repeated the US view that military action could not be justified in this regard, and asserted that several weeks preparation time would be necessary before the conference could be convened<sup>15</sup>.

Eden's approach to the problem of securing US support was to couch the matter as one of international importance and a matter of resisting aggression. However, Harold Macmillan now adopted a different strategy. In an after dinner meeting with Murphy, the hawkish Chancellor spoke urgently and graphically of the determination of the British to prevail, and the inevitability of military operations: "Whatever conferences, arrangements, public postures and maneuvers might be necessary, in the end the government was determined to use force"<sup>16</sup>. Macmillan's strategy was to convince the US of Britain's determination, and thus secure her support in applying pressure on Egypt to back down. If the US doubted Britain's resolution, this line of reasoning went, then the

whole crisis would be bogged down in negotiation and the US would not be forced to take sides. If they were forced to take sides, they would surely come down in support of Britain.

This strategy for co-opting the Americans differed from Eden's at least in emphasis. Murphy relayed Macmillan's belligerence directly to Eisenhower, who was thoroughly alarmed at what he took to be the decision of the British to go to war as soon as possible. Eisenhower dispatched Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to London immediately, and sent with him a letter addressed to Eden expressing "regret that the decision for force seemed to have already been made by the UK"<sup>17</sup>. Macmillan was pleased by these results, recording in his diary "It seems that we have succeeded in thoroughly alarming Murphy. He must have reported in the sense in which we wanted, and Foster Dulles is now coming over post-haste"<sup>18</sup>. Other British decision makers were confused by the letter. Selwyn Lloyd commented that "this was a strange letter. Eden had sent no message to the effect that we were going to use force without delay or without trying other pressures first. The Cabinet had not approved the immediate use of force"<sup>19</sup>. Reading its repeated cautions, Eden commented that "the President did not rule out the use of force"<sup>20</sup>. This was technically true, but not at all what the letter was intended to convey. Eden, who had not been present during Macmillan's performance, found it difficult to understand how his carefully nuanced arguments tailored to appeal to Eisenhower's internationalist predispositions had brought such meager results, and so tended to assume that the President and he were in greater agreement than recent communications would suggest.

Dulles' visit served only to deepen the confusion. Macmillan repeated the

histrionics in a private visit with the secretary: "I told Foster, as plainly as I could, that we just could not afford to lose this game. It was a question not of honour only but of survival. I think he was quite alarmed; for he had hoped to find me less extreme, I think. We must keep the Americans really frightened. They must not be allowed any illusion. Then they will help us get what we want"<sup>21</sup>. Macmillan's entrepreneurial actions show a strategically placed core executive actor utilizing a resource (access and friendships with significant international figures) in order to bend policy towards their own preferences. Dulles himself, among old friends and seeking to at least stop the British from using force before the proposed international conference, was careless in leaving the impression that American policy was more amenable towards force than Eisenhower's letter suggested. Dulles said to Lloyd that "a way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was trying to swallow", a phrase that, Eden recalled, "rang in my ears for months"<sup>22</sup>. Dulles did achieve his primary objective however, as the full Cabinet on Wednesday 1st August agreed to his proposal for a maritime conference.

Military planning had now progressed to the point where the chiefs of staff could present an embryonic concept for an assault on Egypt. This plan, which involved an assault initially on Port Said leading to a takeover of the canal zone, was codenamed *Muskateer*. Information about military planning was from herein restricted to a small circulation list known as *Terrapin*<sup>23</sup>. This restriction of information relied on an invocation of the norm of British central state secrecy, which would be a persistent feature of Suez crisis decision making.

Macmillan, meanwhile, continued to freelance. A contact within the chiefs of staff had informed him of a concept involving the use of Israel, still technically in a state of

war with Egypt, as a proxy in order to begin a conflagration which the British could manipulate into a way of bringing down Nasser. In Egypt Committee on 3rd August, Macmillan stated his view that “the simplest course would be to make use of the immense threat to Egypt that resulted from the position of Israel on her flank”. In reply, Selwyn Lloyd pointed out that involvement of the Israeli’s would merely serve to unite the Arab world behind Egypt<sup>24</sup>. Eden and Lloyd were at this point flatly opposed to involving the Israelis, in part reflecting the fact that the British forces in the Middle East had dormant orders for operations against Israel in the event she attacked Jordan, an ally of Britain's. Indeed, when Macmillan submitted a formal paper arguing for the involvement of Israel, Eden refused to circulate it, much to Macmillan’s annoyance. Undeterred, Macmillan suggested in the 3pm Egypt Committee meeting of 7th August that *Muskateer* had insufficiently broad objectives: “we should have done no more than put ourselves back into the canal zone; and we had already learnt from bitter experience that we could not control Egypt from there. If, as he believed, our real aim was to overthrow Nasser’s government, it might be wiser to undertake an operation more directly related to that objective”. Members of the committee were obliged at this point to remind the chancellor that, while this might be the private objective, the public objective remained the placing of the canal under international control<sup>25</sup>. There is some evidence that Eden was becoming irritated by Macmillan’s activities: a note during this period to Eden from Sir Norman Brook, the Secretary of the Cabinet, reported that at a Cabinet meeting from which Eden had been absent, Macmillan had expressed some strong views about the forthcoming maritime conference; Eden wrote on his copy of the note: “Not his business anyway!”<sup>26</sup>.



The core executive was now faced with major problems of coordination between the forthcoming international conference and the timetable for operations accompanying *Muskateer*. On 14th August, Sir Norman Brook presented a "Forecast of the timetable" by which the strands of British policy could be brought together<sup>27</sup>. The military operation required orders to be given 13 days prior to its actual launch, whereas the necessities of diplomacy required that such orders could not be given until the conference had been concluded, proposals resulting from the conference (presumably) rejected by Egypt, and Parliament had been recalled and had given its approval for military action. The difficulty with slowing down the military timetable was that the operation could only be postponed for a short period before the weather and the deterioration in readiness of forces made it inviolable. The difficulty with speeding up the military timetable was that such moves would be seen as an abandonment of processes of diplomacy, such as the international conference, to which Britain was publicly committed. Therefore, each stage of the timetable to war was allotted a short and inflexible period of time: 7 days for the international conference, 10 days for proposals to be sent and rejected, 2 days for a Parliamentary debate. Difficulties would be encountered if the conference became bogged down in lengthy deliberations, and especially if the conference produced proposals which either bound British freedom of action or allowed Nasser to send a reply part way between acceptance and rejection, and thus stall for time. The ideal was for a short conference to allow Britain to claim she had tried diplomacy, and for a set of proposals to emerge which would provoke Nasser into committing some further act of provocation, which the Egypt Committee had agreed was now essential before public opinion would support the use of force. With these considerations in mind, Eden in

Cabinet on 14th August outlined an ideal scenario for the British:

The Prime Minister suggested that, if the conference endorsed the need for establishing an international authority for the Suez Canal, the countries mainly concerned might agree that, pending the establishment of an international authority, no further transit dues should be paid to any Egyptian authority...Agreement to pay all dues to a blocked account with, say, the International Bank pending the establishment of the new international authority should quickly cause Colonel Nasser to lose prestige. If he were to retaliate by stopping ships from using the canal or by taking action against the employees of the Suez Canal Company, a new situation would have arisen which would warrant the use of force against Egypt<sup>28</sup>.

The international conference began on the 16th August and concluded on the 23rd—matching the British timetable exactly. The conference produced a resolution, proposed by Dulles with the backing of Britain and France, which called for the establishment of a “Suez Canal Board”, with an international membership, to manage the canal. There would be an arbitration commission to settle any disputes, and “effective sanctions” for any interference or threat to interfere with the operation of the canal<sup>29</sup>. Dulles made an effective lobbying effort to rally support for this resolution, and 18 of 22 states attending the conference assented to it. The British and French hoped that Dulles might agree to present the resolution to Nasser himself, but he declined to allow the United States to be so committed, and a delegation of five, chaired by the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, was dispatched to Egypt. The British were pleased by both the brevity and the resolution of the conference, which had not interfered with the military timetable and had produced proposals which appeared not unreasonable to the world but were likely to be rejected by Nasser<sup>30</sup>.

Eden was at this stage pursuing a complex policy based on a tenuous consensus in two respects: First, in the core executive itself, the basic agreement of Cabinet on 27th July to use force in the last resort, but to exhaust diplomatic possibilities first, was a broad umbrella under which both hawk and dove could at least temporarily shelter.

Second, internationally, Eden was attempting to find an appropriate framing of action against Egypt which would satisfy both the United States, which was very much against the use of force, and France, which saw little need for any delay or further “dressing up” of military operations. Internally, Eden had been able to maintain this balance by confining knowledge and discussion of military matters to the Egypt Committee, and allowing the full Cabinet to address only the diplomatic moves. Internationally, Eden maintained the balance by casting the dispute in terms of the issue of control of the canal rather than the private aim of overthrowing Nasser, by agreeing to Dulles’ conference idea, and by seeking a pretext by which action could be justified to world opinion. Eden’s personal view appears to have been that force was the best and only guarantee of the removal of Nasser, and that this was the overwhelming goal. However, Eden was not set on the use of force at any cost, and recognized the internal core executive and the external international constraints upon a belligerent policy. The recognition of these constraints is consistent with his above average conceptual complexity score; such leaders are able to discern multiple dimensions to policy issues. Therefore, Eden pushed along military timetables and actively sought to create a situation wherein force could be presented as a justifiable policy, but was aware of and acted upon the difficulties involved in the use of force. An example of this occurred during the Egypt Committee meeting of the 14th August. The committee considered the difficulties of the military option, and the pressure from the United States to allow political and economic measures to take effect against Egypt.

The Prime Minister said that, once the military operation had been launched, it would be politically impossible to call it off unless Colonel Nasser’s government collapsed before any action took place...In the circumstances, it would be preferable to delay the final decision to launch any military operation until it was certain that such action was

required...The Prime Minister suggested that a decision on the timetable should be deferred for 48 hours until the Foreign Secretary had been able to consult the United States Secretary of State on the likelihood of United States cooperation in strong economic measures to enforce the proposals agreed by the international conference<sup>31</sup>.

The importance of this is that Eden did not become irretrievably set upon a military assault at all costs until relatively late in the crisis: Throughout August and September he pursued his goals in a manner which reflected cognizance of the constraints within which he was working.

However, the visibility of military preparations complicated both aspects of Eden's balancing act. Simply put, rumors and partial accounts of Egypt Committee military plans abounded in Whitehall, while, internationally, the US had swallowed entirely Macmillan's dramatization of the British desire to launch a military operation. At the close of the London conference, several core executive actors confronted Eden over the extent of military preparations and the secrecy with which decisions on these were being made. These confrontations reflect the irreducible mutual dependence of the British core executive system: The Prime Minister is not a monarch nor even a President and, although granted a great variety of resources, cannot for long ignore, much less defy, Cabinet and the collective structure of decision making.

The first to confront Eden was Duncan Sandys, who as Minister of Housing and Local Government was part of the diplomatically-focused full Cabinet discussions but excluded from the operational decisions of the Egypt Committee. Sandys enquired of Eden as to what precisely was being decided in the Egypt Committee on military matters, and whether these were not more properly matters for the full Cabinet to consider. Eden replied rather brusquely that:

In view of the point which you raised with me, I feel I should explain to you, before the next meeting of the Cabinet, the limits within which the Cabinet can discuss the

possibility of a military operation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Up to now the Cabinet have considered this only as a hypothetical question, viz., should we be prepared to take this course in the last resort if all attempts to achieve a satisfactory settlement by other means had failed. If that situation should arise, the Cabinet as a whole will of course be asked to take the final decision, in the light of all the circumstances of the time...It would not, however, be possible for the Cabinet as a whole to discuss the plans for any military operations that might have to be taken. Knowledge of these details must, for obvious reasons of security, be confined within the narrowest possible circle. Such political guidance as the military authorities may need in the preparation of their plans must continue to be given by me, in consultation with a small number of my most senior Cabinet colleagues<sup>32</sup>.

This was a reply which verged on disingenuity. While indeed Cabinet had agreed on 27th July to a hypothetical need to use force, the preparations since then were very real. More importantly, it was simply not true that the Egypt Committee was discussing purely operational matters divorced from the conduct of political negotiations: in fact, the shape and timetable of the negotiating effort had been bent to fit a militarily dictated timetable of events. These were points not lost upon Sandys, who replied that “the extent of the territorial objective of the operation, the manner of initiating it, and, above all, the grounds on which we should justify it to the world, are obviously matters of major political importance”, and concluded that “the choice of the right moment to consult the Cabinet is naturally a matter for your decision; but I hope that you will take us into your confidence before it is too late for any views we may have to be taken into account”<sup>33</sup>.

Additionally, Selwyn Lloyd, who was privy to the Egypt Committee discussions and extremely deferential to Eden in foreign affairs, was sufficiently alarmed by military preparations to ask Dulles to intervene with Eden before he departed the conference. Lloyd feared that, on current plans, “there would be a button pushed in early September and everything would happen automatically and irrevocably”. In particular, Lloyd was concerned that not nearly enough had been done to make the case that military action was justified and that, international conference apart, the fact that Britain had failed to take

the matter to the UN Security Council would weigh heavily against her<sup>34</sup>. Lloyd's under-Secretary, Anthony Nutting, returned at this point from sick leave and, horrified at the advanced state of military planning, urged Eden in the strongest terms to go the UN immediately. Eden, who was convinced that the United Nations would prove ineffective in this matter, strongly disagreed<sup>35</sup>.

Most serious, however, was Sir Walter Monckton's "outburst" in the Egypt Committee on 24th August. Although Monckton had been harboring doubts about the military preparations for several weeks, the immediate provocation at this point was Harold Macmillan's propensity to discuss military operations as if the decision to launch them had already been taken. Macmillan was unrestrained in both domestic and international company in expressing himself in such a way. Monckton's statement of opposition to military action shook the members of the Egypt Committee and especially Eden himself. Many of those present felt the need to write to Eden afterwards to assure him of the continued viability of his policies, while also cautioning him of the need to manage the issue very carefully. Virtually all reported on their presumed tally of whom of their colleagues they believed to be "reliable" on the issue and whom were wavering. Perhaps the most significant letter was that of the Commonwealth Secretary (and future Prime Minister) Alec Douglas-Home:

Even before Walter's outburst at our committee this morning I had thought that I had better warn you that I see a definite wavering in the attitude of some of our colleagues towards the use of force. They vary in the intensity of this feeling but the important thing is that they should get their feelings off their chest so that you should know where you are. I had expected a cleavage of opinion in H(ouse) of C(ommons) and possibly a few of our supporters dissenting but this I think represents something more serious. The anxieties of some, Rab (Butler) for instance, might be removed if we didn't have to go on thinking in terms of button pushing and dates and had plenty of time for diplomatic maneuver. All this is disturbing. For myself I have no doubts that if we cannot make anything of the Security Council, and that largely depends on Dulles, we have no option but to go through with it. I need not say more but I am convinced that we are finished if the Middle East goes and Russia-India-China rule from Africa to the Pacific<sup>36</sup>.

Implicit in these letters to Eden is a warning that the consensus upon which he was basing his policies was not solid, and that he needed to manage the core executive very carefully indeed. While it was true that Eden had secured the agreement of the Cabinet on the 27th July for a policy somewhat akin to the one he was following, and that, as Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies noted, the issues the dissenters raised “stood out miles when we first embarked on our policy”<sup>37</sup>, it was also true that the limits of the mandate Eden had received then were being reached. Indeed, the difficulties faced by Eden in maintaining core executive harmony at this point are illustrated by advice he received from Sir Norman Brook. While Ministers such as Sandys were complaining about not being informed, and others were pushing the edges of the agreed policy of the 27th, Brook was urging Eden to prevent discussion and certainly decision on the issue in full Cabinet at this point, lest the fragile pseudo-consensus be shattered: “All this leads me to the view that it would be a mistake to put the Cabinet at the final fence too soon”<sup>38</sup>.

That this was true was illustrated in the Cabinet of the 28th August. Macmillan repeated his conviction that force had to be used, arguing, this time, an economically-based case for war on the grounds that Nasser threatened Britain's oil supplies from the Middle East, and without these the British economy was inviolable. Monckton was again provoked into response, stating that, while he recognized Nasser could not be allowed to succeed, he had to insist that all other avenues were exhausted before force were used. Eden concluded the meeting by agreeing with both positions, which was still technically possible but did not encompass any real consensus:

The Prime Minister, summing up this part of the discussion, said that it was evident that the Cabinet were united in the view that the frustration of Colonel Nasser's policy was a vital British interest which must be secured, in the last resort, by the use of force. He fully recognized that, before recourse was had to force, every practicable attempt should be

made to secure a satisfactory settlement by peaceful means and it must be made clear to the public, here and overseas, that no effort to this end has been spared<sup>39</sup>.

That the consensus was illusory is illustrated by the fact that the First Sea Lord, Mountbatten, who was present at this Cabinet, retired immediately afterwards to draft an (unsent) letter of resignation, to be delivered to Eden once the use of force had been ordered<sup>40</sup>.

It was with some relief that Eden was able to suggest to the Cabinet that the Suez issue might best be handled solely in the Egypt Committee until Nasser had given his reply to the Menzies mission. However, while the mission gave Eden some respite from Cabinet divisions, it also caused problems in terms of the timetable for *Muskateer*. The Egypt Committee of the afternoon of August 18th were told that, Colonel Nasser having agreed to meet with the Menzies mission, the events of *Muskateer* would have to be temporarily postponed<sup>41</sup>. These difficulties caused a reconsideration on Eden's part of the crucial matter of going to the United Nations, which he had thus far been steadfastly against. In the divided Cabinet meeting of the 28th, Eden warmed markedly towards this idea, arguing that "while it would undoubtedly involve serious risks – e.g., of delay and of embarrassing amendments...we should certainly stand better with foreign opinion and with our own if we had shown that a majority of the Security Council were prepared to endorse the statement of principles adopted by the London Conference"<sup>42</sup>.

The Menzies mission, carrying the proposals for internationalization of the canal agreed to by 18 of the London conference attendees, arrived in Cairo on 2nd September. Menzies would remain in Cairo for 6 days, meeting Nasser on three separate occasions. The British were terrified of these negotiations dragging on. Lloyd anxiously questioned the US representative of the committee, Loy Henderson, before his departure, on "What



will you do if Nasser says 'No, but...'. Edén, whose naturally agitated temperament was much aggravated by the rigors of crisis management, railed to Henderson "Oh, these delays! They are working against us. Every day's postponement is to Nasser's gain and our loss"<sup>43</sup>.

To compound the problems of time pressure and a collapsing core executive consensus, Edén was now faced with the fracturing of the veneer of unity he had managed to create with the United States. He received a letter from Eisenhower on 3rd September which warned Edén that American public opinion would react very badly to a British use of force. Edén found this "disquieting", and put great effort into a reply which once more sought to cast the issue as one affecting US interests rather than private British ones, and also sought to appeal to Eisenhower's sense of history. Drawing upon the perils of 1930s style appeasement, and the global threat of Soviet Russia, Edén sought to persuade Eisenhower that the seizure of the canal is "we are convinced, the opening gambit in a planned campaign designed by Nasser to expel all Western influence and interests from Arab countries"<sup>44</sup>. This letter did not have the desired effect, as at a press conference on the 5th Eisenhower said rather offhandedly that the United States would only support a peaceful solution. With the Menzies mission at this point negotiating in Cairo with Nasser, and the British and French seeking to exert maximum pressure upon Nasser, Edén was horrified at the statement: "The Egyptians began to feel it safe to say no"<sup>45</sup>. Against this backdrop of evaporating American support, the British were compelled to pursue the United Nations route, and Lloyd met with French Foreign Minister Pineau on the same day in order to coordinate an approach, about which the French were decidedly unenthusiastic.

The United States was convinced that Britain and France wanted to go the UN only as a matter of form in order to clear the decks for war. Dulles therefore tried to postpone an Anglo-French referral of the matter to the Security Council. With this in mind, he proposed on 4th September the idea of a "Users' Association" which would manage the canal. Dues would be paid to this association, which, if need be, could be administered from warships anchored at each end of the waterway. While this did not achieve the objective of overthrowing Nasser, and indeed looked suspiciously like a delaying tactic, the British were prepared to accept the suggestion. The hope of the British was that the association would collect all the dues from shipping using the canal, and would guarantee free passage of all vessels. If Nasser acted against the association, then a pretext for military action would have been established. While the plan did not offer a direct route to achieving British goals, it did have one major advantage: it would involve the United States. Set against Eisenhower's blunt repudiations of British policy, Dulles users' association seemed to Eden to be not ideal, but at least a positive contribution of some kind: "Above all, it provided a means of working with the United States. I was prepared to lean over backwards to achieve this...Disturbed as I had been by some recent events, I was still in a temper to endorse an American initiative which had a hope of success, and take a chance upon it"<sup>46</sup>.

The Menzies mission had departed Cairo on 9<sup>th</sup> September, with Nasser formally rejecting the 18 power proposals. However, with Nasser taking no other provocative action, and both the internal and external support for force fractured, *Muskateer* had now been postponed almost to the point of inviolability. The Chiefs of Staff submitted a memorandum to Monckton on 7th September indicating that, unless ordered almost

immediately, “*Muskateer* is not a sound operation of war”<sup>47</sup>. Indeed, after conferring with the Chiefs, Eden noted to the Egypt Committee later that day that very visible preparations, such as the requisitioning of passenger liners, would have to be begun within two days on the current timetable<sup>48</sup>. Consequently, the Egypt Committee accepted a new concept developed by General Keightley; *Muskateer Revise*. This operation, which was the basis of the eventual military assault on Egypt, envisaged a much more ferocious air campaign followed by a much smaller (and perhaps unopposed) landing. With fewer land forces required, “D-Day” became much more flexible.

The users' association proved to be an inadequate device for generating any new consensus around the next steps for proceeding in the crisis. Internally to the core executive, the association concept became the new focal point for the Macmillan-Monckton conflict. In Cabinet on 11th September Macmillan stated his view that the users' association was useless as a solution to the problem, but could be very helpful indeed in providing a pretext for war: "it seemed certain that the Egyptians could not accept it as a permanent system. It should, however, serve to bring the issue to a head". Monckton responded that "he hoped that the adoption of the plan for the establishment of a users' organisation would not be regarded solely as a step towards the use of force" and added, presciently, "any premature recourse to force, especially without the support and approval of the United States, was likely to precipitate disorder throughout the Middle East and to alienate a substantial body of public opinion in this country and elsewhere throughout the world". Eden, with the unenviable task of discerning a will of the Cabinet from this battle, rather understated the matter with his comment that "It would be a difficult exercise of judgment to decide when the point had been reached when recourse

must be had to forceful measures"<sup>49</sup>. Eden was further disturbed by his Foreign Secretary undergoing a literally overnight change of position from the 11th-12th September. Visiting the Prime Minister early in the morning of the 12th, Lloyd told Eden that he had changed his mind, SCUA would not work, and Britain should go straight to the United Nations. Eden records that he was "naturally a good deal shaken" by this<sup>50</sup>.

Internationally, the British had exerted great effort to induce the French to agree to the association, but the concept was undermined by its own creator on 13th September. At a press conference in Washington announcing the creation of the SCUA, Dulles responded to a question inquiring as to what would happen if Nasser refused to cooperate by saying: "We do not intend to shoot our way through"<sup>51</sup>. Eden, who was at the very same moment under attack in the House of Commons for announcing the creation of SCUA and not a referral to the UN Security Council, felt betrayed by this. Putting together Eisenhower's press conference remarks with Dulles' undercutting of SCUA, Eden commented that "often in these weeks we longed for the crisp 'no comment', so firm an ally of American diplomacy in the past. Alas, it never came"<sup>52</sup>.

The Cabinet now agreed that a second London conference, comprising those 18 nations who had supported the Dulles resolution, should be convened in order to decide what action to take in response to Nasser's rejection of the Menzies mission and how to put the SCUA into place. This, of course, was Eden's fear - being led from conference to conference unable to find the appropriate position from which to launch the action designed to overthrow Nasser. The second London conference convened on 19th September, and within 2 days endorsed the SCUA plan. However, much more importantly, many of the nations in attendance urged Britain and France to refer the

matter to the UN Security Council. Dulles, aware that the British could regard going to the UN merely as a precursor to war, recommended against a referral. However, the British decided to refer the matter anyway.

Going to the United Nations had become a new semi-consensus point around which the core executive could agree. However, as with the previous consensus points, the *purpose* of a referral was somewhat disputed. Macmillan was the embodiment of Dulles' fears concerning British motives for going to the UN, and he began on 23rd September a new round of entrepreneurship in behalf of a forceful solution. In Washington D.C. on treasury business, Macmillan met with Eisenhower. Macmillan cabled to Eden on the 23rd that "I know Ike. Ike will lie doggo" if the British decide to use force<sup>53</sup>, and continued that Eisenhower was "really determined to stand up to Nasser...He accepted that by one means or another we must achieve a clear victory"<sup>54</sup>. Neither of these characterizations of Eisenhower's position accords very closely with the signals the President himself was trying to send, and it seems as if Macmillan was seeking to play down the barrier of American opposition to the use of force.

On the part of Eden and Lloyd, however, it appears as if the UN referral signified a more genuine effort to achieve a negotiated settlement. In Egypt Committee on 25th September, the Prime Minister appeared to have accepted many of the principles of the American position. He stated that "every effort should be made to avoid taking any action...which could be construed as giving a definite indication of our intention to take military action", and concluded with what was a startling about face from his early preoccupation with swift action and dismissal of all but military means: "we should continue to adhere to the principle that the canal should not be left in the unfettered

control of one country. Provided this requirement was satisfied it would still be possible to maintain other pressures which in the longer term should achieve the downfall of Colonel Nasser's regime in Egypt". In the same session of the Egypt Committee, Lloyd spoke in support of a new proposal for negotiation sponsored by Krishna Menon of India<sup>55</sup>.

However, while this new openness to negotiation placed Eden closer to the American position, the French were thoroughly appalled when meeting with Eden and Lloyd in order to coordinate plans for approaching the UN. Eden's reactions to the French provide additional evidence that at this point he had moved his position somewhat away from the hawkish side: "the French, particularly M. Pineau, are in the mood to blame everyone, including us, if military action is not taken before the end of October"<sup>56</sup>.

Eden's new found closeness to the US position was short-lived, however. He had been partially swayed by the degree of French opposition to further negotiation and the French dismissal of America's position. Eden on 1st October tried to cement an Anglo-American approach to the problem by writing to Eisenhower again drawing parallels between Hitler and Nasser and casting the dispute in cold war terms that would appeal to the President's conception of US national interest. However, Eden was visibly upset to hear of another public gaffe by Dulles on 2nd October. At a press conference, Dulles was drawn into a discussion of the SCUA. Dead-batting for a while, he was eventually tempted to respond to one question on the method by which SCUA would be enforced, or rather, as it transpired, would not be: "There is talk of teeth being pulled out of the plan, but I know of no teeth; there were not teeth in it so far as I am aware"<sup>57</sup>. Eden was in the presence of Anthony Nutting when news of Dulles' comments reached London: "Eden

read the Dulles statement quickly and then, with a contemptuous gesture, he flung the piece of paper across the table, hissing as he did so, 'And now what have you to say for your American friends?'. Eden himself felt that "It would be hard to imagine a statement more likely to cause the maximum allied disunity and disarray...Mr. Dulles proceeded to make plain at this juncture that the United States did not intend to use force, even though it had the right to do so. The words were an advertisement to Nasser that he could reject the project with impunity"<sup>58</sup>. From Eden's viewpoint, he had postponed action at great risk and imperiled the alliance with the French, as well as gone against the wishes of some members of his government and his own better judgment, in order to secure a measure of American support in confronting Nasser, but had progressed no closer to his objectives. This marked a turning point after which Eden became less concerned with maintaining US support, and much more proactive in creating the opportunity for force to be used.

Eden's dissatisfaction with the US position was made clear in Cabinet on the 3rd October. Eden reported on the recent talks he and Lloyd had had with the French in more favorable terms than before Dulles statement. Eden now professed to be "impressed by the vigour of M. Mollet's Government and their uncompromising attitude towards the Suez situation". The French were "impatient" and "resentful" of United States policy, the Prime Minister reported in terms which could just as easily have referred to himself. With the absence of firm US backing, Eden had also cooled markedly towards prospects for a negotiated settlement through the United Nations, and had reverted to his original perspective of viewing negotiations as a mechanism preventing him from taking decisive action, and which must be manipulated so as to provide a convincing *casus belli*: "there

were no indications of the attitude which the Egyptians were likely to adopt in the Security Council. If they continued to obdurate, world opinion might be readier to support a recourse to forceful measures. If they offered to negotiate, the task of achieving a satisfactory settlement would be more difficult and more protracted". Either way, "the Government's task had not been made easier by the public statements...by members of the United States Administration"<sup>59</sup>. With the ire of Eden fresh in his ears, Lloyd joined with Pineau in confronting Dulles on Friday 5th October. Dulles, recognizing that the British were close to taking matters into their own hands, was somewhat more forthcoming than on earlier occasions. He stated that, if the British recourse to the Security Council were made in good faith and was unsuccessful, then it would be "permissible to consider force as an alternative". In return, Lloyd assured Dulles that, for him at least, the Security Council approach was not regarded "just as a formality to be rushed through"<sup>60</sup>. Both Dulles and Lloyd were out ahead of their chief executives in the exchange: Dulles appearing more hawkish than Eisenhower and Lloyd more dovish than Eden.

Eden at this point was stricken by ill health. Several years previously he had undergone an unsuccessful operation on his stomach, which had left him prone to bouts of fever and abdominal pain. While it is difficult to draw a direct link between Eden's health and Suez decision making<sup>61</sup>, there can be little doubt that ill-health, exacerbated by Eden's temperament which was agitated at the best of times, unsettled the Prime Minister at crucial moments. In this instance, Eden's illness removed him from direct participation in core executive meetings for the duration of the Security Council debate (5-9th October). Eden's absence is apparent during the Egypt Committee meeting of the 8th, where Rab Butler, deputizing for Eden, judged recent communications from the United



States as “reassuring”, and that this “improvement” in the attitude of the US raised hopes that “a satisfactory agreement could be reached on the basis of the eighteen-power proposals”<sup>62</sup>.

At the United Nations in New York, Selwyn Lloyd pressed Britain’s case with a measure of success. Concurrent with the talks, Lloyd and Pineau held private sessions with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Fawzi, with Security General of the UN Dag Hammarskjold moderating. During these talks, Lloyd presented the Anglo-French minimum position on the management of the canal in the form of “six principles”. These were:

- 1) Free and open transit without discrimination, overt or covert
- 2) Respect for the sovereignty of Egypt
- 3) Insulation from the politics of any one country
- 4) Distribution of dues to be decided between Egypt and the users
- 5) A proportion of the revenue from the canal to be used for development in Egypt
- 6) Disputes to be settled by arbitration.

The major sticking points were point number 3, which would appear to deny the right of Egypt to nationalize the canal, point number 4, with Egypt and the west having different notions of how the revenues should be split, and point number 6, or perhaps more accurately, means of recourse should Egypt violate the agreement. Lloyd was able to report that Fawzi had agreed to these six principles, although was “slippery” in regards to means of implementation. Fawzi’s elusiveness was as nothing compared to the trouble Lloyd was having with his French counterpart, whom he found “alarming”, and the Foreign Secretary was moved to cable “I doubt whether Pineau really believes that a

peaceful settlement is possible and I am not entirely convinced that he wants one”<sup>63</sup>. Eden, disillusioned with the diplomatic process cabled Lloyd with admonitions against taking the Egyptian agreement at face value: “It is...very important that, while appearing reasonable, we should not be inveigled away in the negotiation from the fundamentals to which we have held all along”. In particular, Eden insisted that Britain “should not be parted from the French”<sup>64</sup>. Interpreting these developments to the Egypt Committee, Eden conceded it was “surprising” that Fawzi appeared to agree to these principles, and in particular that he had apparently agreed to canal dues being paid to the users’ association rather than to Egypt direct. However, Eden was skeptical as to the extent of the breakthrough, especially in light of American irresolution as to the means of enforcing any settlement: “The Foreign Secretary should be asked to seek urgently Mr. Dulles’ support for an arrangement on these lines, emphasizing that unless these essential requirements were met Her Majesty’s Government must reserve their freedom of action”<sup>65</sup>. Proceedings at the United Nations concluded on the 13th October. The French and the British sponsored a resolution endorsing the six principles and enjoining Egypt to immediately state how they would be put into effect, to the satisfaction of the Western powers. The resolution was eventually voted upon in two parts, with the first part, containing the six principles, unanimously adopted, while the second part, compelling Egypt to implement them, was vetoed by the USSR. Kyle contends that Eden viewed the agreement of Fawzi to the six principles as significant progress, asserting that “In London, Eden was clearly by now in two minds as to how to proceed. For the next few days, sensing that the chances of a *casus belli* were fast receding, he appeared to warm to the prospects of a compromise settlement”<sup>66</sup>. The record is less clear on this point than

Kyle's account suggests. While Eden had certainly wavered on the relative merits of a diplomatic Vs military solution earlier in the crisis, by this point he appears to have given up hope that the Americans could be brought on board with any feasible diplomatic scheme that would lay Nasser low. If we are to accept that Eden was warming towards a negotiated settlement, the question must arise as to why he insisted on maintaining unity with the implacably belligerent French, a task which Selwyn Lloyd was finding both difficult and unpleasant? Certainly, however, Eden was in an uncomfortable situation- he could have no real hope for a satisfactory diplomatic solution and, with Egypt giving some ground in negotiations and the US set against the use of force, the prospects of being able to launch a military expedition under cover of international legitimacy seemed worse than ever. His mood was not helped by Eisenhower's breezy declaration in light of agreement on the six principles that "it looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us"<sup>67</sup>, nor by news of Lloyd's exchange with Dulles in New York at the conclusion of UN Security Council proceedings, wherein Dulles casually dropped into the conversation that the US envisaged 90% of dues paid to the SCUA being paid directly to Egypt. Lloyd received this news with "horror", and wrote to Dulles in uncharacteristically forceful language: "I cannot believe that it is what you intend...we must face the fact that revelation of so grave a divergence between us on the purposes of SCUA would have serious repercussions in Britain"<sup>68</sup>. Certainly, there were serious repercussions in that Lloyd, who believed that progress had been made in New York, now had to enter a serious debit in his own mind on the side of the negotiated settlement.

This was all the more crucial as Eden had received that day two significant emissaries from France, Albert Gazier, who was handling affairs at the Quai d'Orsay

while Pineau was in New York, and General Maurice Challe of the French General Staff. The circumstances of their arrival were curious. They came *sans* entourage, and Challe went to some lengths to conceal his position within the government, representing himself as a “member of the Prime Minister’s personal staff”. They also requested that the British ambassador to France, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, be excluded from the meeting, although he happened to be in London and was available. Their meeting with Eden took a somewhat oblique route<sup>69</sup>. They began by enquiring of Eden as to the attitude of the British government in the event - hypothetically - that Israel should attack Egypt. Eden replied, perfectly properly, that the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 committed Britain to defending Arab nations from Soviet or Israeli aggression. When the French pressed him, however, he conceded that he could not foresee a huge constituency in the United Kingdom for military action on Nasser’s behalf. Challe at this point outlined what he presented as an idea which had recently occurred to him: What if, for the sake of argument, France and the UK were to encourage Israel to attack Egypt. As the superior Israeli forces advanced into Egypt, there would appear to be a direct threat to the secure operation of the Suez canal. Under those circumstances, surely Britain and France would be well within their rights to land forces in order to create a *cordon sanitaire* ten miles either side of the canal? This accomplished, and by happy coincidence, Britain and France would be left in a somewhat enhanced bargaining position as regards the future of the canal and, indeed, the future of Nasser’s government. The French neglected to mention that they were by this point in the advanced stages of negotiating the details of such a ruse with the Israelis. Eden was, by all accounts, instantly taken by the idea, which seemed to offer a manner of launching decisive military action against Nasser under the

cover of international legitimacy. Britain and France would, under this scenario, be acting not out of colonial self-interest, but as international policemen upholding rights of free passage. The French, who had for once conformed to British stereotype by running their foreign policy as a giant intrigue, could not believe that the notion had failed to occur to Eden previously. Challe later recalled that, “If M. Gazier had not been present and if he had not gathered the same impression, I should have wondered if M. Eden were not making fun of me”<sup>70</sup>. Eden, head of a Cabinet and not President of the United Kingdom, could not commit the government immediately, but undertook to investigate the possibility. However, his actions following the meeting attest to its impact upon him. He invoked the norm of central state secrecy immediately, instructing Anthony Nutting, in charge at the Foreign Office until Lloyd’s return, to discuss the idea with only two civil servants: Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and Archibald Ross. Nutting, somewhat alarmed both at the French concept and Eden’s embrace of it, suggested that perhaps the legal aspects of the matter might be investigated through consultation with the Foreign Office Legal advisor, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. “Fitz is the last person I want consulted”, was Eden’s reply. “The lawyers are always against our doing anything. For God’s sake, keep them out of it. This is a political affair”<sup>71</sup>. Lloyd was contacted by Eden and forced to make a hasty exit from New York. Eden would, on Nutting’s account, “brook no delay”, and gave the impression that his support for the plan was not contingent on the views of senior colleagues<sup>72</sup>.

Nutting’s limited consultations resulted in a Foreign Office briefing the balance of which was strongly against the proposed scheme. The ruse would be quickly discovered, and would shatter Britain’s position in the Middle East and relations with the United

States. This brief was presented by Nutting to Eden and a small meeting of "senior ministers" the morning after Gazier and Challe departed, 16th October. The attendance at this meeting is unclear, and no minutes were kept. We can speculate that Eden included the hawkish Macmillan, perhaps the equally hawkish replacement of Mockton, Anthony Head, and possibly his old friend Salisbury. Lloyd, fatigued from his exertions in New York and the overnight flight back to London, returned during this meeting and was whisked straight to Whitehall to be brought into the picture. Nutting claims to have caught a word with the Foreign Secretary before Eden saw him and records that "I told him what was afoot and what advice I had given on behalf of the foreign office. His reaction was spontaneous. 'You are right', he said. 'We must have nothing to do with the French plan'"<sup>73</sup>. It seems unlikely that Lloyd was so uncharacteristically emphatic, although there is no doubt that Lloyd is sincere when he recalls that "I thought that the idea of inviting Israel to attack Egypt was a poor one"<sup>74</sup>. However, Lloyd was of course extremely deferential to Eden in foreign affairs, and recognized that he had not the standing to push his objections too forcefully with the Prime Minister. In addition, Lloyd was bitterly disappointed by his conversation with Dulles in New York, which had seemed to remove the sheen from his diplomatic accomplishments there. Consequently when Eden, who was relishing the chance to do something proactive, insisted that his exhausted Foreign Secretary accompany him to Paris to meet with Mollet and Pineau and refine the plan, Lloyd assented without protest.

As with the visit of the French officials to London, Eden took pains to exclude the diplomatic apparatus of the foreign office. Gladwyn Jebb was thoroughly put out by this, and protested to Eden that "It is, I believe, a novel arrangement for diplomatic business of

the highest importance to be conducted without any official being present”<sup>75</sup>. The meeting involved a further elucidation of General Challe's scenario. It was agreed that, after the Israeli attack, Britain and France would issue ultimatums to both Israel and Egypt ordering them to halt hostilities and remove their forces from the canal zone. The acquiescence of Israel was assured, and it was felt that Nasser could not accept these terms (which, after all, proposed that he accept the loss of control of some of his territory to a third party as a result of defending himself against the aggression of a second party), and Britain and France would then forcibly insert their forces. The French required commitments from Eden and Lloyd that Britain would intervene in the manner specified in the event of an Israeli attack on Egypt, and that Britain considered the Tripartite declaration, requiring Britain to defend Egypt, to not be in effect in these circumstances<sup>76</sup>. Eden replied that he would have to consult with the rest of the government. In fact, the requisite assurances were speedily forthcoming, although the extent of Eden's consultation is even now unclear. However, Eden had to gain some measure of Cabinet assent, and so convened Cabinet on 18th October for a crucial meeting. Eden's management of this meeting, and the extent of his disclosure of the true state of affairs, is revealing. Demonstrating the irreducible mutual dependency upon which the core executive system is based, Eden could not ignore Cabinet and make decisions on this matter in a monarchical or even Presidential manner. However, the large arsenal of resources at the disposal of a Prime Minister, particularly one regarded as a foreign policy expert such as Eden, does make it possible for a Prime Minister to bounce Cabinet into a decision, especially if some salient aspects of it are hidden from them.

Eden removed a major potential hurdle immediately prior to the Cabinet session

by taking Rab Butler into his confidence to a limited degree. He outlined to Butler a sanitized sketch of the scenario, and indicated that it seemed as if it might shortly come to pass. Butler, who had designs on the leadership of the party and so could afford neither to seem disloyal to Eden nor to oppose a potentially successful military adventure, indicated his acquiescence. His supineity in this matter was to damage his reputation and prevent him from becoming party leader. Gaining the support of senior ministers before Cabinet meetings is a powerful tool for the Prime Minister: if the minister has doubts he is forced to express them to the Prime Minister face to face and outside of the Cabinet room, where the exploration of alternative possibilities is regarded as legitimate prior to a decision. Having preempted any opposition from Butler, Eden approached Cabinet in a very deliberate manner. Firstly, Selwyn Lloyd was given the chance to report on his UN diplomacy. This he did in a positive manner, and Cabinet was in agreement that "the outcome of the proceedings in the Security Council was as favorable, from our point of view, as could have been hoped. The statement of principles, which had been passed unanimously, covered the substance of the demands made by the principal users of the canal". Therefore, Cabinet agreed, public statements on the negotiating effort should be upbeat, and should stress that the government were awaiting Egyptian proposals as to how they intended to give practical effect to the six principles endorsed by the Security Council. With these preliminaries over, Eden began his report on the discussions he and Lloyd had held in Paris "in order to discuss with French Ministers what further steps could now be taken towards a settlement of the Suez dispute". Eden introduced a new factor into the situation: the apparent (and heretofore unrecognized) inevitability of an Israeli military move against one of the Arab countries. In light of this, Eden suggested,



Britain's position was delicate. It appeared as if there were two possible targets for Israeli aggression: Jordan and Egypt. While Britain was committed under the Tripartite Declaration to defend both, the obligations were much more serious towards Jordan due to the Anglo-Jordan treaty. Besides which, Egypt could be said to have abrogated the Tripartite Declaration by her recent actions (in fact the declaration, being unilateral in nature, carried no Egyptian obligations and so it was not possible for her to breach it). In these circumstances, Eden continued, if Israel were to make a military move, it was far more desirable that she should do so against Egypt than against Jordan. However, military action against Egypt would imperil the security of the Suez canal, and so would not the Cabinet agree that, in the event of such a scenario, Britain and France should intervene in order to separate the combatants?<sup>77</sup>. There was no formal dissent from this position, which was fortunate as Eden had already committed the British government to this course of action in a communiqué to the French. Eden, of course, had prior knowledge, which he did not share with the Cabinet, that Israel was shortly to bring about precisely the chain of events outlined at the behest of Britain and France. By securing Cabinet agreement to the scenario he had outlined, Eden had secured a mandate for force provided the matter of collusion with the Israelis was not revealed. He went to great lengths to ensure that this was so. General Keightley, commander of British forces in the region, was told to step up preparations but could not be sure if action would be against Israel or Egypt. Few in the civil service and diplomatic corps were informed, and regular foreign office channels of communication with France were abandoned in favor of the "back channels" of MI5<sup>78</sup>.

On 21st October an ad hoc meeting of Ministers and officials at Chequers, the

Prime Ministers official residence, decided to dispatch Selwyn Lloyd as Britain's representative to a trilateral conference designed to conclude the terms of the operation. No announcement was made of Lloyd's trip, and indeed he was forced to travel incognito<sup>79</sup>. The meeting was to take place at Sevres, a suburb of Paris. Pineau and Mollet were present representing the French, and David Ben-Gurion and a host of senior members of the Israeli military were also in attendance. Lloyd was under instructions to forge a deal which would present British intervention in the best possible light: in particular, it was crucial that the Israelis commit an act of aggression which was large enough for Britain to be able to intervene plausibly as peacekeeper. Ben-Gurion wanted a smaller intervention which would not provoke Egyptian airstrikes on Israeli cities - a real threat since the Egyptian airforce had recently received an influx of Soviet jets. Eventually, a compromise was proposed whereby Israel would intervene in sufficient force in return for Britain immediately neutralizing the Egyptian air threat. This, however, was an additional burden on the British pretext for war: why, if Britain were acting neutrally, would the Royal Air Force be launching attacks against a nation under aggressive invasion? Perhaps Britain could launch airstrikes two or three days into the conflict as part of the wider peacekeeping operations, Lloyd suggested. This, the Israeli's protested, would leave Israeli cities vulnerable, and so would not do. Selwyn Lloyd would not commit and left Sevres in order present the new scenario to Eden. Lloyd was disturbed at the way events were going. The Israeli representatives at Sevres had been disappointed when he arrived - they had been told to expect the number 2 man in the government, and were surprised and dismayed when this turned out to be the Foreign Secretary. Moshe Dayan of the Israeli military delegation recalled "I had the impression

that he (Lloyd) just hated the whole thing. He didn't like it, like he was trying to hold something that was not quite clean and you want to wash your hands afterwards"<sup>80</sup>. Indeed, Lloyd felt that there was no way to bridge the Israeli and British conceptions of how the plan might work: the Israeli concept would not be a large enough conflagration in order to justify British intervention, and Britain could not commit to bombing Egyptian airfields so soon after the beginning of the conflagration - there would simply be no way to make this appear evenhanded.

The question of what Eden disclosed and withheld from Cabinet in the coming days is crucial to an understanding of the Suez decisions. Having been briefed by Lloyd on the state of play at Sevres, Eden convened the Cabinet on the morning of Tuesday 23rd October. Having told Cabinet on the 18th that the Israeli's were poised to strike and that all efforts should be directed towards training their fire upon the Egyptians, Eden informed the Cabinet, according to the official minutes, that "It now seemed unlikely that the Israeli's would launch a full-scale attack against Egypt"<sup>81</sup>. In fact, Eden gave slightly more information to the Cabinet than the official minutes record. Keith Kyle located, amongst the multiple copies of Cabinet minutes held at the Public Records Office in Kew, one set which shows that Eden went further in disclosing how he had come to this knowledge of Israeli intentions. Kyle has the minutes as disclosing Eden's source of information: "from secret conversations which had been held in Paris with representatives of the Israeli government"<sup>82</sup>. However, even this was hardly full disclosure. Eden certainly did not report the context or substance of Lloyd's talks, and the position remained that only a small group of ministers knew that the plan involved not a contingency in reaction to an exogenously caused military action by Israel, but rather that

the military action was to be undertaken with British and French encouragement. In addition, and crucially, the doctoring of the Cabinet minutes to remove the reference to "secret talks" would have kept the majority of the civil service in the dark. Eden proposed that the new situation - Israeli unwillingness to attack - presented the British and French governments with an unpleasant choice: "an early military operation or a relatively prolonged negotiation". Military readiness could not be preserved for many more days, and the French were desperate to launch an attack and may do so alone - probably dragging Britain in - if the British wavered for too much longer. At this point, Lloyd was invited to give his assessment of the diplomatic position. He began optimistically, saying he "would not exclude the possibility that we might be able to reach, by negotiation with the Egyptians, a settlement which would give us the substance of our demand for effective international supervision of the canal". However, there were three problems. Firstly, the French would not be content with a negotiated settlement. Secondly, once the military threat was removed the negotiating position would weaken. Finally, "he saw no prospect of reaching such a settlement as would diminish Colonel Nasser's influence throughout the Middle East". The last, of course, was crucial for Eden, and in this light the Prime Minister summed up ominously: "grave decisions would have to be taken by the Cabinet in the course of the next few days". However, for now nothing further could be done until new discussions with the French, in the person of Pineau who was en route to London, had been completed<sup>83</sup>.

Pineau had taken the decision to fly to London for two reasons. Firstly, he wanted to talk to Eden direct, whom he felt was much more amenable to the basic principles of the ruse than the heavy-hearted Lloyd. Secondly, Pineau carried with him a revised plan

from the Israelis authored by Moshe Dayan. This plan met the British half way: the Israeli attack would not be full-scale but would be as "loud" as possible and seem to offer a threat to the canal, and the Israelis would allow Britain thirty-six hours before requiring the bombing of Egyptian airfields. Eden did not disappoint Pineau, and accepted the new plan in principle<sup>84</sup>.

The following day, the 24th, Eden dispatched the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Patrick Dean, to tie down the agreement with the Israelis at Sevres. Dean was told only what he strictly needed to know in order to complete his limited assignment. Eden, awaiting confirmation of the agreement, directed Cabinet on the 24th over much the same ground as the previous day. Dean returned from Sevres having reached agreement late that evening. Eden was furious to learn that Dean had signed a documentary record of proceedings (the "Protocol of Sevres"), and made unsuccessful efforts to have the French and Israeli's destroy their copies. He managed only to have all British copies of the document destroyed. The protocol states that Israel will attack Egypt on the 29th October, that Britain and France will issue ultimata to both sides to cease fire and withdraw from the canal zone (although the protocol envisaged only limited Israeli activity in this area), that the ultimatum to Egypt will include a provision that she accepts temporary occupation by British and French forces of the canal zone and, when Egypt refused (as would presumably be the case), the British and French would attack Egyptian forces. Lloyd recalls that "At 11 p.m. Dean came to No. 10 and reported to a group of Ministers, Eden, Butler, Macmillan, Head and myself. Mountbatten, First Sea Lord, was also there. We decided we would recommend the contingency plan to the full Cabinet"<sup>85</sup>. Of this group, Lloyd and Head were heavily and

recently in Eden's debt for their jobs and could not be regarded as substantial political figures, Macmillan was a known hawk on the issue and indeed had long anticipated the idea of involving the Israelis, Butler, as discussed above, had compelling political reasons to support Eden and the Prime Minister had been careful to secure his support previously. Mountbatten was not a Cabinet member nor indeed a political figure and so had not the right to naysay to this senior group. Nonetheless, he would resign over the decision soon afterwards.

Cabinet was duly convened at 10am on Thursday 25th October to endorse the final decision. Eden had carefully laid the ground for his presentation of the options and sought to frame the issues in such a way that assent for the plan would be the only reasonable course of action, and indeed was implied in previous Cabinet decisions. He began by recalling that he had suggested on 18 October that Israel was poised to launch a military operation (thus reminding Cabinet that they had agreed then that it would be beneficial if this was against Egypt and not Jordan, and that if a threat developed to the canal as a result of the operation, they had agreed in principle that Britain should intervene). Eden continued that on 23rd October, he had informed the Cabinet that Israel no longer seemed ready to strike (thus recalling for the Cabinet that they had agreed that this presented a horrible dilemma between a negotiated settlement which would not achieve their objectives and a military operation launched at the behest of the French under unpropitious circumstances). "It now appeared", Eden announced, "that the Israelis were, after all, advancing their military preparations with a view to making an attack on Egypt". Eden did not reveal that the Israelis were undertaking this attack with heavy encouragement and as a result of guarantees received from Britain and France - a clear

deception of the Cabinet. Therefore, "the Cabinet must consider the situation which was likely to arise if hostilities broke out between Israel and Egypt and must judge whether it would necessitate Anglo-French intervention in this area". Eden was now, as Sir Norman Brook would have it, 'putting the Cabinet at the final fence'. His own definition of the choice facing Cabinet deserves quoting in full:

In these circumstances the Prime Minister suggested that, if Israel launched a full-scale military operation against Egypt, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France should at once call on both parties to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the canal; and that it should at the same time be clear that, if one or both Governments failed to undertake within twelve hours to comply with these requirements, British and French forces would intervene in order to enforce compliance. Israel might well undertake to comply with such a demand. If Egypt also complied, Colonel Nasser's prestige would be fatally undermined. If she failed to comply, there would be ample justification for Anglo-French military action against Egypt in order to safeguard the Canal. We must face the risk that we should be accused of collusion with Israel. But this charge was liable to be brought against us in any event; for it could now be assumed that, if an Anglo-French operation were undertaken against Egypt, we should be unable to prevent the Israelis from launching a parallel attack themselves; and it was preferable that we should be seen to be holding the balance between Israel and Egypt rather than appear to be accepting Israeli co-operation in an attack on Egypt alone.

Lloyd now joined in. He supported Eden in unequivocal terms which in no way reflected his private doubts about the policy. The danger in not going forward, Lloyd averred, was far from being confined only to the situation in Egypt: "Unless prompt action were taken to check Colonel Nasser's ambitions, our position would be undermined throughout the Middle East". He listed Nasser / Russian inspired conspiracies and threats against the governments of Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Even with Eden's careful preparation, his quite disingenuous statement of the options, and Lloyd's alarmist report, major objections to the proposed course of action were raised. There was "no prospect of securing the support or approval of the United States Government" and it was probable that "lasting damage" would be done to Anglo-American relations. The terms of the ultimatums could not help but look hopelessly imbalanced against Egypt, given that "we should be asking the Egyptians to withdraw still further within their

territory, while leaving Israeli forces on Egyptian soil well in advance of their own frontier". Finally, while world opinion might accept peacekeeping operations as a general principle, the legal and moral position of freelancing policeman operations was much less certain: "we should be purporting to undertake an international function without the specific authority of the United Nations"<sup>86</sup>. Nonetheless, with the limited information Eden had given them, his careful framing of the options, the lack of dissent from the Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord Privy Seal (all of whom, except Macmillan, had supported the policy for reasons not based predominantly on its merits), Cabinet agreed to Eden's proposed course of action. Kyle tallies the main doubters as Monckton, who had already resigned as Secretary of Defence but remained in Cabinet as Paymaster-General, the Minister of Agriculture Heathcoat Amory, and the Minister of Labour Iain Macleod<sup>87</sup>. This group did not have the resources to resist Eden's determination coupled with his senior ministers' acquiescence, and so could not affect policy short of resignation (and probably not then), and this they chose not to do. With the decision made, Macmillan on the 26th October reported that Britain's economic health was being profoundly affected by the crisis. Reserves of gold and dollars were falling rapidly, and it could be anticipated that economic assistance from the United States would shortly be required in order to stabilize the pound<sup>88</sup>.

On the 29th October, Israeli forces entered Egypt. Cabinet on the morning of the 30th approved the terms of ceasefire notes to be addressed to both Egypt and Israel. The American Ambassador in London, Roger Aldrich, had visited Selwyn Lloyd on the morning of the 30th to inform him that the US government intended to table a Security Council resolution citing Israel as an aggressor. Lloyd, somewhat alarmed, responded



that, in the view of the British government, matters were not quite so clear as that<sup>89</sup>. Lloyd reported this to Cabinet. With the tenuous economic situation, the dangers of proceeding with the operation were now clear - indeed, it was through the mechanism of withholding economic assistance that the United States would eventually compel Britain to desist from the attack on Egypt. However, by this stage a false optimism still prevailed regarding the extent of American opposition to the enterprise. We may speculate that Macmillan, who had previously provided a rosy forecast of Eisenhower's reactions to an intervention, had waited until after the fundamental decision to go ahead had been taken before detailing the economic repercussions. Certainly, on the 30th, Cabinet sought to play down the alarming news brought by Lloyd. The Foreign Secretary proffered the unrealistic scenario that perhaps the US government could be persuaded to support the action Britain and France proposed to take. While Cabinet recognized that this was unlikely to be achievable, they were curiously optimistic as to the benefits of the attempt:

Even though it was unlikely that the United States Government would respond to such an appeal, we should do our utmost to reduce the offence to American public opinion which was liable to be caused by our notes to Egypt and Israel. Our reserves of gold and dollars were still falling at a dangerously rapid rate; and, in view of the extent to which we might have to rely on American economic assistance, we could not afford to alienate the United States Government more than was absolutely necessary<sup>90</sup>.

These notes were delivered the next day (31st October), to the Israeli Ambassador at 4.15pm and the Egyptian Ambassador at 4.25pm. On reading the notes, President Eisenhower cabled Eden and Mollet and stated that he totally disassociated himself from these policies. A similar reaction came from the civil service, who had been kept out of the picture in recent weeks. The Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, and legal adviser to the Foreign Office each made clear that they had not been consulted and, if they had been, they would not have certified the legality of the government's position<sup>91</sup>. Many

junior ministers were angry at the extent to which policy had been kept out of normal government channels, and the desperately troubled Anthony Nutting immediately submitted his resignation.

A more immediate problem, however, were proceedings at the Security Council. A debate began under the rarely invoked "Uniting for Peace" procedure: A mechanism which transferred the executive functions of the Security Council to the General Assembly in the event that the Security Council was not a proper forum of decision (in this instance, because Britain and France were the main subjects of any resolution). A resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire between Egypt and Israel, the halt of all movement of military forces (i.e. Anglo-French) into the area, and the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force, was passed 64-5 with Britain and France voting against. Cabinet met twice on the 2nd to consider how to prevent the defeat in the United Nations and the opposition of the United States from becoming an outright disaster Lloyd presented a dire account of the reaction to the Anglo-French ultimata, indicating that crippling oil sanctions against Britain could be expected, and that Britain's position in the Arab world was rapidly being destroyed. Sir Pierson Dixon, UK Ambassador to the UN, was cabling frequently from New York in equally agitated terms. Cabinet finally agreed that the British policy should now be to accept a UN force, but continue with their own intervention on the grounds that the UN force had not been constituted and Anglo-French forces were already in the area. The Anglo-French force would therefore serve as an "advance guard" for the UN force<sup>92</sup>. The discussions of the 2nd contain no reference to the original objective of the enterprise - to fatally damage Nasser - but refer only to the way in which damage could be limited in the UN, the US, and the Middle East.

Matters were complicated further with the response of Egypt and Israel to the ceasefire resolution. Egypt accepted on the 3rd, which was expected, but the British and French were mortified when the Israelis, with entirely their own agenda, also appeared to accept early on the 4th. Two more resolutions, authorizing a United Nations Expeditionary Force and giving all parties twelve hours to implement the ceasefire, were passed early in the morning of the 4<sup>th</sup>. It was therefore in the face of overwhelming pressure to call off the operation that the core executive had to consider its next move. First to meet was the Egypt Committee at 12.30pm. The immediate issue was how to respond to the UN Secretary General, who had written to the UK and France in light of the new UN resolutions, calling for a ceasefire by 8pm. A decision could not be reached in the first meeting, and so adjournment was made until a second meeting at 3.30pm. Lloyd began by summarizing the critical state of affairs: Britain and France were in defiance of fully four UN resolutions, and could shortly expect a fifth imposing oil sanctions. Further, Egypt and Israel, the original combatants, had both accepted a ceasefire in principle. Formidable arguments were made in favor of calling off the invasion:

...since the object of our initial intervention, as announced publicly, had been to stop the fighting, a landing by Anglo-French forces in Egypt after hostilities had ceased would lead to further difficulties in Parliament and would not be supported by public opinion. It would be difficult to counter the allegation that our real objective all along had been to attack Egypt. The censure would be particularly severe if Anglo-French landings were resisted by the Egyptians and there were heavy casualties.

In response, the suggestion was made that, although Israel appeared to have accepted a ceasefire, she had not accepted the imposition of a UN force and had not withdrawn from Egyptian territory. Therefore, the implication was, the ceasefire could not be regarded as stable and a need remained for intervention to protect the canal. The logic of this

position, of course, was that a forced entry into Egypt was to be effected as a response to aggressive actions by Israel. In addition, the "advanced guard" formula was again proffered as a way of appearing to be accepting UN authority. Eden, recognizing the gravity of the situation, suggested that "the issues were so important that they should be discussed by the Cabinet before final decisions were taken"<sup>93</sup>. At 6.30pm, Cabinet met to consider the crucial decision of whether to go ahead with the landings. Eden, who was committed beyond reverse to the operation, was forced during this meeting to utilize all of the resources available to the Prime Minister in the British Cabinet system. It quickly emerged that three courses of action were available:

- i) The initial phase of the occupation consisting of the landing of British and French parachute troops at Port Said, should be allowed to proceed, and the United Nations should be informed that, although this action had been made imperative by the need to re-establish authority in the Suez Canal area, we remained willing to transfer the responsibility for policing that area to a United Nations force as soon as such a force could be effectively constituted and on the spot...
- ii) The parachute landings should be suspended for the next twenty-four hours in order to give the Governments of Egypt and Israel an opportunity to agree to accept a United Nations force in the Suez Canal area and to allow the United Nations time to consider whether the Anglo-French force should effect the landing already planned as an advance guard of the ultimate United Nations force.
- iii) We should defer further action indefinitely, on the ground that by bringing to an end the hostilities between Egypt and Israel we had achieved the substance of our original objective, and that we must henceforward be content to exert such pressure as we could maintain through political and diplomatic channels to secure a final settlement of the problems of the Suez Canal area under the aegis of the United Nations.

Eden, who could only accept the first option, sought to invoke the norm of collective Cabinet responsibility. He "invited each of his colleagues to indicate his view on the three alternative courses"<sup>94</sup>. In the Cabinet system, this forces ministers to show their hands: if they state a position contrary to the majority will of the Cabinet, they must either accept the majority viewpoint or resign. Eden's deployment of this resource was partially successful. Three ministers (Salisbury, Buchan-Hepburn, and Monckton) were in favor of the final course. Salisbury and Buchan-Hepburn would, however, accept the majority

position. Four ministers, (Kilmuir, Heathcoat Amory, Macleod, and, crucially, Butler) favored the twenty-four hour postponement, but, again, would follow the majority course. All other ministers were with Eden in recommending the continuation of the operation as planned. Only Monckton, therefore, signaled that he would resign from Cabinet if the decision went against him (the impact of which could be discounted to some extent as he had already resigned from one ministerial post over the issue).

However, this did not eliminate Eden's problems. Seven ministers favored a course different from his and, more importantly, two (Salisbury and Butler) were senior colleagues. As ministers argued through these options, it became clear that for several of them, and especially Butler, the final choice was contingent upon whether Israel accepted the imposition of an international force or did not. Eden adjourned the meeting in order that urgent clarification on this point could be sought. During the adjournment, Eden deployed the last resort resource available to the Prime Minister - the threat of resignation. Eden took his three most senior colleagues (Salisbury, Butler, and Macmillan) aside and informed them that, if other than option 1 was chosen, he would resign. Some accounts have it that Eden then retreated upstairs "to consider his position". Butler offered the opinion that no one else in the Cabinet could form a government, and Salisbury and Macmillan concurred<sup>95</sup>. Quite apart from whether they believed this to be true or not, it is certainly the case in British politics that senior ministers who act directly to bring down the Prime Minister very rarely go on to occupy the post themselves. There must also have been some fear that, if Eden resigned at this crucial moment, the government as a whole would face a Parliamentary vote of no confidence which it would be very hard pressed to win, thus forcing a snap General Election in which the

conservative party would be similarly ill positioned.

As the meeting resumed, confirmation was received that Israel, "while willing in principle to agree to cease hostilities in the Canal area, had now made it clear that they were not prepared to do so on the conditions specified in the United Nations resolution". This allowed the government to maintain a fig-leaf like pretext for going forward, although the decision was based more on Eden's deployment of the final resources available to him. "It thus appeared that a cease-fire had not yet been achieved in the area; and this, coupled with the refusal of Israel to accept a United Nations force and to withdraw from the Egyptian territory which she had occupied, was a sufficient ground for proceeding with police action in the area of the Canal<sup>96</sup>.

The Anglo-French force thus landed on 5th November. They encountered little resistance, although the course of the battle was always going to be determined more by political than military considerations. The political battle had continued to go badly for the British. A menacing note had been received from the Soviet Union threatening military intervention in the Middle East and, with a little more bluff than reality, rocket attacks on Great Britain. More importantly, the financial situation had grown untenable. Macmillan estimated that an eighth of the total of Britain's reserve had been used up in the first week of November. The United States was studiously ignoring Macmillan's increasingly desperate entreaties. In this context, the Chancellor, who had been extremely active and entrepreneurial in bringing the intervention to pass, became a frantic advocate of its immediate cessation. These arguments had an effect on Butler and Salisbury, who presented Eden with a united front in favor of a ceasefire. The Prime Minister, who had played his final card and was both ill and exhausted, had no capacity to resist.

Accordingly, Cabinet at 9.45am on 6th November agreed that "in order to regain the initiative and to re-establish relations with those members of the United Nations who were fundamentally in sympathy with our aims, we should agree, subject to the concurrence of the French Government, to stop further military operations"<sup>97</sup>. The Suez crisis was effectively over. Eden would resign on health grounds within a few months, to be succeeded by Macmillan. Eventually, a program for international management of the canal was agreed, although Nasser's prestige rose immeasurably in the Middle East, while Britain would not regain her position as a major power in the region.

### **Explaining the major decisions**

#### *Accepting the use of force as 'last resort'*

The first crucial decision was that taken during the 27th July Cabinet meeting; in the last resort, the Cabinet would authorize the use of force against Nasser. This decision set in train the military planning and preparations, colored the attempt to find a diplomatic solution, and, for Macmillan and eventually Eden, became a mandate for the search for a pretext under which such an action could be launched. The decision meant different things to different members of the Cabinet, however. For the more hawkish, such as Macmillan, it was a mandate to launch operations as soon as they were ready. For a middle group, including for a time the Prime Minister, it was a formulation which covered the search for an acceptable solution and did not rule out the diplomatic route. For a final group, including Monckton, it was a contingency they found very difficult to believe would come to pass. The determinants of the decision are therefore crucial.

Part of the explanation can be found in the individual characteristics of Sir

Anthony Eden, particularly his high score on the belief in ability to control events trait. Leaders high in this trait tend to prefer a proactive orientation towards policy, and indeed, it was Eden personally who pushed the Cabinet beyond merely agreeing that they disapproved of Nasser's actions and would take steps to reverse it, and into an explicit acceptance of the possibility of an armed attack.

A further part of the explanation can be found in the vulnerability of the government, and particularly Eden personally, to charges of appeasing Nasser. Certainly, they would have had a rough time of it in the House of Commons announcing an acceptance of Nasser's actions.

Finally, the norm of collective Cabinet responsibility was important in this decision. The formulation - force to be used in the 'last resort' - could be agreed to by all even as it covered enormous differences in ministerial conceptions of what constituted the 'last resort'. When the alternative to accepting this majority position was resignation, it becomes clear why Cabinet would agree to a policy which only in the most watered down sense represented their collective view - who was willing to be removed from the Cabinet over what seemed at that point an unlikely and far-off contingency?

#### *Misreading of US opposition to Suez Intervention*

It is clear that the British regarded American support as crucial from the earliest moments of the crisis until its final days, and went to great efforts to secure that support. It is also clear that most members of the core executive believed that, even if America would not actively help Britain and France achieve their objectives, they would at the very least stand aside in studied nonchalance once satisfied of Anglo-French determination. The



extent of American opposition to intervention, which brought to an end the short Suez war through the mechanism of deteriorating sterling balances, was massively underestimated. Why was this so?

Again, the individual characteristics of Eden are part of the explanation. His high belief in ability to control events indicates that he sees the political world as more under his control than most leaders - therefore he overestimated the degree to which American opposition was amenable to being massaged into something less disagreeable. Further, his high self-confidence score indicates that he would tend to believe in his ability to achieve such a task. Indeed, Eden did undertake a carefully reasoned approach to President Eisenhower, utilizing broad historical reasoning and casting the issue in internationalist, cold war terms.

Further, the entrepreneurial acts of other core executive actors, in particular Harold Macmillan, are an important explanatory factor. Macmillan, who favored the use of force, had an incentive to play down the barrier to this course of action created by American opposition. Early in the crisis, Macmillan sought to create the impression in the minds of US emissaries sent by Eisenhower that the British were absolutely determined to use force at the earliest possible moment. This was a strategy which Eden had not authorized and about which he was not directly aware. When Eisenhower wrote to Eden of his alarm at this apparent belligerence, the Prime Minister, who could not understand how the President had drawn such a conclusion from his own carefully reasoned messages, misunderstood the extent of Eisenhower's opposition as he could discern no reason for it. Further, Macmillan played down the likelihood of the US actively opposing the use of force in reports of his visit to Washington on treasury business ("I know Ike.

Ike will lie doggo”), and did not detail the economic risks of intervention in Egypt until after the Cabinet had made the decision.

### *Acceptance of the Challe Scenario*

The final, some may say fatal, crucial decision was the acceptance of the Challe plan - the basis of the ruse whereby Israel would invade Egypt with British and French encouragement, who would then pose as peacekeepers, thus providing a pretext for inserting forces into the Suez canal zone. Certainly, during the crucial Cabinet meeting of 4<sup>th</sup> November it was Eden's deployment of all resources available to him - in particular the invocation of collective Cabinet responsibility and the threat of resignation - which ensured that the decision would be to follow through on the Challe plan and launch the invasion. In terms of acceptance of the concept when it was presented by General Challe, three factors were of major explanatory importance.

Firstly, the plan offered a means of taking proactive action which would appeal to Eden given his high belief in ability to control events, especially given that his patience with alternative courses of action, and in particular with the United States, had by this point become exhausted. Secondly, knowledge of the plan was heavily restricted, stifling the opportunity of many Cabinet ministers, and the vast majority of the civil service and diplomatic apparatus, to state their opposition to the plan and to subject its details to any real scrutiny. The matter of the Challe plan represents a particularly severe case of the use of the norm of British central state secrecy, indeed many have argued it crossed over the boundaries of this norm and into outright deception<sup>98</sup>.

Finally, those who did know of the plan and disagreed with it were timid in

pushing their objections. On the part of Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, this was due to his extreme deference to Eden in foreign affairs. This deference was one of Eden's greatest resources in the foreign policy core executive, and here it was tested to the full but ultimately held. Rab Butler similarly had doubts about the plan but chose not to push them. He was in a stronger position than Lloyd, being a figure of independent standing within the government. However, Butler had designs on the leadership once Eden, whose ill-health was widely known, decided he could no longer continue. Therefore, Butler did not desire the mantle of 'regicide', and chose to still his doubts.

## **Quantitative Analysis**

### *The core executive institution*

The site of decision within the Suez crisis was split between the full Cabinet and the major Cabinet committee: the 'Egypt Committee'. The qualitative narrative indicated that secrecy was a major part of the decision making, and this is supported by the quantitative results: the norm of central state secrecy was invoked on fully 20 occasions. Additionally, the qualitative narrative indicated that collective Cabinet responsibility played a major role in the crisis, stilling the doubts of some ministers and allowing for at least the façade of an agreed policy. Again, this is supported by the quantitative results: collective Cabinet responsibility played a part in 14 occasions for decision.

In terms of the relationship between Eden and Lloyd, the qualitative analysis found that this was dominated by Eden, who was much better resourced and more personally assertive than Lloyd. Indeed, although evidence could be found that the two disagreed with one another in eleven occasions for decision, on only four of these occasions did Lloyd utilize resources against Eden. On most of the occasions when he disagreed with Eden, therefore, Lloyd chose not to act.

TABLE 15: THE CORE EXECUTIVE INSTITUTION IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Decision taken in Cabinet	20	16
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee	20	16
Decision taken in Other location	10	26
Civil Service challenges ministers	10	26
Norm of central state secrecy results in restriction of information	20	16
Norm of collective responsibility appears to stifle policy doubts	14	22
Prime Minister/ Foreign Secretary disagree on policy?	11	25
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary	4	32
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister	4	32
Core Executive actors use resources against each other	17	19

*Impact of Prime Minister*

Table 16 presents the quantitative data on Eden's behavior during the Suez crisis. Eden was proactive towards the policy issue two-thirds of the time, the quantitative results reveal. The qualitative analysis suggested that Eden became especially proactive once the Challe plan had been presented to him. He demonstrated relatively complex information processing, referring to more than one viewpoint / dimension to the issue during nearly half of all occasions for decision. Eden was relatively quick to challenge the interpretation of the situation / policy recommendation of others – with evidence of this being present exactly half of the time.

TABLE 16: IMPACT OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue	24	12
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/ dimension of issue	15	21
Prime Minister changes views	8	28
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior, a concern for personal prestige or authority	11	25
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation offered by others	18	18
Prime Minister shows concern with maintaining harmony among decision makers	8	28

### *Quality of Decision Making*

Table 17 reports data on the quality of decision making variables. Objectives of policy were specified during two thirds of the occasions for decision. The high frequency of consideration of multiple policies can be attributed to the dynamic, revealed in the analytical narrative, whereby the core executive simultaneously had to consider diplomatic moves while planning for a military operation. Similarly, many of the ten instances when a previously rejected policy was reconsidered involved reopening the diplomatic route due to the inviolability of the military option at a particular moment. Surprisingly, given the reputation of the crisis as a policy fiasco, costs, risks and implications of policies were specified in nearly two thirds of the occasions for decision.

In terms of institutional and individual correlates of decision making quality, the following statistically significant relationships exist.

- There is a negative relationship between ‘objectives of policy specified’ and ‘norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubt’ (-.282, p=.096).
- There is a negative relationship between ‘multiple policies considered’ and ‘civil service challenges ministers’ (-.446, p=.006).
- There are three negative relationships with ‘previously rejected policy reconsidered’: ‘evidence of civil service challenging ministers’ (-.385, p. =.021); ‘norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubt’ (-.368, p=.027); and ‘Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue’ (-.351, p=.036). There are also three positive relationships with ‘previously rejected policy reconsidered’: ‘Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary’ (.373, p=.025); ‘Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister’ (.373, p=.025); and ‘Prime



- Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/ dimension of issue' (.482,  $p=.003$ ).
- There is a positive relationship between 'additional sources of information actively sought' and 'Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers' (.518,  $p=.001$ ).
  - There are several positive relationships with the quality of decision making variable 'responsiveness to information': 'decision taken in other location' (.388,  $p=.067$ ); 'Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/ dimension to issue' (.389,  $p=.066$ ); 'Prime Minister changes views' (.677,  $p=.000$ ); 'Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers' (.388,  $p=.067$ ).
  - There are two negative relationships with 'costs, risks, and implications of preferred policy choice specified': 'Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary' (-.286,  $p=.091$ ); 'Norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubts' (-.349,  $p=.037$ ).

TABLE 17: QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Objectives of policy specified	24	12
More than one policy considered	26	10
Previously rejected policy reconsidered	10	26
Additional sources of information actively sought	8	28
Responsiveness to Information (policy change/ information suggests policy change)	10/23	
Costs, risks, and implications of preferred policy choice specified	23	13

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has investigated the linkages between institutional and individual variables and the process, outcome, and quality of decision during the Suez crisis. The utility of combining institutional and individual explanatory factors is apparent in this case. During the initial stages of the crisis Eden, a relatively high complexity leader, was cognizant of the internal and external constraints upon pursuit of his preferred policy of use of force. Consequently, he expended some effort and resources in seeking to achieve his goals within these constraints and gave consideration to several diplomatic initiatives. However, as the prospects for achieving his goals seemed to be receding later in the crisis, Eden, a proactive leader high in belief in ability to control events, was presented with a plan allowing the Western powers to take control of the situation. At this point, institutional factors such as Eden's deployment of resources available to a Prime Minister, the norm of central state secrecy, the weakness and deferential instincts of the Foreign Secretary, were crucial in ensuring that the plan was adopted.

TABLE 18: CHRONOLOGY OF THE SUEZ CRISIS

<b>#</b>	<b><u>Dates</u></b>	<b><u>Major Events in Crisis</u></b>	<b><u>Core Executive Interaction</u></b>	<b><u>Policy Decisions</u></b>
1	7/26/56	7/26: Nasser forcibly nationalizes Suez Canal company.	7/26: Ad Hoc meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nasser must not be allowed to "get away with it".</li> </ul>
2	7/27		7/27: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision that, "in the last resort", force would be used to compel Nasser to give up control of Suez canal.</li> </ul>
3	7/28-7/29		7/28: Egypt Committee meeting. 7/29: Talks between Lloyd, Pineau and Murphy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider Eisenhower's proposal of international conference, attempt to secure French and American support for policy.</li> </ul>
4	7/30		7/30: Egypt Committee meeting (2).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eden states removal of Nasser, not merely renationalization of canal, should be prime objective. Consideration of timetable for international conference.</li> </ul>
5	7/31-8/1	8/1: US Secretary of State Dulles arrives in UK for talks with Britain and France.	7/31: Cabinet meeting. 7/31: Egypt Committee meeting (3). 8/1: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Acceptance of US suggestion for an international maritime conference.</li> </ul>

6	8/2		8/2: Egypt Committee meeting. 8/2: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chiefs of Staff present "Muskateer"- an operation against Egypt. Information is restricted to a very short circulation list known as "Terrapin".</li> </ul>
7	8/3	8/3: Announcement of international conference of maritime nations to be held in London.	8/3: Cabinet meeting. 8/3: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consideration of tactics for forthcoming international conference.</li> <li>Macmillan suggests involvement of Israel in situation.</li> </ul>
8	8/4-8/7		8/7: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dismissal of Macmillan's concept of Israeli involvement.</li> </ul>
9	8/9-8/15		8/9: Egypt Committee meeting. 8/10: Egypt Committee meeting. 8/14: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consideration of questions of timing in relation to forthcoming international conference and military action.</li> </ul>
10	8/16-8/22	8/16-8/23: International Maritime Conference in London. 8/23: Menzies mission dispatched to Cairo.	8/20: Egypt Committee meeting. 8/21-8/22: Eden-Sandys exchange on secrecy involved in military planning. 8/21: Cabinet meeting. 8/22: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International conference ongoing, attempts to secure an anti-Nasser resolution from the conference.</li> </ul>

11	8/23		8/23: Egypt Committee. 8/23: Ad Hoc meeting. 8/23: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Committee of representatives of 5 of the 18 nations who supported anti-Nasser resolution is dispatched to Cairo. Led by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies.</li> </ul>
12	8/24-8/26		8/24: Egypt Committee meeting. 8/24-8/25: Several Cabinet members write to Eden.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreement on sequence for proceeding after international conference.</li> </ul>
13	8/27		8/27: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to refer issue to UN Security Council as soon as Nasser rejects Menzies proposals.</li> </ul>
14	8/28		8/28: Cabinet meeting. 8/28: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consideration of whether Nasser can be attacked without a further provocative act, and how one could be engineered. Reconsideration of timetable of operations.</li> </ul>
15	8/29-9/5	9/3: Menzies and Nasser meet. 9/4: Dulles proposes idea of a canal Users' Association.	9/1-9/3: Eden and Lloyd meet with Loy Henderson. 9/4: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pressure put upon Henderson to take a decisive stand and seek a quick response from Nasser.</li> </ul>

16	9/6		9/6: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acceptance in principle by Eden of Dulles Canal users' association idea.</li> <li>• Decision to recall Parliament for 12th September.</li> </ul>
17	9/7		9/7: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New operational concept for assault on Egypt, 'Muskateer Revise', considered.</li> </ul>
18	9/8-9/11	9/9: Menzies mission leaves Cairo. 9/11: Eisenhower rules out US use of force or endorsement of use of force by others to resolve crisis.	9/10: Egypt Committee meeting. 9/11: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 'Muskateer Revise' endorsed.</li> <li>• Dulles' canal users' association endorsed by Cabinet.</li> </ul>
19	9/12-9/18	9/12: Dulles announces canal Users' Association, then immediately undermines it by saying it will not be backed by force.	9/12: Bilateral meeting, Eden-Lloyd. 9/14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lloyd reverses position, and argues for immediate referral of matter to UN, Eden disagrees.</li> <li>• Cabinet agrees to second London conference involving 18 powers who assented to majority resolution from first conference.</li> </ul>
20	9/19-9/31	9/19-9/21: Second International Maritime conference in London. 9/21: Conference approves SCUA. 9/23: Britain and France refer dispute to UN Security Council.	9/19: Egypt Committee meeting. 9/25: Cabinet meeting. 9/26: Egypt Committee meeting. 9/26: Full Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Britain and France refer dispute to UN Security Council.</li> <li>• Eden and Lloyd signal new openness to negotiation.</li> </ul>

21	10/1-10/2	10/2: Dulles in press conference says SCUA has “no teeth”.	10/1: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plan strategy for UN Security Council debate.</li> </ul>
22	10/3-10/5	10/5: UN Security Council debate begins.	10/3: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eden turns against negotiated solution.</li> </ul>
23	10/6-10/9		10/8: Egypt Committee meeting. 10/9: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarification of US position on SCUA sought.</li> </ul>
24	10/10-10/11	10/10: ‘Six Principles’ agreement reached at UN by Lloyd, Pineau and Fawzi.	10/10: Egypt Committee meeting. 10/11: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consideration of agreement along the lines of the ‘six principles’. Further clarification of US position sought.</li> </ul>
25	10/12–10/15	10/13: UN Security Council passes resolution endorsing six principles but second resolution, endorsing outcome of London Maritime conference, fails.	10/12: Eden meets with French visitors, Gazier and Challe.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eden begins process of adopting Challe plan.</li> </ul>
26	10/16		10/16: Ad hoc meeting with Eden, small group of ministers. 10/16: Eden and Lloyd to Paris.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eden takes decision he and Lloyd will fly to Paris for talks.</li> </ul>
27	10/17-10/18		10/17: Egypt Committee meeting. 10/18: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cabinet informed Israel planning military strike, agrees it would be better if this were against Jordan.</li> </ul>
28	10/19-10/23	10/22: Representatives of Britain, France, and Israel meet in Parisian suburb of Sevres.	10/21: Ad hoc meeting of senior ministers at Chequers. 10/23: Cabinet meeting. 10/23: Egypt Committee meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lloyd sent to Paris incognito.</li> <li>Eden announces to Cabinet Israel no longer ready to attack, and Cabinet therefore faces ‘grave decisions’.</li> </ul>



29	10/24	10/24: 'Protocol of Sevres' agreed.	10/24: Cabinet meeting 10/24: Ad Hoc meeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to recommend plan outlined in Sevres protocol to Cabinet.</li> </ul>
30	10/25		10/25: Egypt Committee meeting. 10/25: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cabinet agrees to the scenario of the Challe plan, although without full disclosure of its genesis.</li> </ul>
31	10/26-10/30	10/29: Israel attacks Egypt. 10/30: British and French governments issue ultimata to Israel and Egypt.	10/26: Cabinet meeting. 10/30: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Endorse presentation of ultimata to Israel and Egypt.</li> </ul>
32	10/31	10/31: Anglo-French air strikes at Egyptian air force. 10/31: Emergency meeting of UN General Assembly begins.	10/31: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Authorization of attack on Egypt.</li> </ul>
33	11/1-11/2	11/1: Egyptian air force decimated by Anglo-French attack, Israelis advancing rapidly against army. 11/2: UN General Assembly calls for ceasefire.	11/1: Egypt Committee meeting (2). 11/2: Cabinet meeting (2).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to continue air attacks on Egypt.</li> <li>Decision to offer to halt military actions and withdraw when UN force ready to be put in place.</li> </ul>
34	11/3	11/3: Egypt accepts ceasefire, Israel follows conditionally.	11/3: Egypt Committee meeting (2). 11/3: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to go ahead with preparations for land operations.</li> </ul>
35	11/4		11/4: Egypt Committee meeting (2) 11/4: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to land in Port Said.</li> </ul>
36	11/5-11/6	11/5: British and French paratroopers land at Port Said.	11/6: Cabinet meeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to announce cease fire and halt operations.</li> </ul>

- 
- <sup>1</sup> Keith Kyle, *Suez*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991): 39.
- <sup>2</sup> Kyle, 88.
- <sup>3</sup> Selwyn Lloyd, *Suez 1956: A Personal Account*, (London: Cape, 1978): 4.
- <sup>4</sup> David Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis*, (New York: Blackwell, 1989): 13.
- <sup>5</sup> Kyle, 40-43.
- <sup>6</sup> Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez*, (New York: C. N. Potter, 1967): 18.
- <sup>7</sup> Nutting, 14.
- <sup>8</sup> Kyle, 135.
- <sup>9</sup> Kyle, 135-137.
- <sup>10</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 54.
- <sup>11</sup> PREM 11/1098 Eden to Eisenhower, 27.6.56.
- <sup>12</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 2nd Meeting.
- <sup>13</sup> Kyle, 146.
- <sup>14</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 3rd Meeting.
- <sup>15</sup> Kyle, 154.
- <sup>16</sup> Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956-1959*, (London: Macmillan, 1971): 104-105.
- <sup>17</sup> PREM 11/1098 Eisenhower to Eden, 31.6.56.
- <sup>18</sup> Macmillan, 105.
- <sup>19</sup> Lloyd, 94.
- <sup>20</sup> Kyle, 161.
- <sup>21</sup> Macmillan, 106.
- <sup>22</sup> Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960): 437.
- <sup>23</sup> Kyle, 172.
- <sup>24</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 10<sup>th</sup> Meeting
- <sup>25</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 11th Meeting
- <sup>26</sup> PREM 11/1098 Norman Brook to Anthony Eden, 2.8.56.
- <sup>27</sup> CAB 134/1217 "Forecast of the Timetable", 14.8.56
- <sup>28</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 59.
- <sup>29</sup> Kyle, 193-194
- <sup>30</sup> Lloyd, p. 119
- <sup>31</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 15th Meeting.
- <sup>32</sup> PREM 11/1152 Eden to Sandys, 22.8.56.
- <sup>33</sup> PREM 11/1152 Sandys to Eden, 23.8.56.
- <sup>34</sup> Kyle, 199.
- <sup>35</sup> Nutting, 58-59.
- <sup>36</sup> PREM 11/1152 Home to Eden, 24.8.56.
- <sup>37</sup> PREM 11.1152 Lennox-Boyd to Eden, 24.8.56.
- <sup>38</sup> PREM 11/1152 Brook to Eden, 24.8.56.
- <sup>39</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 62.
- <sup>40</sup> Kyle, 215
- <sup>41</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 23rd Meeting.
- <sup>42</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 62.
- <sup>43</sup> Kyle, 212.

- 
- <sup>44</sup> Eden, 465.
- <sup>45</sup> Eden, 469.
- <sup>46</sup> Eden, 479-481.
- <sup>47</sup> CAB 134/1217 “Operation Muskateer: Implications of Postponement”, 7.9.56.
- <sup>48</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 25th Meeting.
- <sup>49</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 64
- <sup>50</sup> Eden, 481.
- <sup>51</sup> Kyle, 245.
- <sup>52</sup> Eden, 469.
- <sup>53</sup> Kyle, 258.
- <sup>54</sup> Macmillan, 135.
- <sup>55</sup> CAB 134/1216 EC (56) 31st Meeting.
- <sup>56</sup> Kyle, 261.
- <sup>57</sup> quoted in Lloyd, 152.
- <sup>58</sup> Eden, 483-484.
- <sup>59</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 68.
- <sup>60</sup> Lloyd, 154-155
- <sup>61</sup> Bertjan Verbeek, *Decision Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis*, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); Kyle, 277.
- <sup>62</sup> CAB 134/126 EC (56) 33rd Meeting.
- <sup>63</sup> Kyle, 283
- <sup>64</sup> Kyle, 286.
- <sup>65</sup> CAB 134/126 EC (56) 34th Meeting.
- <sup>66</sup> Kyle, 286.
- <sup>67</sup> quoted in Kyle, 288
- <sup>68</sup> Kyle, 290.
- <sup>69</sup> Kyle, 296-297.
- <sup>70</sup> quoted in Kyle, 297.
- <sup>71</sup> Nutting, 95.
- <sup>72</sup> Nutting, 95.
- <sup>73</sup> Nutting, 96.
- <sup>74</sup> Lloyd, 166.
- <sup>75</sup> quoted in Kyle, 302.
- <sup>76</sup> Kyle, 302.
- <sup>77</sup> CAB 128/ 30, CM (56) 71.
- <sup>78</sup> Kyle, 305.
- <sup>79</sup> Carleton, 63.
- <sup>80</sup> quoted in Kyle, 319.
- <sup>81</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 72.
- <sup>82</sup> Kyle, 322.
- <sup>83</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 72.
- <sup>84</sup> Kyle, 321.
- <sup>85</sup> Lloyd, 188.
- <sup>86</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56), 74.
- <sup>87</sup> Kyle, 334.
- <sup>88</sup> Kyle, 335.

---

<sup>89</sup> Kyle, 355.

<sup>90</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 75.

<sup>91</sup> Kyle, 391.

<sup>92</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 78.

<sup>93</sup> CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 40th Meeting.

<sup>94</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 79.

<sup>95</sup> Kyle, 442.

<sup>96</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 79.

<sup>97</sup> CAB 128/30 CM (56) 80

<sup>98</sup> See Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis*.

## **CHAPTER SIX: THE FALKLANDS CRISIS**

### **Introduction**

The Falklands crisis provides a rich body of evidence for studies of British foreign policy decision making. The crisis indicates the importance of small group dynamics as the majority of decisions were handled by an intimate group of ministers and civil servants. However, the crisis also shows the analytical importance of situating small groups within the wider context of core executive operations and political constraints. At key moments of policy change or military developments the smaller primary decision making group felt it necessary to secure the support of the full Cabinet. Further, the crisis indicates the importance of prominent individuals. Two key individuals stand out. Firstly, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose decision making style disposed her towards framing issues in uni-dimensional terms and to relentlessly pursue a single objective. Secondly, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, whose personal identification with a diplomatic approach led to persistent disagreements and the use of resources by the key core executive actors against one another. Finally, this case demonstrates the complex linkages between institutional and individual variables and the quality of decision making. While Thatcher's "black and white" representation of the situation heavily favored the military solution upon which she had immediately settled, the presence of a well-resourced and committed advocate of negotiation in Francis Pym prevented the core executive as a whole from fully abandoning diplomatic efforts until the eve of the British repossession of the islands.

This chapter first explores the background to the Falklands crisis and the political and military constraints on policy inherited by the Thatcher government. The analytical

narrative of the crisis itself demonstrates qualitatively the nature of interactions between institutional factors of the core executive, the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister, and the process, outcome and quality of decision making. The quantitative analysis which follows provides additional evidence and sharpens the linkages thus identified.

### **Distribution of resources**

Thatcher was not a well-resourced Prime Minister at the time of the Falklands crisis. Her government was unpopular in the country, presiding over an economic recession. Further, her senior colleagues had not warmed to her leadership, and indeed many of them were of a distinctly different ideological persuasion than her - the Conservative party was still more traditional one-nation Tory rather than Thatcherite neo-liberal, as it would become as the 1980s progressed. Many of the senior figures in the Cabinet, therefore, were not well disposed towards the Prime Minister. In the specific area of foreign affairs, Thatcher had little experience and was not an acknowledged expert. While she expressed hard-line views towards the Soviet Union, her major focus was on domestic affairs.

The Foreign Secretary at the outbreak of the crisis, Lord Carrington, was a respected figure, to whom Thatcher had largely delegated stewardship of foreign policy. However, as detailed below, Carrington resigned shortly after the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland islands. The extent of Thatcher's weakness was revealed in the choice of Carrington's replacement: She was forced to select Francis Pym, who was from the opposite wing of the party to her and with whom she shared a mutual dislike. However, Pym was a major figure within the party, and Thatcher did not have the standing to

appoint someone more to her taste. Consequently, while Thatcher possessed the resources in foreign affairs which accrue to any Prime Minister, she did not add any personal prestige to them nor did she have the benefit of a deferential or dependent Foreign Secretary - in fact, Pym had personal and institutional resources of his own.

Another salient factor was the weakness of the Defense Secretary, John Nott. Thatcher had appointed Nott in order to oversee deep cuts in the naval budget in particular, and a painful reorientation of the priorities of British defense spending. Pursuing this agenda had left Nott damaged by attacks from the defense lobby in Parliament and from senior military figures, reducing his political standing. In addition, Thatcher found him irresolute and nervy as a colleague under pressure, so diminishing his ability to affect policy deliberations even further.

### **Characteristics of Prime Minister**

Table 19 reports data on the individual characteristics of Margaret Thatcher (see Chapter three).

TABLE 19: TRAIT SCORES: MARGARET THATCHER

	Belief in Ability to Control Events	Conceptual Complexity	Need for Power	Self Confidence	Task Orientation
Mean Score	26.8	47.5	23	32	63.6
Difference from post 1945 Prime Ministers ( <i>t</i> score)	-4.510***	-6.393***	.533	-5.249***	-3.362***

Thatcher's belief in ability to control events score is significantly lower than the groups, meaning we would expect her to be predominantly reactive in her policy approach. Her conceptual complexity score is also significantly lower than the group's, meaning she would be likely to see events in 'black and white' terms and would only rarely change views on policy. Her need for power score is higher than the group's, but the difference is not significant. Accordingly, we would expect her to display competitive behavior on occasion. Her self confidence score is significantly lower than the group's, leading to the prediction that she would be reticent about challenging the interpretations / recommendations of others. Finally, her task orientation score is lower than the group's, meaning that she should show some concern about maintaining harmony among decision makers.



### **Background to the crisis**

British possession of the Falkland Islands was a holdover from the imperial era. Sovereignty of the islands was disputed, with both Britain (8000 miles from the islands) and Argentina (somewhat closer) claiming first discovery and settlement. These claims were augmented on the British side by the fact that the islanders themselves wished to remain a crown colony, and on the Argentine side by the fact that the islands were both in geographic proximity to and heavily economically dependent upon Argentina.

At the height of the British empire, the islands represented a strategically significant holding, and Argentine adventurism was in any case deterred by British sea power. However, by the mid-1960s neither of these conditions held. Argentina had therefore begun a determined diplomatic effort to press its claims, occasionally augmented by military threats. Successive British governments would happily have negotiated sovereignty away but for the domestic political sensitivity of the islands. Firstly, the islanders themselves resolutely refused to countenance living under an Argentine government. Secondly, their protests as to their Britishness excited a jingoistic group of members of Parliament<sup>1</sup>. Thirdly, whenever the Falklands issue came up, these MPs were joined by a substantial additional group who refused to accept the decline of Britain's imperial status. Indeed, when new foreign office minister Nicholas Ridley suggested a form of "leaseback" of the islands in December 1980, wherein Argentina would gain formal sovereignty but would allow Britain to remain in effective control for an extended period, he received a savage commons reception and the government was caused some embarrassment. These constraints, in the context of a relatively low priority foreign policy issue, determined that Britain's policy would be essentially status quo:

Continue low level negotiations with Argentina in order that she did not resort to extreme actions, whilst at the same time keeping the issue off the domestic political agenda.

Militarily, Britain made little attempt to effectively defend the islands. The costs of doing so against a threat that was judged until the eve of invasion as unlikely to materialize were prohibitive. Instead, a “tripwire” force – a small garrison on land supplemented by the lightly armed patrol vessel *HMS Endurance* at sea – was maintained. However, the Conservative government elected in 1979 was determined to reduce Britain’s defense burdens, and to concentrate resources on anti-Soviet priorities determined by NATO. Therefore, *HMS Endurance* was publicly slated for withdrawal. While logical in economic terms, the decision caused some Foreign Office concern as to the signals it sent about Britain’s commitment to the Falklands.

Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight it is clear that both the negotiation freeze and the reduction of military commitment, while having a certain domestic political logic, had the result of encouraging the Argentine government to believe that Britain would not defend the islands if they were attacked. The Argentine military junta, in dire economic trouble at home (as, incidentally, was the British government), and possessed of an erratic decision making structure, felt by early 1982 that it need not exercise caution in its own rhetoric and diplomacy, nor in discouraging unofficial incursions of Argentine nationalists onto the islands, which carried the potential for escalation.

### **Analytical narrative**

Long standing disputes aside, the proximate cause of the crisis over the Falklands was the unauthorized landing of Argentine scrap metal merchant Constantino Davidoff

on the island of South Georgia on 19th March 1982. This appeared at the time to be not markedly more threatening than many previous incidents. Indeed, there has never been conclusive proof that Davidoff's landing was sanctioned by any part of the Argentine government, although certainly the junta had adopted a policy of not discouraging such adventures. The incident was significant enough to receive attention from the two foremost core executive foreign policy decision makers, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. The next day, they agreed to dispatch *HMS Endurance* from Falklands patrol to South Georgia in order to oversee the removal of Davidoff and his men. Thatcher and Carrington intended the move to be an understated response, though later evidence from the Argentine side suggested it provoked the junta, who decided during this period that the Davidoff landing provided an opportunity which could be exploited<sup>2</sup>. From 20-26 March, official estimates from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Joint Intelligence Committee suggested that the likelihood of the incident presaging an Argentine invasion was minimal<sup>3</sup>. These estimates began to shift on 28 March, with suggestions that the Argentine government was divided on the question of military action, with the navy openly agitating for an invasion<sup>4</sup>. Thatcher and Carrington continued to decide the British response bilaterally, agreeing to the dispatch of a nuclear submarine to the area<sup>5</sup>. They also involved the American government for the first time in the issue, Carrington telephoning Secretary of State Alexander Haig<sup>6</sup>. Indicative of the degree to which decision making at this stage was uncoordinated, with Ministers acting independently of each other and on the basis of either old or uncollated intelligence, Minister of Defence John Nott claims to have decided to recommend dispatch of a submarine concurrently, but without consultation,

with Thatcher and Carrington<sup>7</sup>. With the intelligence estimates provided to Carrington carrying further hints of possible trouble on 30th March, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary agreed the dispatch of a second nuclear submarine. At this date, any Argentine aggression was still assumed "not to be imminent"<sup>8</sup>. It would later be suggested that a more coordinated process of collating intelligence estimates and examining policy at this point would have indicated some imminent action, although this assertion would be rejected by the official body set up to investigate the matter, the Franks Commission. What is clear, however, is that decision making at this stage was ad hoc and centered on the Thatcher-Carrington axis<sup>9</sup>. In defense of government procedures at this point, the imperative to concentrate solely on the Falklands was not overwhelmingly apparent at the time, and the episode did not seem qualitatively different from other Argentine actions in recent memory.

This changed with the receipt by John Nott on 31st March of MOD intelligence suggesting an imminent Argentine invasion - 2 April being set as the "day of action"<sup>10</sup>. The MOD estimate was solid enough to prompt Nott to request an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister. They were joined by senior civil servants: Richard Luce and Humphrey Atkins from the Foreign Office, Antony Acland from the Joint Intelligence Committee, and Sir Frank Cooper, Nott's permanent secretary<sup>11</sup>. On being told by Nott that intelligence suggested an imminent Argentine invasion, Thatcher said instantly "If they are invaded, we have got to get them back"<sup>12</sup>. However, the others present were more inclined to caution. The JIC and Foreign Office officials, who had less incendiary intelligence reports with them, argued that since there was nothing Britain could do to prevent an invasion, which in any case was not certain to occur, she should not do

anything to provoke one<sup>13</sup>. Nott also counseled caution, having been the unhappy recipient the previous day of a Ministry of Defence briefing which cast doubt on Britain's capability to mount a successful expedition to recover the islands<sup>14</sup>. The result of this was that the first policy decision of the meeting was to make a further approach to the United States, seeking to have President Reagan intervene directly with General Galtieri, the head of the Argentine junta, in order to seek to dissuade him from any action. Reagan was eventually able to reach Galtieri on 1st April, but the evidence is that the Argentine leader took little notice of the American President's understated warnings. Thatcher's immediate instinct had been for more forceful action than this and she was uneasy with the caution of the other core executive actors. At this point, Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord, arrived. His impact was immediate. He had been involved in many battles with Nott over the Minister of Defence's proposed cuts to the navy, and seized on the opportunity to emphasize its capabilities. Leach recalls the following exchange with Thatcher:

*Prime Minister: Could we recapture the islands if they are invaded?*

*Leach: Yes we could and in my judgment (though it is not my business to say so) we should.*

*Prime Minister: Why do you say that?*

*Leach: Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little<sup>15</sup>.*

Leach struck Thatcher as being "quiet, calm and confident"<sup>16</sup>. Leach's position accorded much more closely with Thatcher's own, and Thatcher found his conviction regarding Britain's naval capabilities much more to her taste than Nott's hesitancy. Nott himself was disturbed. He held the view that Leach was "not exactly cerebral man"<sup>17</sup>, and indeed it has been suggested that had Leach's superior, Admiral Lewin, been available for the

meeting rather than absent in New Zealand, he would have presented a more sober military assessment and Thatcher might not have become set on the sailing of a task force. Indeed, this first, ad hoc meeting of decision makers faced with an imminent invasion is significant in terms of the Prime Minister's subsequent position. In this meeting, she announced the principle from which she would not move throughout the crisis: that Argentine possession of the islands was "totally unacceptable" and Britain would take forceful action to recover them<sup>18</sup>. Further, Thatcher's positive response to Leach would be repeated in her interaction with the military as a whole during this crisis: she would more readily accept the recommendations of military figures than diplomats, and showed far greater concern for the impact of decisions on military matters than on diplomatic matters<sup>19</sup>. Indeed, Thatcher recalls that "(t)hroughout the war we were confronted with the problem of managing the intricate relationship between diplomatic and military requirements. I was determined that the needs of our servicemen should have priority over politics"<sup>20</sup>.

On the morning of April 1, with intelligence suggesting a large Argentine fleet was at sea en route to the Falklands, Thatcher presided over a Cabinet meeting and a meeting of the Overseas Defence (OD) committee. She reported that the situation appeared "very grave", and that "the best hope of avoiding confrontation lay in the influence that the United States government could bring to bear on the Argentine government"<sup>21</sup>. However, Thatcher was not being entirely candid with the full Cabinet or the OD committee- she did not reveal either that intelligence suggested invasion was not only possible but highly probable, nor did she give full voice to her belief that a military expedition could and should be launched to recover the islands<sup>22</sup>. In an ad hoc gathering

that evening of the ministers and officials who would form the core group of British decision making throughout the crisis, she was less equivocal. An unnamed minister present later summed up the mood of that meeting as "we sensed a missile had already been launched, we could only wait to see where it might land"<sup>23</sup>. John Nott had quieted his doubts from the night before, and came down in favor of sending a task force along the lines proposed by Henry Leach. The political tenor of the meeting was that a task force would have to be launched in order for the government to survive in the event of invasion, but the belief was that the crisis could be resolved short of open conflict through a mixture of diplomatic pressure and the steady approach of the task force to the islands<sup>24</sup>. The final decision was to put the fleet on full alert and to prepare the task force, but to reserve the order for it to sail. A number of assumptions were allowed to go unchallenged during this meeting- in particular that once a task force had sailed diplomatic freedom of action could be maintained. Subsequent events were to show that the military timetable imposed by the sailing would supersede the diplomatic effort. In addition, the task force option remained under-specified- there had been no discussion of its capabilities in relation to the Argentine fleet nor the rules under which it could engage the invasion forces<sup>25</sup>.

Friday 2nd April began with an emergency Cabinet meeting to discuss the apparently imminent invasion. Again, Cabinet appears to have been informed, and then not fully, rather than consulted<sup>26</sup>. Throughout the day there was confusion regarding whether an invasion had in fact taken place, until at 6pm Lord Carrington and John Nott held a press conference to confirm the fact. There immediately followed a second emergency Cabinet of the day. At this point, Thatcher was required to allow full and

frank discussion of the issue in a much wider setting than she had previously- the decisions since the Davidoff incursion having largely been taken in bilateral and ad hoc groupings. However, freedom of maneuver was by this point strictly limited. Thatcher and her conferees had begun visible preparations for the task force and could not stand down the fleet now that the invasion had occurred. More seriously, however, there was a realization among the Cabinet that the government could not survive without a forceful response; the right-wing of the Conservative party was in full voice regarding government supineity in responding to earlier indications of threat to the islands<sup>27</sup>. Thatcher therefore sought full Cabinet support for her policy at a time when it appeared the only possible course of action, rather than earlier in the crisis before the fact of Argentine invasion and preparations to sail the fleet. This established a pattern whereby Cabinet support was sought for the most significant decisions of the war, but only when they had become *fait accompli*. The effect of making decisions at this stage in ad hoc groups was also that the civil service was only fitfully involved. John Nott saw this as of great benefit to the rapid preparation of the task force:

(I)n the chaos of the last few days the Whitehall system had been hit below the solar plexus. A great tangled mass of coordinating committees, Cabinet sub-committees, the great panoply of bureaucratic checking and double-checking had been completely flattened...It was partly due to the fact that Whitehall was virtually in suspense, shell-shocked and useless, that no obstacles arose in getting the fleet to sea<sup>28</sup>.

However, this dispatch was purchased at the price of careful consideration of the situation the fleet would face. The task force departed with no detailed assessment of the risks it would encounter. Indeed, it was not until the task force had been at sea for several weeks that ministers were given a full briefing on the likely losses and risks. When they were, they were extremely shocked, but also committed beyond reverse<sup>29</sup>. Also at this point, Thatcher was confirmed in her preference for the military over the Foreign Office- an



institution which she habitually distrusted. Her comments are revealing in terms of her unequivocal framing of the situation and her impatience with alternative points of view:

It was also on Friday 2nd April that I received advice from the Foreign Office which summed up the flexibility of principle characteristic of that department. I was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power. All these considerations were fair enough. But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking. You have to set out with an iron will to overcome them. And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen's subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister<sup>30</sup>.

In the immediate aftermath of the Argentine invasion, Thatcher was faced with a major crisis within the government. Her own bullishness in the House of Commons on 3 April had been well received, but her Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence had received far rougher treatment. Lord Carrington, in particular, was deeply shocked by the blame laid at his door for the invasion by the right-wing of the Conservative party, and, as a member of the more sedate House of Lords, was unable to deal effectively with these attacks. Nott too had problems. He gave a poor, nervous performance in the House of Commons on the 2nd, and both Carrington and he seemed to be on the brink of being pushed out of the government. Carrington informed Thatcher on April 4th that he wanted to resign from office. Thatcher sought to dissuade him. Although ideologically dissimilar, Thatcher had come to respect and trust Carrington, and was also concerned at the ramifications for her government as a whole of the resignation of such a senior figure. However, Carrington could not be moved. The only replacement candidate for Foreign Secretary with sufficient experience and standing within the party was Francis Pym. Thatcher and he were ideological opposites, and found each other personally distasteful. As deputy Prime Minister William Whitelaw commented at the time: "Francis cannot

stand her. And she cannot stand him. Can there ever have been a worse relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary?"<sup>31</sup>. Thatcher herself commented that

Francis is in many ways a quintessential old style Tory: a country gentleman and a soldier, a good tactician, but no strategist. He is a proud pragmatist and an enemy of ideology; the sort of man of whom people used to say that he would be 'just right in a crisis'. I was to have reason to question that judgment. Francis's appointment undoubtedly united the party. But it heralded serious difficulties for the conduct of the campaign itself<sup>32</sup>.

Indeed, Pym was much more disposed towards a negotiated settlement of the Falklands crisis, and became personally identified with the diplomatic efforts. This would become the central fault line within the core executive. On learning of Carrington's resignation, Nott also hastened to offer his, which was rejected by Thatcher<sup>33</sup>. The result of this crisis within the government was that both major foreign policy ministries, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, were headed by politicians who did not have Thatcher's trust. In this context Nott found it difficult to exercise any independent effect on proceedings, while Pym had to carefully utilize the resources available to him and often found himself working at loggerheads with the Prime Minister.

With the reorganization complete, the core executive now created the decision making apparatus that would guide management of the crisis. The chosen instrument was officially a sub group of the Overseas Defence Cabinet committee: Overseas Defense committee for the South Atlantic (ODSA). This quickly became known both within and outside government as the "War Cabinet". The composition of ODSA is shown in figure 3:

FIGURE 3: ODSA: THE FALKLANDS 'WAR CABINET'<sup>34</sup>

<b>Politicians</b>	<b>Civil Servants</b>
PRIME MINISTER Margaret Thatcher	CABINET SECRETARY Sir Robert Armstrong
FOREIGN SECRETARY Francis Pym	PERMANENT SECRETARY, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE Sir Antony Acland
DEFENCE SECRETARY John Nott	RETIRING PERMANENT SECRETARY, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE Sir Michael Palliser
HOME SECRETARY/ DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER William Whitelaw	PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Sir Frank Cooper
PAYMASTER GENERAL, CHAIRMEN OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY Cecil Parkinson	CHIEF DEFENCE STAFF Admiral Lewin

Much of the membership was automatic, but the inclusion of Cecil Parkinson is noteworthy. A Cabinet member of only junior rank, he was not an obvious choice. The official reason for his inclusion was his Chairmanship of the Conservative party- he would be charged with keeping the party informed and transmitting the mood of the party to the War Cabinet. However, the real reason indicates the degree to which composition of a decision making group is both crucial to its output and regarded as such by decision makers. In fact, John Nott was concerned that Francis Pym and Willie Whitelaw, who were both regarded as institutionally inclined towards a Foreign Office way of thinking, would form a powerful alliance. He therefore requested the addition of Parkinson, whom Nott felt understood him and the needs of the MOD, on the grounds that “Francis has Willie”<sup>35</sup>. It would transpire that Nott need not have been concerned, as the Pym-Whitelaw alliance did not materialize. War Cabinet became the central decision making site within the core executive, only infrequently seeking Cabinet approval for its decisions. The inclusion of a team of senior civil servants ensured that the War Cabinet for the most part functioned with professional bureaucratic support.

With the decision to dispatch the task force taken, the newly established War Cabinet was faced with the uncomfortable prospect of an extended interregnum while the fleet sailed into position. It was this delay which animated the efforts to reach a diplomatic solution. At this point, the American Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, Jr., arrived on the scene. Determined to emulate his mentor Henry Kissinger, Haig offered himself as a ‘mediator’ in the dispute and embarked upon a program of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ between Washington, D.C, Buenos Aires, and London. Thatcher was displeased at Haig’s presentation of himself as mediator rather than ally, and saw his

mission as a distraction, good for providing time for the task force to reach its destination, but carrying the danger of forcing an unacceptable diplomatic resolution on Britain<sup>36</sup>. Francis Pym, by contrast, was much more optimistic about the prospects for a negotiated solution, much more pessimistic about the military prospects, and became personally committed to Haig's diplomacy. Haig arrived in London on 8th April. He was immediately brought before the War Cabinet, where he presented an American plan for resolution of the conflict which would be revisited in various forms until the British landed on the Falklands<sup>37</sup>. The Haig plan called for the withdrawal of both Argentine and British forces from the area (or, at this point, a halt in the progress of the British task force), a temporary international government for the islands, and the setting of a firm deadline for an Anglo-Argentine agreement on sovereignty. Thatcher was not at all amenable to this plan. She saw British sovereignty as a fact and an absolute, and believed the junta was in any case not willing to negotiate in good faith<sup>38</sup>. Haig's aide E. J. Streater reported that Thatcher saw the situation as "a simple matter of right and wrong", and Haig noted that she framed the issue in an unequivocal manner and drew upon dubious historical parallels:

In the drawing room at No. 10, after I had explained the American proposals to Mrs Thatcher, she rapped sharply on the tabletop and recalled that this was the table at which Neville Chamberlain sat in 1938 and spoke of the Czechs as a faraway people about whom we know so little and with whom we have so little in common. A world war and the death of over 45 million people followed. She begged us to remember this: Do not urge Britain to reward aggression, to give Argentina something taken by force that it could not attain by peaceful means...She was in a forceful mood, embattled, incisive<sup>39</sup>.

Francis Pym must have drawn similar conclusions during the same session when, on suggesting that "maybe we should ask the Falklanders how they feel about a war" Thatcher snapped at him: "aggressors will always try to intimidate those against whom they aggress"<sup>40</sup>. This framing of the issue in absolutist terms would be expected given

Thatcher's very low conceptual complexity score.

Haig departed from London for Buenos Aires impressed with Thatcher's resolve, but also aware of the fault line between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and with some belief that, if he could reach a settlement with the junta, pressure could be brought to bear on Thatcher to accept<sup>41</sup>. By the time Haig returned from Argentina on the 12th April, the task force had reached Ascension island, a staging post approximately half way to the Falklands. Haig had found the Argentine junta split on the question of negotiations, but had managed to agree a seven point plan to be put to the British with the Argentine foreign minister, Costa Mendes. Thatcher was unimpressed by the plan, but the War Cabinet as a whole felt that the combined weight of public opinion, both in Britain and the world, and American pressure for settlement meant negotiations could not be ended<sup>42</sup>. By the same token, Thatcher felt she could not delay the task force given the incensed state of the hawkish wing of the Conservative party. Nor, she notes, did she want to halt its progress in any case<sup>43</sup>. Thatcher was rescued from this quandary by the actions of the junta. Haig was contacted by Costa Mendez with revised and more stringent terms, which Thatcher found much easier to reject. The Haig shuttle was now stalled. However, he refused to abandon his diplomacy, and lobbied the junta and the British government to move from their demands. By April 17, Haig had detected enough movement in Buenos Aires to justify a return visit.

In the meantime, British military preparations continued. On 15 April, the Chiefs of Staff made a detailed presentation to the War Cabinet of the military dangers of an operation to recover the Falklands. This was the first such briefing, and left many ministers shaken at the estimates of losses and casualties<sup>44</sup>. However, the full realization

of the costs of sending the task force had come when the fleet was already en route to the Falklands. Had such a briefing been received before the order was given for the task force to sail, it may have given the core executive collectively greater pause before making the decision. Indeed Thatcher, conscious of the press assembled outside, had to ask members of the War Cabinet to "look confident" as they departed<sup>45</sup>.

Haig contacted the British government on 19th April outlining new proposals agreed with the junta. Thatcher found these proposals to be still unacceptable, and not worth a return visit by Haig to London. Thatcher was unimpressed by what she saw as rhetorical nuances in the new proposals, and continued to interpret the situation through the framework she had established even before the Falklands were invaded: "(The proposals were) a great many words to shroud the simple fact that the use of force would have succeeded, dictatorship would have prevailed"<sup>46</sup>. At this point the military timetable abruptly intruded on the course of diplomacy. Advanced units of the task force had reached South Georgia - the small island on which Davidoff had made his initial incursion. South Georgia was now defended by only a small Argentine garrison. War Cabinet on the 19th authorized the repossession of South Georgia. The military advantages of doing so were minimal, but it was felt that a success was needed in order to sustain public morale and whet the appetite for the larger struggle. However, the operation to repossess South Georgia obviously threatened the diplomatic track - the danger being that once shots were fired both sides of the conflict would harden their positions. Haig, when told of the War Cabinet decision, expressed precisely this fear, whereupon Thatcher reminded him that he was being informed rather than consulted<sup>47</sup>. Haig then requested that Pym fly to Washington in order to discuss the latest Argentine

proposals. Thatcher readily agreed. Indeed, Pym's departure from War Cabinet decision making was symbolic of the fact that most of the group, following Thatcher's lead, had become disinterested in the diplomatic track. Before Pym departed for Washington, he was forced, under some pressure from Thatcher, to retract a statement he had made in the Commons implying that force would not be used while negotiations continued.

With Pym and Haig in Washington, Cabinet on 22nd April was informed that operations to repossess South Georgia had begun. Nott recalls that this came as a "shock" to the full Cabinet, who had not been consulted in advance<sup>48</sup>. Two members of the Cabinet, Jim Prior and Peter Walker, expressed concern that Britain should be taking military action while conducting negotiations. However, as had been the case with the decision to sail the task force, by the time the full Cabinet was informed the matter was a *fait accompli*. With the most senior advocate of negotiation absent in Washington, dissent was muted. Again, it can be no more than speculation to posit that a fuller discussion of options and a different policy output might have occurred had the full Cabinet been consulted sooner, or indeed had Pym been present and his voice added to those of Prior and Walker. In War Cabinet on 23rd April there was consideration of the rules under which the task force could engage Argentine units. Restrictive rules of engagement had been agreed on 16th April, but these were now broadened and a public warning was issued that the task force would engage any Argentine forces which "interfered" with it<sup>49</sup>.

Pym returned from Washington the next day with new proposals from Haig. As had now become customary, Thatcher found these unacceptable, but Pym announced that he would recommend their acceptance to the War Cabinet to be held that evening. Thatcher considered the document Pym had produced as "a conditional surrender", and as



a result Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were "at loggerheads"<sup>50</sup>. Thatcher spent the time before War Cabinet in careful preparation. She summoned the Attorney General and spent several hours exploring the loopholes and vagaries in the text. Immediately prior to War Cabinet, she summoned Willie Whitelaw to her study and sought assurance that he would support her rejection of the proposals. Cecil Parkinson comments that "I had noticed that such meetings always seemed to be held just before some really contentious issue was to be put before Cabinet"<sup>51</sup>. Pym, too, was not idle. Thatcher recalls that as ministers and civil servants gathered outside the Cabinet room prior to the 6pm meeting, "Francis was there, busily lobbying for their support"<sup>52</sup>. Parkinson confirms that Pym personally approached him<sup>53</sup>. In War Cabinet, Pym presented the proposals and forcefully argued for their acceptance. Thatcher made use of her preparation time and rebutted them point by point. Most of the War Cabinet were inclined to side with Thatcher, although she could not simply ignore Pym's position, nor could she risk the resignation of another Foreign Secretary. Therefore, some compromise had to be found. Eventually, John Nott suggested that the proposals be put to the junta through Haig, with the belief that the proposals would be as unacceptable to the Argentine government as they were to the British. The British could therefore claim it was the Argentineans, and not themselves, who had proven intransigent. The committee agreed. Haig transmitted these proposals to the junta and set a deadline of Wednesday April 28 for a reply. This deadline passed with no response, but late on April 29th the Argentine government formally rejected the proposals. This precipitated an official US "tilt" towards Britain, and away from acting as informal mediator, on 30th May. Pym departed for the US again to consult with Haig. Thatcher, however, continued to display a negative and

instrumental view of the negotiating effort as a whole, only consenting to allow diplomacy to continue at all due to the pressures of the Americans and international opinion, and the increasingly isolated and entrepreneurial efforts of her Foreign Secretary:

From the beginning of May through to the recapture of the Falklands in mid-June military considerations loomed ever larger in my mind. But this did not mean that the pressure for negotiations eased- far from it. I was under an almost intolerable pressure to negotiate for the sake of negotiation and because so many politicians were desperately anxious to avoid the use of force- as if the Argentineans had not already used force by invading in the first place...Yet I could never afford to ignore the diplomatic effort because on its successful conduct rested...the degree of support we might receive from our allies, above all the United States<sup>54</sup>.

With Pym absent from War Cabinet on 30th April, there was a further loosening of the task force rules of engagement. The threat posed by the Argentinean aircraft carrier *25 de Mayo* was discussed, with the result that the principle was established that a major surface unit such as this could be attacked on the basis that it inherently posed a threat to the task force, regardless of whether it was actively “interfering” with operations<sup>55</sup>.

The events of the weekend of 1-2 May have since been the subject of much scrutiny. The two major events of the weekend were the sudden emergence of a peace initiative sponsored by the Peruvian government on 1 May, and the sinking of the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano*, with the loss of 300 lives, on 2 May<sup>56</sup>. Much debate has centered on the extent of War Cabinet knowledge of the peace proposals prior to the order to sink the *Belgrano*. Some have claimed that the *Belgrano* was sunk in full knowledge of the Peruvian peace plan and in order to foil it<sup>57</sup>. However, the War Cabinet has always denied any knowledge of the plan at the time the decision was taken, and maintained that the proposals in any case would not have been acceptable to the British government. What is incontrovertible, however, is that the War Cabinet decision to allow the sinking of the *Belgrano*, on the principle that she posed as great a threat to the task

force as the *25 de Mayo*, was taken with the exclusion of key actors who could reasonably have been expected to have objected to it, and that the sinking did in fact end all realistic possibility of a negotiated outcome. Certainly, for the third time, Francis Pym was absent when a relaxation of the rules of engagement was considered. It is reasonable to expect that Pym, in Washington trying to resurrect the diplomatic effort, might have been consulted beforehand as to the effect this military escalation would have on negotiations. In fact, in evidence before the Commons committee set up to investigate these events, Pym reports that “they (the War Cabinet) did it and they told me they had done it...in my absence”<sup>58</sup>. However, he goes on to add that he would have supported the decision had he been present, and that the Peruvian peace document, which he had not relayed to the War Cabinet in London, “was not in any way a developed set of proposals. It was, as it were, headings of possibilities for the future”<sup>59</sup>. In addition to Pym’s absence, the War Cabinet met at Chequers on 2 May absent its usual civil service secretariat. This “Mandarins Committee” had been present in the other instances where the rules of engagement were altered, and could have been expected to point out the legal ambiguity in attacking a cruiser sailing away from the task force and in international waters. However, as the foreign affairs committee investigation into these matters reports:

The decisive meeting which changed the rules of engagement in order to sink the *Belgrano* was not a formal meeting of the War Cabinet but an informal gathering before lunch of some of those summoned to the War Cabinet meeting that day...The safeguards of the Mandarins Committee, used in every other case of a change of rules of engagement, were thus preempted<sup>60</sup>.

The sinking of the *Belgrano* was not well received internationally, and increased pressure was applied on the core executive to reconsider the military route<sup>61</sup>. The motivation to do so was increased when the destroyer *Sheffield* was hit by an exocet missile on 5th May,

with the loss of more than thirty lives. The result of these developments was that when Pym returned on the 5th bearing a more detailed iteration of the Peruvian peace proposals, he found a rather more receptive audience among his colleagues. Ironically, the escalation of the conflict had produced a renewed core executive interest in diplomacy. In this context, Thatcher felt the need both to give more attention to negotiations and to seek the support of the full Cabinet in emergency session. Cabinet on May 5th involved the detailed questioning of Admiral Lewin on the military risks of continued operations, and an exploration of the peace proposals Pym had brought back from Washington. The core executive as a whole therefore responded quite reasonably to the vivid demonstration of the risks of a previous policy choice, and began exploring alternatives. The policy decision was to accept in principle the Peruvian peace plan. However, Thatcher did so only because she perceived the political necessity of continuing negotiations. She did not shift from her fundamental belief that they would be futile: "We could not delay military options simply because of negotiations. The truth was that it was only our military measures which had produced a diplomatic response"<sup>62</sup>. Indeed, Thatcher was concerned throughout the crisis with a monochrome interpretation of events determined by a predominantly military timescale. Lewin and Leach had briefed War Cabinet to the effect that once arrived at the Falklands, the task force would experience a rapid diminution of operational readiness, and would be horribly exposed to Argentine air attack. Further, the weather would turn in short order. This timetable dictated that the task force would be ready to mount an operation to repossess the islands by 16 May, but would experience prohibitive and increasing difficulty in doing so after 30 May<sup>63</sup>. This determined that any negotiations had to be concluded within ten days.

At this point the erratic decision making of the junta intervened once more. The Argentine government rejected the Peruvian peace plan, which Francis Pym stated could have led to a cease fire "within hours"<sup>64</sup>. Instead, they proposed that negotiations be focused on a much less developed plan, without British support, forwarded by United Nations Secretary General Phillipe de Cuellar. The evidence is that the junta felt buoyed by their success in hitting *Sheffield*, and believed that they could negotiate a more favorable settlement through the UN. The result in Britain was to deal a blow to the supporters of negotiation, and strengthen the hands of the Prime Minister and the military who argued for the subordination of diplomacy to the operational timetable. Thatcher therefore found it a relatively straightforward matter to coax the War Cabinet through the crucial decision to send the landing force south from Ascension island on May 8, despite the resurfacing of Nott's doubts about British capabilities and Pym's continued commitment to negotiation.

Meanwhile, despite the obvious urgency of the militarily-imposed deadline, the negotiation effort, by this point focused on the UN, meandered at a leisurely pace. The War Cabinet as a whole had once more lost interest, allowing Thatcher to frame the diplomatic effort as merely one part in preparing the ground for war. With this aim she presided over two War Cabinets on 14th May, the first of which examined the military position and the second of which dealt with the state of the UN initiative. Considerations expressed in the first dominated the choices of the second. The chiefs of staff presented their plan for a landing at San Carlos, which would be the initial British incursion. The chiefs specified the weekend of 21-22 May as the ideal time for the operation, and Thatcher therefore adopted this as the date by which all negotiations were to be

concluded. In the second meeting, Pym argued that "every avenue of negotiation" had to be exhausted<sup>65</sup>. Thatcher, concerned with the military schedule, conceded this position (as has previously been noted, she was aware she could not simply roll over the fundamental objections of her Foreign Secretary), but secured agreement that final British terms would be presented as an ultimatum to Argentina, thus providing a clear ending to the diplomatic phase.

War Cabinet on 16 May was joined by two senior diplomats: Britain's Ambassador to the United States Tony Parsons and the Ambassador to the United Nations, Nicholas Henderson. The Foreign Office contingent, and especially Parsons, sought to impress upon Thatcher the need to make final demands of Argentina which would be viewed by world public opinion as reasonable. Thatcher, who not once displayed any sympathy for the view that Britain ought to be seen to act reasonably in the face of Argentine unreasonableness, was furious. John Nott recalls "I have to say that Margaret Thatcher was pretty aggressive at this meeting...Margaret accused them (the Foreign Office) of being 'wet, ready to sell out, unsupportive of British interests etc etc'. And 'did the Foreign Office have no principles?'"<sup>66</sup>. However, Parsons maintained the Foreign Office position, providing a rare instance of a civil servant openly challenging the Prime Minister. Parsons would interrupt Thatcher's increasingly agitated monologues, and seek to keep discussion focused on the need to "at least clear decks for war in the most advantageous manner"<sup>67</sup>. The result was that the final British proposals, while not offering any dramatic concessions over those which the junta had already rejected, did at least seem to not be theatrically intransigent.

On 18 May the War Cabinet approved the plans for a landing at San Carlos that

weekend, and the full Cabinet which followed gave its consent. The following day the British ultimatum expired without reply from the junta. Francis Pym made one final attempt to prevent the invasion in War Cabinet on 20th May, urging that new proposals brought forward by de Cuellar be accepted. By this point, however, only the most dramatic of diplomatic interventions could have halted the imminent British attack, and de Cuellar's proposals did not amount to that. Thatcher felt confident in dismissing the initiative, as she explains: "Once again, Francis urged a compromise, and this time at the eleventh hour...But the fact was that de Cuellar's proposals were sketchy and unclear; to have accepted would have put us right back at the beginning again. I summed up very firmly. There could be no question of holding up the military timetable"<sup>68</sup>.

This represented the effective end of diplomacy. Once British forces had landed, the War Cabinet focused the majority of its attention on operational matters, and diplomatic policy consisted solely of the prevention of outside intervention delaying or muddying military victory<sup>69</sup>, which was achieved with the receipt of the Argentine surrender at Port Stanley on 12 June.

### **Explaining the key decisions**

#### *Task force*

The crucial decision to launch the task force to reclaim the Falklands was taken very early during the crisis. Thatcher's personal characteristics are important to the explanation. She had settled immediately upon a 'black and white' view of the issue which determined that the Argentine action was an unprovoked aggression, undertaken by an illegitimate dictatorship, which Britain therefore had the right and obligation to

oppose. This framing of the situation did not allow for the nuances and compromises associated with finding a diplomatic solution. Thatcher, as a low complexity leader, was prone to this kind of absolutist framing of issues.

An additional factor explaining the choice for a task force was the interaction between Thatcher's framing of the situation and the impeccable timing of the arrival of Henry Leach, the gung-ho First Sea Lord. Leach arrived in the crucial decision making meeting as Thatcher was growing increasingly dissatisfied with the cautious advice of senior politicians, and gave a rather more upbeat account of the military possibilities.

Further, the weakness of John Nott, the minister of defence, was important here. A figure of marginal political standing whom Thatcher found unimpressive, Nott was unable to provide the effective advocacy against a military option which would do justice to the cautionary estimates circulating around the Ministry of Defense as to the prospects of its success at reasonable cost.

The ad hoc, isolated nature of decision making at this point in the crisis was also significant. Options were being considered outside of formal venues such as the Cabinet, and policy was not progressing through the usual civil service machinery, meaning that it was not subject to the checks and caveats which are synonymous with Whitehall policy making. While this allowed the government to put together the task force option, and indeed dispatch the force with great alacrity, it also deprived them of a full survey of the costs and risks inherent in the policy - the task force sailed without any detailed appreciation of the disposition of Argentine forces nor of the losses which could be expected. When such a detailed briefing was prepared and delivered to ministers some time later, they were shaken by its pessimism.



*Rejection of diplomatic approach*

On several occasions, most notably when Pym returned from Washington on 24<sup>th</sup> April and in the matter of the Peruvian peace plan of 1-2 May, the core executive rejected proposals for a diplomatic solution.

Again, a major explanatory factor is Thatcher's low complexity. Having settled upon a framing of the situation which allowed no compromise with the Argentine junta, she was not amenable to reconsidering this position, and discounted information which may have suggested a change in policy - such as the mounting costs and risks in task force operations as exemplified by the attack on *HMS Sheffield*, or the declining international legitimacy of Britain's position following the sinking of the *General Belgrano*. In addition, Thatcher's higher than average need for power indicates that she would display competitive behavior when she felt her authority was under challenge. Certainly the manner in which the diplomatic effort became centered around Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, who had independent political standing within the party and was something of a rival to her, did not increase her willingness to consider the merits of negotiation.

However, Thatcher's personal characteristics alone do not explain the disposition of the core executive towards negotiations. Thatcher, as a Prime Minister and not a President, could not ensure that the core executive would dismiss diplomacy merely on her say so. Indeed, the independent standing of Pym and his entrepreneurial efforts, combined with the torturous progress of the task force at sea, determined that a diplomatic track progressed concurrent with the military track until the eve of the British

incursion onto the Falkland islands. Therefore, Thatcher had to marshal her own resources carefully in order to defeat Pym's initiatives. The best example of this is her detailed preparation in concert with the Attorney General prior to the War Cabinet meeting of 24<sup>th</sup> April, where Pym had announced he would recommend adoption of a new American peace plan. In addition, prior to this crucial meeting Thatcher was careful to square her most senior colleague, Willie Whitelaw.

### *Sinking of the Belgrano*

Certainly the most immediately controversial decision of the core executive was to sink the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano*. At the most basic level, Thatcher's unequivocal commitment to a military resolution is again important. The sinking of the *Belgrano* was an operational decision, which carried very great political costs in terms of international opinion, and in terms of its effect on the junta's willingness to compromise. Few acts could have been more damaging to the prospects of a negotiated settlement. However, Thatcher had settled upon a 'black and white' framing of the situation, and had little interest in exploring alternative, diplomatic, paths to resolution.

However, as with each of the crucial Falklands decisions, Thatcher's personal preferences are not sufficient explanatory factors, and institutional variables are also causally important. In particular, the exclusion of key actors who could have been expected to have opposed the decision was critical. Firstly, the decision was taken while Foreign Secretary Francis Pym was absent in Washington, D.C., seeking to make progress on the diplomatic track. Given the obvious deleterious consequences of the sinking on prospects for a negotiated outcome, Pym could have been expected to have

raised very serious objections to the decision. Secondly, the decision was taken during an ad hoc meeting at Chequers, the Prime Minister's official residence. In consequence, the "Mandarins Committee" of civil servants, who had researched and advised the War Cabinet on previous specifications of the task force rules of engagement, were not included in deliberations. It is reasonable to assume that the "Mandarins Committee" would at the very least have pointed out the dubious status of the proposed action under international law. Absent these actors, however, few objections were raised among the decision making group.

## Quantitative analysis

### *The core executive institution.*

The coding results (Table 20) support the observation that during the Falklands crisis the central decision site was the War Cabinet. The pattern illustrated in the analytical narrative was that Cabinet was only used as a site of decision when major new developments occurred and Thatcher felt the need of full Cabinet backing. The relationship between Thatcher and Pym disagreeing and decisions being taken in full Cabinet (.346,  $p=.071$ ) is stronger than that between Thatcher and Pym disagreeing and decisions being taken in War Cabinet (.215,  $p=.272$ ), suggesting either that Cabinet provided a more open forum for disagreement, or that Thatcher and Pym disagreed over the most fundamental issues, which more often made it to full Cabinet. Indeed, the analytical narrative might incline us towards the latter explanation. Outside of the War Cabinet and the full Cabinet, on six occasions decisions were taken in another location, most commonly bilaterally between Thatcher and one or several ministers. The single occasion when the norm of central state secrecy was used to restrict information occurred as a result of an ad hoc meeting (on 1 April, when Thatcher did not reveal to Cabinet nor the Overseas Defence Committee that intelligence reports discussed in an ad hoc meeting that morning indicated an Argentine invasion was not only imminent, but effectively underway). The quantitative results would seem to indicate that the other variable concerned with central state norms – that of collective Cabinet responsibility – did not play a major role in the crisis. However, the analytical narrative indicated that on the few occasions when the norm was invoked Thatcher was in a vulnerable position. Indeed, in both instances where collective responsibility was invoked, Thatcher also displayed a

concern for her own authority. Further, these were also likely to be instances where policy was changed in the light of new information (.531,  $p=.004$ ). Finally, the civil service was involved in the overwhelming majority of the occasions for decision, mostly in the context of the “Mandarins Committee” attached to the War Cabinet. However, the occasions when the civil service was excluded were substantively important, as demonstrated in the analytical narrative when the decision to sink the *Belgrano* was taken without consulting officials. Civil Servants challenging ministers was comparatively rare, but did correlate with quality of decision making, as will be elaborated in the appropriate section below.

As the analytical narrative demonstrated, Falklands crisis decision making was dominated by the policy split between Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Pym, who disagreed in nearly half of all occasions for decision. The Foreign Secretary utilized resources on more occasions than the Prime Minister – the analytical narrative would suggest this was due to Pym’s consistent minority status within the core executive. As we might expect, instances of their disagreement correlate strongly with instances of their using resources against one another (correlation with ‘PM uses resources against FS’: .522,  $p=.004$ ; correlation with ‘FS uses resources against PM’: .658,  $p=.000$ ). Indeed, much of the time the use of resources against one another was mutual (‘PM uses resources against FS’ and ‘FS uses resources against PM’ correlated at .471,  $p=.011$ ). In addition, disagreement between Thatcher and Pym correlates with instances of other core executive actors using resources against one another (.366,  $p=.056$ ).

TABLE 20: THE CORE EXECUTIVE INSTITUTION IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

	Yes	No
Decision taken in Cabinet	3	24
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee	14	13
Decision taken in Other location	6	21
Civil Service challenges ministers	4	23
Norm of central state secrecy results in restriction of information	1	26
Norm of collective responsibility appears to stifle policy doubts	2	25
Prime Minister/ Foreign Secretary disagree on policy?	13	14
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary	6	21
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister	10	17
Core Executive use resources against one another	11	17

*Impact of the Prime Minister*

Thatcher was prominent within Falklands decision making, often taking a proactive approach to the issue, and often challenging the interpretation of the situation or policy recommendation offered by others. Further, the analytical narrative demonstrated that Thatcher settled on a framing of the situation and a policy response very early in the Falklands crisis, and never moved from it. Indeed, she seemed to see the issue overwhelmingly in unidimensional, 'black and white' terms. This would have been expected given her low conceptual complexity score in relation to the comparison group of Prime Ministers developed in chapter three. These conclusions are supported by the quantitative analysis. Thatcher displayed a concern with her authority on 6 occasions. Instances of this correlate, as we might expect, with the 'PM/FS disagree' variable (.522,  $p=.004$ ). Finally, Thatcher rarely showed concern with maintaining harmony among decision makers.

TABLE 21: IMPACT OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

	Yes	No
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue	11	16
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/ dimension of issue	2	25
Prime Minister changes views	0	27
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior, a concern for personal prestige or authority	6	21
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation offered by others	12	15
Prime Minister shows concern with maintaining harmony among decision makers	1	26



### *Quality of Decision Making*

The analytical narrative suggested that there was a good degree of consideration of alternative and previously rejected policies, as the diplomatic route was by turns dismissed and rediscovered, but that the military route was the ‘default’ policy to which ministers always returned, and which took precedence over diplomacy whenever the two conflicted. The major deficiency in quality of decision making was an absence of specification of the costs and risks associated with policy choices. As recounted above, the task force sailed without ministers considering the dangers to which it would be exposed, and several other policy choices, such as the sinking of the *Belgrano*, had negative consequences which had not been explored beforehand. Correlates of institutional and individual variables with the quality of decision making variables are reported below, where the relationship reaches statistical significance:

- There is a positive relationship between 'objectives of policy specified' and 'Prime Minister displays competitive behavior' (.386,  $p = .042$ ).
- There are two positive relationships between 'more than one policy considered' and predictor variables; with 'civil service challenges ministers' (.375,  $p = .050$ ) and 'Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation' (.433,  $p = .021$ ).
- There are several positive relationships between 'previously rejected policy reconsidered' and predictor variables; with 'decision taken in Cabinet committee' (.334,  $p = .082$ ); with 'civil service challenges ministers' (.375,  $p = .050$ ); with 'Prime Minister/ Foreign Secretary disagree' (.382,  $p = .045$ ); with 'Prime Minister displays competitive behavior' (.386,  $p = .042$ ); and with 'Prime Minister challenges

interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation' (.433,  $p = .021$ ).

- There is a positive relationship between 'Additional sources of information actively sought' and 'decision taken in Cabinet committee' (.380,  $p = .046$ ).

TABLE 22: QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

	Yes	No
Objectives of policy specified	13	15
More than one policy considered	9	19
Previously rejected policy reconsidered	9	19
Additional sources of information actively sought	4	24
Responsiveness to information (policy change / information suggests policy change)	6/10	
Costs, risks, and implications of preferred policy choice specified	10	18

## **Conclusion**

Decision making during the Falklands crisis was shaped both by the individual characteristics of Margaret Thatcher and by institutional factors of the core executive. Thatcher's absolutist, 'black and white' definition of the situation, upon which she fastened immediately the crisis began and from which she could not be moved, plays a large explanatory role in accounting for the decision to launch the task force to reclaim the islands. In addition, her assertive style within the core executive ensured that supporters of alternative courses of action were given an extremely hard time. These types of behavior are in line with expectations derived from the data reported in chapter three – in particular Thatcher's very low conceptual complexity and higher than average need for power.

However, the individual characteristics and behavior of the Prime Minister were necessary but not sufficient explanations for the process, outcome, and quality of decision making in this case. Thatcher could not ignore the diplomatic track entirely due to the efforts exerted and resources possessed by her Foreign Secretary, who became personally committed to a negotiated solution.

Additionally, key deficiencies in the quality of decision making during this case are best explained by combining the individual and institutional approaches. The absence of a specification of the costs, risks, and implications of dispatching the task force had as its proximate cause the exclusion of the civil service from deliberations regarding the decision – an institutional explanation. In individual terms, however, Thatcher's personal assertiveness and refusal to consider alternatives undoubtedly contributed to the exclusion of these actors.

TABLE 23: CHRONOLOGY OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

<b>#</b>	<b><u>Dates</u></b>	<b><u>Major Events in Crisis</u></b>	<b><u>Core Executive Interaction</u></b>	<b><u>Policy Decisions</u></b>
1	3/20/8 2- 3/30/8 2		3/20: Bilateral meeting between Thatcher and Carrington. 3/28: Phone conversation between Thatcher and Carrington.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HMS Endurance dispatched to South Georgia.</li> <li>• Two nuclear submarines dispatched to Falklands area.</li> </ul>
2	3/31		3/31: Ad Hoc Meeting in Thatcher's study.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Instructions to Chief of Naval Staff to prepare a task force.</li> </ul>
3	4/1		4/1: Cabinet Meeting 4/1: Meeting of Overseas Defence Committee. 4/1: Ad Hoc Meeting of core group of ministers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preliminary decision to send task force.</li> </ul>
4	4/2-4/6	4/2: Argentine invasion of Falklands. 4/3: United Nations passes resolution 502 calling for Argentina to withdraw from islands.	4/2: Cabinet meeting (2). 4/4: Bilateral meeting between Thatcher and Carrington. 4/4: Bilateral meeting between Thatcher and Nott.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Final decision to send task force.</li> <li>• Carrington resigns, Nott tenders resignation but Thatcher refuses it.</li> <li>• Establishment of OD(SA)- "War Cabinet".</li> </ul>
5	4/6-4/8	4/5: Task force sails for Falklands from Portsmouth.	4/6: Cabinet meeting 4/7: War Cabinet meeting (2).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decision to establish 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ).</li> </ul>

6	4/8-4/10	4/8: Haig arrives in London. 4/10: Haig to Buenos Aires.	4/8: War Cabinet meeting + Haig. 4/9: Ad Hoc meeting. 4/10: Ad Hoc meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thatcher impresses upon Haig British determination to retake Islands, offers little basis for negotiations.</li> </ul>
7	4/12-4/13	4/12: 200 mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) comes into effect around Falkland Islands. 4/12: Haig back in London.	4/12: War Cabinet meeting + Haig.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>War Cabinet considers Argentine proposals conveyed through Haig, judges them unsatisfactory.</li> </ul>
8	4/14	4/14: Haig in Washington.	4/14: Bilateral meeting between Thatcher and Pym.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider Haig's proposed statement on situation.</li> </ul>
9	4/15	4/15: Haig returns to Buenos Aires.	4/15: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>War Cabinet receives first detailed assessment of risks involved in naval operation.</li> </ul>
10	4/16-4/18	4/17: Argentine junta is presented with 5-point Haig plan for negotiations.	4/16: War Cabinet meeting. 4/18: Bilateral meetings Thatcher-Nott, Thatcher-Parsons.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Task force rules of engagement established.</li> </ul>

11	4/19-4/21	4/19: Haig proposals, modified by Argentine junta, passed to UK government. 4/21: Operation to repossess South Georgia begins.	4/19: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to authorize landing to repossess South Georgia.</li> </ul>
12	4/22		4/22: Ad Hoc meeting Thatcher-Pym. 4/22: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pym to Washington to receive /negotiate new Haig proposals.</li> </ul>
13	4/23		4/23: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Change in task force rules of engagement.</li> </ul>
14	4/24-4/25.	4/25: Repossession of South Georgia completed.	4/24: Bilateral meeting, Thatcher-Pym. 4/24: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rejection of new negotiating proposals brought back by Pym.</li> </ul>
15	4/26		4/26: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>200-mile "Total Exclusion Zone" (TEZ) agreed.</li> </ul>

16	4/27-4/29	4/27: New Haig proposals sent to UK government.	4/29: Cabinet meeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Message sent to President Reagan stating that, in opinion of UK government, Argentina had rejected Haig peace proposals.</li> </ul>
17	4/30	4/30: Task force now in position, Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) comes into effect. US "tilt" towards UK.	4/30: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision that aircraft carrier <i>25 de Mayo</i> can be sunk when sighted.</li> </ul>
18	5/1-5/2	5/1: New peace initiative began by Peruvian President. 5/2: Sinking of Argentine heavy cruiser <i>General Belgrano</i> .	5/2: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rules of engagement amended, allowing sinking of <i>General Belgrano</i>, being tracked by <i>HMS Conqueror</i>.</li> </ul>
19	5/3-5/4	5/3: Galtieri rejects Peruvian peace plan in wake of sinking of the <i>Belgrano</i> .	5/4: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consideration of diplomatic moves in light of sinking of <i>Belgrano</i>, attack on <i>HMS Sheffield</i>.</li> </ul>
20	5/5		5/5: War Cabinet meeting. 5/5: Full Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pym brings forth new negotiating proposals, which the War Cabinet, taking Thatcher's lead, rejects.</li> </ul>



21	56-5/8		5/8: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to send landing force south from Ascension Island.</li> </ul>
22	5/14		5/14: War Cabinet meeting (2).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Terms agreed of an ultimatum to be put to Argentine government.</li> </ul>
23	5/16	5/16: British ultimatum put to Argentine junta.	5/16: War Cabinet + others meet at Chequers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thatcher has "showdown" with FO officials over negotiations.</li> </ul>
24	5/18-19	5/18: Junta rejects British ultimatum.	5/18: War Cabinet meeting. 5/18: Cabinet meeting. 5/19: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plans for landing on Falklands agreed.</li> </ul>
25	5/20		5/20: War Cabinet meeting. 5/20: Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pym urges acceptance of new negotiating proposals brought forward by UN Secretary General. Thatcher disagrees, and carries Cabinet with her.</li> </ul>
26	5/21-5/22	5/21 Landing on San Carlos begins.	5/22: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ministers pressure military commanders to advance out of beachhead established on Falklands.</li> </ul>

27	5/23-6/1	5/25: Destroyer <i>HMS Coventry</i> and supply ship <i>HMS Atlantic Conveyor</i> sunk. 5/28: Battle of Goose Green	6/1: War Cabinet meeting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Discussion of international diplomatic efforts.</li></ul>
28	6/3-6/4	6/4: Britain vetoes ceasefire resolution in UN Security Council.	6/3: Thatcher in Versailles, US President Reagan presents new peace plan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Rejection of negotiation proposals.</li></ul>

- 
- <sup>1</sup> G.M. Dillon, *The Falklands, Politics and War*, (London: Macmillan, 1989): 56.
- <sup>2</sup> Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, (London: Joseph, 1983): 59; Dillon, 52.
- <sup>3</sup> *Falkland Islands Review. A Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors* (Chairman: the Rt Hon. The Lord Franks), (London: HMSO, January 1983), para 201-206. Hereafter referred to as *Franks Report*.
- <sup>4</sup> *Franks Report*, para 206-207.
- <sup>5</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 65.
- <sup>6</sup> *Franks Report*, para 211.
- <sup>7</sup> John Nott, *Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Memoirs of an Errant Politician*, (London: Politicos, 2002): 248.
- <sup>8</sup> Lord Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past*, (London: Collins, 1988): 360.
- <sup>9</sup> Dillon, 52
- <sup>10</sup> *Franks Report*, para 233.
- <sup>11</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 67-68.
- <sup>12</sup> Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1993): 179.
- <sup>13</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 66.
- <sup>14</sup> Nott, 268.
- <sup>15</sup> Sir Henry Leach, *Endure No Makeshifts: Some Naval Recollections*, (London: Casemate, 1993): 221.
- <sup>16</sup> Thatcher, 179.
- <sup>17</sup> Nott, 258.
- <sup>18</sup> Thatcher, 179.
- <sup>19</sup> Young, *One of Us*.
- <sup>20</sup> Thatcher, 89.
- <sup>21</sup> *Franks Report*, para 240.
- <sup>22</sup> Nott, 259.
- <sup>23</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, p. 70.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> *Franks Report*, para 256.
- <sup>27</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 76.
- <sup>28</sup> Nott, 279.
- <sup>29</sup> Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996): 132.
- <sup>30</sup> Thatcher, 181.
- <sup>31</sup> Quoted in Young, *One of Us*, 267. See also Cecil Parkinson, *Right at the Centre: An Autobiography*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1992): 197-198.
- <sup>32</sup> Thatcher, 182.
- <sup>33</sup> Nott, 278-279.
- <sup>34</sup> Source: Dillon, 109; Hastings and Jenkins, 81.
- <sup>35</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 81.
- <sup>36</sup> Thatcher, 191-193.
- <sup>37</sup> Dillon, 143.
- <sup>38</sup> Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*, (New York:

---

Macmillan, 1984): 273.

<sup>39</sup> Haig, 272-273.

<sup>40</sup> Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War*, (New York: Blackwell, 1988: 76.

<sup>41</sup> Parkinson, 201.

<sup>42</sup> Nott, 292.

<sup>43</sup> Thatcher, 197.

<sup>44</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 107.

<sup>45</sup> Thatcher, 201.

<sup>46</sup> Thatcher, 204.

<sup>47</sup> Thatcher, 204.

<sup>48</sup> Nott, 301.

<sup>49</sup> Dillon, 150.

<sup>50</sup> Thatcher, 205-206.

<sup>51</sup> Parkinson, 202.

<sup>52</sup> Thatcher, 207.

<sup>53</sup> Parkinson, 202.

<sup>54</sup> Thatcher, 213.

<sup>55</sup> Dillon, 150.

<sup>56</sup> Dillon, 151-156.

<sup>57</sup> Arthur L. Gavshon and Desmond Rice, *The Sinking of the Belgrano*, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1984); Tam Dalyell, *Thatcher's Torpedo*, (London: Woolf, 1983).

<sup>58</sup> *Third Report From the Foreign Affairs Committee. Session 1984-85. Events Surrounding the Weekend of 1-2 May 1982*. Report together with the Proceedings of the Committee; Minutes of Evidence; and Appendices. (London: HMSO, 22 July 1985), para 391. Hereafter referred to as *Third Report*.

<sup>59</sup> *Third Report*, para 385.

<sup>60</sup> *Third Report*, para 28.

<sup>61</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 165-166.

<sup>62</sup> Thatcher, 221.

<sup>63</sup> *Third Report*, para 96.

<sup>64</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 168.

<sup>65</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 170.

<sup>66</sup> Nott, 293-294.

<sup>67</sup> Hastings and Jenkins, 172.

<sup>68</sup> Thatcher, 224.

<sup>69</sup> Dillon, 163-164.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS**

### **Introduction**

This chapter provides an analysis of the data generated through investigation of the Korean, Suez and Falklands crises. The dynamics of the cases are compared to one another across the variables in the study, and the quantitative data is pooled and analyzed by means of multivariate logistic regression. The chapter concludes by indicating the major findings of the study from both the qualitative and quantitative investigations: the nature of Prime Ministerial power and constraint, the importance of the site of decision, conflict between core executive actors, norms of the core executive, and the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister. Implications for foreign policy analysis are specified, in particular the importance of conceptual and methodological diversity, and avenues of future research are suggested.

### **Cross-Case Quantitative Analysis**

Table one presents a comparison of the variables in the study across the three cases, reporting frequencies and chi-square values.

TABLE 24: CROSS CASE COMPARISON OF VARIABLES

Variable	Case	No	Yes	$\chi^2$
Decision taken in Cabinet?	Korea	2	19	31.485***
	Suez	16	20	
	Falklands	25	3	
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee?	Korea	15	6	4.344
	Suez	16	20	
	Falklands	13	15	
Decision taken in other location?	Korea	12	9	2.035
	Suez	26	10	
	Falklands	21	7	
Civil Service challenges Ministers?	Korea	17	4	1.793
	Suez	26	10	
	Falklands	24	4	
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information?	Korea	21	0	32.032***
	Suez	16	20	
	Falklands	27	1	
Norm of Collective responsibility stifles policy doubts?	Korea	20	1	13.968***
	Suez	22	14	
	Falklands	26	2	
Prime Minister/Foreign Secretary disagree?	Korea	16	5	4.218
	Suez	25	11	
	Falklands	14	14	
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary?	Korea	19	2	1.868
	Suez	32	4	
	Falklands	22	6	
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister?	Korea	18	3	8.283**
	Suez	32	4	
	Falklands	17	11	

Other core executive actors use resources against one another?	Korea	13	8	.613
	Suez	19	17	
	Falklands	17	11	
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue?	Korea	14	7	7.608**
	Suez	12	24	
	Falklands	17	11	
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/dimension of issue?	Korea	10	11	13.270***
	Suez	21	15	
	Falklands	26	2	
Prime Minister changes views?	Korea	18	3	6.948**
	Suez	28	8	
	Falklands	28	0	
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior?	Korea	18	3	2.054
	Suez	25	11	
	Falklands	22	6	
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation?	Korea	16	5	4.010
	Suez	18	18	
	Falklands	15	13	
Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers?	Korea	21	0	9.090**
	Suez	28	8	
	Falklands	27	1	
Objectives of policy specified?	Korea	7	14	3.204
	Suez	12	24	
	Falklands	15	13	
More than on policy considered?	Korea	4	17	15.245***
	Suez	10	26	
	Falklands	19	9	
Previously rejected policy reconsidered?	Korea	11	10	2.395
	Suez	26	10	

	Falklands	19	9	
Additional sources of information actively sought?	Korea	12	9	5.473*
	Suez	28	8	
	Falklands	24	4	
Responsiveness to Information (policy change/ information suggests policy change)	Korea	8	15	.529
	Suez	10	23	
	Falklands	6	11	
Costs, risks, and implications of policy choice specified?	Korea	1	20	18.175***
	Suez	13	23	
	Falklands	18	10	

\*  $p = <.10$ , \*\*  $p = <.05$ , \*\*\*  $p = <.01$ .



The descriptive statistics in table 24 allow for the comparison of cases by variable. Differences which emerged in the qualitative accounts of the cases can be more precisely isolated.

*Institutional variables:*

There is a clear difference between the cases in terms of the use of the full Cabinet as a site of decision. Cabinet was used most in the Korean case, in a plurality of instances in the Suez case, and rarely in the Falklands case. The results reveal that Cabinet committees (Defence Committee; Egypt Committee; 'War Cabinet') were the most frequently used alternative decision site. The 'War Cabinet' was by some distance the most frequent site of decision during the Falklands crisis.

The civil service challenged ministers on occasion in all the cases, but the difference in proportions are not significant. However, the qualitative analysis revealed that, although civil service challenges were comparatively rare events, they were usually significant ones to the shape of decision making.

A stark difference emerges in regard to the frequency of secrecy resulting in the restriction of information. This never occurred during the Korea crisis, and only once during the Falklands crisis. However, it occurred on fully 20 occasions during the Suez crisis. The qualitative analysis demonstrated that many of these instances occurred once Eden had fastened on to the Challe plan, and the norm of secrecy was used as a mechanism to suppress dissent within the core executive to a plan which, if revealed in full, would have been opposed by several of its members. The collective responsibility variable shows a similar distribution: rarely invoked in Korea and the Falklands, but

invoked often in Suez. Again, the qualitative account of the Suez crisis indicated that this norm was crucial to Eden's ability to maintain Cabinet support for a position which in fact hid great differences in view. Although this norm was used rarely in the Falklands crisis, the qualitative account of this crisis demonstrated that these were important occasions: Thatcher utilizing the norm when her policy had suffered a setback in order to bolster her position.

The conceptual framework in chapter one posited that the dynamics of the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were crucial in foreign policy making. The qualitative analysis indicated that this was indeed the case: Bevin's supremacy in foreign policy tended to ensure his viewpoint prevailed; Lloyd's supineity and self-restraint removed one barrier to Eden's execution of the Challe plan; and Pym's repeated efforts on behalf of the diplomatic solution clashed sharply with Thatcher's commitment to military action. These differences are sharpened by examination of the three variables concerned with this relationship. Disagreement between these two actions was proportionately greater during the Falklands crisis than during the other episodes, although this difference just fails to reach statistical significance across the three cases. The qualitative analysis would indicate that disagreements were less in the Korean case because Bevin was so dominant, and in the Suez case because Eden was so dominant. In the Falklands case, where Thatcher was comparatively low in resources and Pym had significant independent standing, a conflictual dynamic was the result. Evidence from the two variables concerned with utilization of resources by these two actors against one another reveals a similar picture, indeed, across the three cases, these variables are positively correlated with each other.

In terms of the final institutional variable, the use of resources by other core executive actors against one another, this was a relatively frequent occurrence across the three decision making episodes, and does not result in a statistically significant chi-square score.

### *Individual variables*

The individual variables can be analyzed from two perspectives: As a further illumination of comparative dynamics across the cases, and as a test of the behavioral predictions of Prime Ministerial behavior forwarded in chapter three.

There is a statistically significant difference in the frequencies of proactive Prime Ministerial behavior across the cases. This is due to the greater frequency to which Eden behaved proactively in comparison with Attlee and Thatcher. This supports the behavioral prediction derived from the data in chapter three: Eden's belief in ability to control events score is significantly higher than the group's, Attlee's was average, while Thatcher's was significantly lower than the group's.

The Prime Minister referred to multiple viewpoints / dimensions of the issue much more frequently in the Korean and Suez crises than in the Falklands case. Again, this is in line with predictions derived from the data reported in chapter three: Attlee and Eden being substantially higher in conceptual complexity than Thatcher. A similar picture is revealed with the 'Prime Minister changes views' variable; something which Thatcher failed to do on even one occasion during Falklands decision making.

Competitive behavior by the Prime Minister was most in evidence during the Suez crisis, although the difference between the cases is not statistically significant. This is supportive of the predictions we can derive from the data on the need for power of the

Prime Ministers: although Thatcher is marginally higher than the other two, it is a statistical 'dead heat'. In these cases, therefore, behavioral predictions drawn from the individual variables of belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, and need for power were supported by analysis of the decision making record.

The Prime Minister challenged the interpretation of the situation/ policy recommendation of others much more frequently in Suez and the Falklands than Korea. This does not fully accord with the expectations derived from the characteristics of the Prime Ministers. We would expect Eden, with his higher than the group self confidence score, to frequently behave in this way. However, we would expect him to be joined in behaving this way by Attlee, with a similar self confidence score, rather than Thatcher, whose self confidence score is significantly lower than the group's.

In terms of Prime Ministerial concern with maintaining harmony among decision makers, this occurred most frequently in the Suez crisis, only once during the Falklands crisis, and never during the Korean crisis. Again, this does not accord in all three cases with the predictions derived from the individual characteristics of the Prime Ministers. In the case of Attlee, his unconcern with maintaining harmony is in line with his task orientation score, which is significantly higher than the group's. The case of Eden is indeterminate, as his task orientation score was not significantly different from the group's. However, the case of Thatcher confounds expectations - her task orientation score is significantly lower than the group's yet she did not show consistent concern with maintaining harmony in relations with and among colleagues.

*Quality of decision making*

The cases varied considerably on the quality of decision making variables.

In terms of specification of objectives, this was achieved in two-thirds of occasions for decision in both Korea and Suez, while in under half the occasions for decision in Falklands decision making. The qualitative analysis suggested that objectives of Falklands policy became subsumed beneath the determination that military action be launched once the task force had set sail. However, the quantitative results do require supplementation by the qualitative analysis in order to provide an accurate picture: one of the deficiencies of Suez decision making as the crisis progressed was that the original objectives seemed to be lost, and no reference was made to them at all once the Challe plan had gone into effect.

The consideration of multiple policies was again much more frequent during the Korea and Suez crises than the Falklands crisis. Indeed, the qualitative analysis would suggest that this was due to Thatcher's attempts to close down consideration of other than a military resolution. During the Korean crisis, alternative policies were considered largely in the context of finding an alternative to the US-led military adventure which the core executive judged so dangerous. In Suez, multiple policies were considered as the preferred option, military force, seemed unusable on many occasions.

There is not a statistically significant difference between the cases in the frequency with which previously rejected policies were reconsidered, although inspection of the frequencies shows that this was proportionately more likely in the Korean case.

Additional sources of information were sought significantly more frequently during the Korea case than the Suez and Falklands cases. The qualitative analysis demonstrated that this was due to the subordination of British policy to American: on

many occasions when additional information was sought it was concerned with American views and intentions.

The core executive was responsive to information suggesting policy change to broadly the same degree across the three cases. These results illustrate that policy changes on roughly half of the occasions in which a stimulus to change is received.

Finally, there was a statistically significant difference in the diligence of the core executive in specifying costs, risks, and implications of a policy choice. Decision makers during the Korean crisis were most cognizant of these factors, failing to specify these risks on only one occasion. Qualitative analysis demonstrated that this was due to the feeling, pervasive within the core executive, that American policy was extremely dangerous. Costs, risks, and implications were specified less than half of the time during the Suez crisis, and this was a proportion which is front-loaded towards the beginning of the crisis: once the Challe plan appeared on the horizon most of this careful planning was abandoned. Finally, costs, risks, and implications were only specified during the Falklands crisis on one occasion - when ministers received a briefing on the dangers the task force would face many days after it had sailed. The qualitative analysis indicated that this absence of specification of risks inherent in the task force option was a central flaw in Falklands decision making.

### **Multivariate analysis**

For the multivariate analysis, data for the three cases was pooled into a single data set. As explained in chapter two, the variables were specified as dichotomous and categorical, allowing for the use of logistic regression routines to estimate the causal impact of

institutional and individual factors on quality of decision making variables. Due to the high correlation of the three variables concerned with the Prime Minister - Foreign Secretary relationship, two models were run: model one contains the Prime Minister/Foreign Secretary disagree variable and model two contains the two variables recording use of resources by one against the other. Two dummy variables were introduced in order to control for case specific relationships. Korea became the base-line model with the inclusion of a Suez dummy and a Falklands dummy. Results are displayed in table 25A-C and table 26A-C.

TABLE 25A: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING LIKELIHOOD OF QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING FACTORS (MODEL 1).

Note: Entries in all tables are *b/se (odds ratio)*.

Predictor	Objectives of policy specified?	More than one policy considered?
Decision taken in Cabinet?	-.722 / .823 (.462)	.845 / .905 (2.328)
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee?	-1.458** / .627 (.233)	.652 / .682 (1.920)
Decision taken in other location?	-.200 / .629 (.819)	.324 / .698 (1.382)
Civil service challenges Ministers?	.224 / .693 (1.251)	-.284 / .695 (.753)
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information	-2.291** / 1.000 (.101)	-1.193 / .976 (.303)
Norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubts?	.553 / .969 (1.738)	.365 / 1.084 (1.440)
Prime Minister / Foreign Secretary disagree?	.617 / .620 (1.853)	.021 / .650 (1.021)
Other core executive actors use resources against one another?	.002 / .574 (1.002)	.478 / .618 (1.613)
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue?	-.036 / .593 (.965)	-.609 / .655 (.544)
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of issue	1.410** / .686 (4.096)	.725 / .698 (2.065)
Prime Minister changes views?	.687 / .972 (1.987)	-.103 / .919 (.902)
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior?	-.028 / .875 (.973)	-.403 / .872 (.668)
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of the situation / policy recommendation?	.914 / .647 (2.495)	1.260* / .725 (3.526)
Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers	.200 / 1.040 (1.222)	.482 / 1.066 (1.620)
Suez	.964 / 1.027 (2.622)	.088 / 1.067 (1.092)
Falklands	-.955 / .965 (.385)	-1.873* / 1.093 (.154)
Constant	.879 (2.409)	.022 (1.023)
Pseudo R	.220	.261
N	85	85

\*  $p < .10$ . \*\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*\*  $p < .01$ .



TABLE 25B: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING LIKELIHOOD OF QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING FACTORS (MODEL 1)

Predictor	Previously rejected policy reconsidered?	Additional sources of information actively sought?
Decision taken in Cabinet?	2.078* / 1.234 (7.987)	-.559 / 1.056 (.572)
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee?	1.152 / .790 (3.165)	.269 / .722 (1.309)
Decision taken in other location?	-1.982** / .861 (.138)	1.175* / .691 (3.237)
Civil service challenges Ministers?	-.255 / .907 (.775)	.981 / .921 (2.668)
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information	.003 / 1.352 (1.003)	-.749 / 1.092 (.473)
Norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubts?	-2.415 / 1.594 (.089)	-.926 / 1.284 (.396)
Prime Minister / Foreign Secretary disagree?	1.848** / .803 (6.344)	-.748 / .827 (.473)
Other core executive actors use resources against one another?	-.920 / .785 (.399)	-.493 / .719 (.611)
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue?	-1.361 / .868 (.256)	.621 / .771 (1.861)
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of issue	2.206*** / .830 (9.083)	1.300* / .720 (3.668)
Prime Minister changes views?	2.766** / 1.172 (15.903)	-.483 / 1.005 (.617)
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior?	3.242*** / 1.174 (25.573)	.282 / 1.010 (1.325)
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of the situation / policy recommendation?	.144 / .869 (1.155)	-.862 / .850 (.422)
Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers	-.566 / 1.412 (.568)	2.971*** / 1.146 (19.503)
Suez	-1.107 / 1.340 (.331)	-1.442 / 1.168 (.236)
Falklands	.516 / 1.370 (1.676)	-1.109 / 1.185 (.330)
Constant	-2.944* (.053)	-.884 (.413)
Pseudo R	.408	.258
N	85	85

\*  $p < .10$ . \*\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*\*  $p < .01$ .

TABLE 25C: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING LIKELIHOOD OF QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING FACTORS (MODEL 1)

Predictor	Responsive to information?	Costs, risks and implications of policy choice specified?
Decision taken in Cabinet?	1.581 / 2.022 (4.861)	.560 / .864 (1.751)
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee?	-1.775 / 1.477 (.169)	-.009 / .673 (.991)
Decision taken in other location?	1.466 / 1.249 (4.334)	-1.242 / .780 (.289)
Civil service challenges Ministers?	-3.418 / 2.086 (.033)	-.004 / .749 (.996)
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information	1.400 / 1.903 (4.056)	.152 / .865 (1.164)
Norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubts?	-.784 / 2.728 (.457)	-1.963* / .1037 (.140)
Prime Minister / Foreign Secretary disagree?	-.269 / 1.449 (.764)	.147 / .658 (1.158)
Other core executive actors use resources against one another?	3.184** / 1.410 (24.141)	.897 / .633 (2.452)
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue?	.102 / 1.477 (1.108)	.165 / .735 (1.180)
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of issue	-.736 / 1.386 (.479)	.180 / .739 (1.197)
Prime Minister changes views?	25.781 / 9905.6 (1.57E+11)	.469 / 1.034 (1.598)
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior?	-.153 / 1.946 (.858)	-.241 / .851 (.786)
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of the situation / policy recommendation?	.051 / 1.471 (1.052)	.089 / .750 (1.093)
Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers	5.271* / 2.716 (194.612)	.409 / 1.036 (1.506)
Suez	-.360 / 1.617 (.698)	-2.184 / 1.360 (.113)
Falklands	2.277 / 2.138 (9.747)	-3.584** / 1.425 (.028)
Constant	-2.592 (.075)	2.802* (16.478)
Pseudo R	.512	.302
N	49	85

\*  $p < .10$ . \*\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*\*  $p < .01$ .

TABLE 26A: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING LIKELIHOOD OF QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING FACTORS (MODEL 2)

Predictor	Objectives of policy specified?	More than one policy considered?
Decision taken in Cabinet?	-.884 / .855 (.413)	.721 / .981 (2.057)
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee?	-1.735** / .697 (.176)	.343 / .787 (1.409)
Decision taken in other location?	-.032 / .642 (.969)	.779 / .781 (2.179)
Civil service challenges Ministers?	.144 / .719 (1.155)	-.504 / .749 (.604)
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information	-2.464** / 1.027 (.085)	-1.865* / 1.080 (.155)
Norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubts?	.686 / 1.030 (1.985)	.800 / 1.248 (2.225)
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary?	-.154 / .919 (.857)	-1.585 / .992 (.205)
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister?	1.241 / .810 (3.458)	2.790*** / 1.062 (16.276)
Other core executive actors use resources against one another?	.025 / .577 (1.025)	.420 / .631 (1.522)
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue?	.098 / .621 (1.103)	-.413 / .716 (.661)
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of issue	1.404** / .689 (4.070)	.815 / .770 (2.259)
Prime Minister changes views?	.872 / .996 (2.391)	.427 / .996 (1.532)
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior?	-.178 / .936 (.837)	-.946 / 1.018 (.388)
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of the situation / policy recommendation?	1.098 / .673 (2.998)	2.035** / .919 (7.656)
Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers	.352 / 1.040 (1.422)	.663 / 1.084 (1.941)
Suez	1.075 / 1.039 (2.930)	.291 / 1.101 (1.337)
Falklands	-1.090 / .992 (.336)	-2.738** / 1.251 (.065)
Constant	.870 (2.388)	-.245 (.782)
Pseudo R	.235	.338
N	85	85

\*  $p < .10$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

TABLE 26B: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING LIKELIHOOD OF QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING FACTORS (MODEL 2)

Predictor	Previously rejected policy reconsidered?	Additional sources of information actively sought?
Decision taken in Cabinet?	1.925 / 1.253 (6.852)	-.632 / 1.099 (.532)
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee?	.555 / .848 (1.741)	.376 / .765 (1.457)
Decision taken in other location?	-1.869** / .881 (.154)	.939 / .706 (2.558)
Civil service challenges Ministers?	-.647 / .959 (.524)	1.251 / .935 (3.493)
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information	-.062 / 1.324 (.940)	-.605 / 1.093 (.546)
Norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubts?	-2.314 / 1.556 (.099)	-1.014 / 1.340 (.363)
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary?	.975 / .966 (2.651)	.844 / 1.121 (2.326)
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister?	2.073** / .955 (7.949)	-1.519 / 1.295 (.219)
Other core executive actors use resources against one another?	-.700 / .814 (.497)	-.512 / .726 (.599)
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue?	-1.428 / .932 (.240)	.631 / .763 (1.879)
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of issue	2.314*** / .845 (10.112)	1.240* / .731 (3.454)
Prime Minister changes views?	2.913** / 1.172 (18.414)	-.418 / .985 (.658)
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior?	2.928** / 1.235 (18.695)	.004 / 1.040 (1.004)
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of the situation / policy recommendation?	1.021 / .932 (2.777)	-1.063 / .856 (.345)
Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers	-.124 / 1.350 (.883)	2.835** / 1.172 (17.032)
Suez	-1.202 / 1.399 (.301)	-1.624 / 1.159 (.197)
Falklands	.258 / 1.354 (1.294)	1.188 / 1.224 (.305)
Constant	.870 (2.388)	-.245 (.782)
Pseudo R	.235	.338
N	85	85

\*  $p = <.10$ , \*\*  $p = <.05$ , \*\*\*  $p = <.01$

TABLE 26C: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING LIKELIHOOD OF QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING FACTORS (MODEL 2)

Predictor	Responsive to information?	Costs, risks and implications of policy choice specified?
Decision taken in Cabinet?	1.407 / 1.911 (4.085)	.952 / .927 (2.590)
Decision taken in Cabinet Committee?	-2.087 / 1.632 (.124)	.374 / .766 (1.454)
Decision taken in other location?	1.523 / 1.299 (4.586)	-1.043 / .813 (.352)
Civil service challenges Ministers?	-3.523* / 2.040 (.030)	-.199 / .766 (.820)
Norm of secrecy results in restriction of information	1.671 / 2.086 (5.319)	-.003 / .901 (.997)
Norm of collective responsibility stifles policy doubts?	-.572 / 2.560 (.565)	-2.596** / 1.119 (.075)
Prime Minister uses resources against Foreign Secretary?	.940 / 2.212 (2.559)	-1.926* / 1.010 (.146)
Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister?	-.058 / 2.098 (.944)	.734 / .807 (2.084)
Other core executive actors use resources against one another?	3.416** / 1.586 (30.444)	.861 / .652 (2.365)
Prime Minister takes proactive approach to issue?	.037 / 1.476 (1.038)	.438 / .784 (1.550)
Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of issue	-1.008 / 1.493 (.365)	.056 / .769 (1.057)
Prime Minister changes views?	26.182 / 9824.9 (2.35E+11)	.603 / 1.211 (1.827)
Prime Minister displays competitive behavior?	-.633 / 1.860 (.531)	.496 / .931 (1.642)
Prime Minister challenges interpretation of the situation / policy recommendation?	-.050 / 1.450 (.952)	-.042 / .799 (.959)
Prime Minister concerned with maintaining harmony among decision makers	5.287* / 2.753 (197.799)	.650 / 1.058 (1.915)
Suez	-.377 / 1.623 (.686)	-2.158 / 1.456 (.116)
Falklands	2.114 / 2.050 (8.278)	-3.595** / 1.497 (.027)
Constant	-2.407 (.090)	2.562 (12.965)
Pseudo R	.514	.333
N	49	85

\*  $p = <.10$ , \*\*  $p = <.05$ , \*\*\*  $p = <.01$

The results are interesting and illustrative, but ultimately inconclusive. There is something of a lack of significant relationships between the individual and institutional variables, and some of the relationships which do prove significant are in some sense contradictory. Therefore, the quantitative investigation of links between institutions, individuals, and quality of decision making is at this stage inconclusive, and less satisfying than the qualitative investigation into links between institutions, individuals, policy processes and outcomes which is the main focus of the study. There are three possible explanations for this. Firstly, there are rather a lot of variables included in the analysis for the 85 observations to support. On this account, a greater number of significant relationships would emerge with a larger data set, and the inconclusive results are simply a function of the nature of significance testing. Secondly, the relationships between institutional and individual variables and quality of decision making may not in fact be very important - with the quality of decision perhaps being determined more directly by factors such as the amount of time available in which to make it. Finally, relationships between individual and institutional variables may in fact be present and important, but my operationalization of the variables is lacking. In future research I will increase the number of observations, and revisit the operationalization of key variables, in order to deal with the first and third explanation offered here. It should also be possible to include control variables for other factors, such as the time available to make a decision, thus dealing with possibility two. With that said, there are in this initial quantitative exploration several relationships which support the theoretical framework of this part of the study.

*Objectives of Policy Specified:*

Three variables prove significant predictors of the likelihood of objectives of policy being specified. Firstly, objectives of policy are significantly less likely to be specified when decisions are taken in Cabinet committees. The qualitative analysis suggested that these Cabinet committees were most likely to be concerned with operational planning rather than the macro-details of policy orientation. Secondly, when the norm of secrecy is invoked it is less likely that objectives of policy will be specified. This relationship is an intuitive one and indeed was predicted deductively in chapter three. The relationship was demonstrated qualitatively in the Suez crisis especially – the Challe plan was kept under wraps with the result that little consideration was given to what it was designed to achieve, beyond offering a pretext for armed intervention. Finally, one individual factor is a significant predictor of this quality of decision making variable: it is more likely that objectives of policy will be specified when the Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of the issue.

*More than one policy considered:* In model one, a single variable derived from the conceptual framework significantly predicts whether multiple policies will be considered. When the Prime Minister challenges the interpretation of the situation/ policy recommendation of others, this leads to consideration of multiple policies. This supports the hypothesized relationship specified in chapter three. Additionally, the Falklands dummy variable is significant here, indicating the degree to which consideration was given to the military option to the exclusion of others during much of that crisis. Interestingly, in model two, the Foreign Secretary uses resources against Prime Minister variable is significant and in a positive direction. In addition, its companion variable concerned with

Prime Ministerial uses of resources against the Foreign Secretary approaches significance in the opposite direction. This is a fascinating finding: the consideration of multiple policies is influenced by conflict between the two main core executive actors, with the Prime Minister most usually seeking to 'close down' consideration of other courses of action while the Foreign Secretary acts to open them up. Again, the best qualitative illustration of this is the Thatcher-Pym relationship during Falklands decision making. Additionally in model two the secrecy variable becomes significant. Again it is in a negative direction, indicating a further effect of this norm in reducing the openness of the decision making process.

*Previously rejected policy reconsidered:* Several variables prove significant predictors of whether the core executive will return to a previously rejected policy. This is more likely to happen when a decision is made in Cabinet. The direction of this causal relationship can be questioned however: perhaps the reopening of major policy debates occurs mostly in Cabinet, but it is equally plausible that the need to return to a rejected policy triggers consideration of the issue in the full Cabinet. The taking of decisions in locations other than formal Cabinet and Cabinet Committee locations makes it less likely that a previously rejected policy will be reconsidered. The Prime Minister / Foreign Secretary disagreement variable is again significant in predicting this quality of decision making factor: It is more likely that a previously rejected policy will be reconsidered when these two central actors disagree. The results in model two demonstrate that it is the Foreign Secretary who has the greater hand in prompting reconsideration of a rejected course of action rather than the Prime Minister. However, analysis of the individual variables



indicates that the Prime Minister can act to prompt reconsideration of a rejected policy. This is more likely to occur when the Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint/dimension of an issue, changes views, and displays competitive behavior. These strong relationships indicate that individual characteristics have a large impact in whether a rejected course of action is returned to.

*Additional Sources of Information Sought:* A number of variables prove to be significant predictors of whether the core executive will seek additional sources of information during decision making. When a decision is taken outside of the formal venues of the Cabinet or Cabinet Committees, it is more likely that this will be so. It is not immediately apparent from examining the qualitative record why this is so, but this is an interesting avenue for future research. Two of the variables focusing on the impact of the Prime Minister are also significant predictors: When the Prime Minister refers to more than one viewpoint / dimension of an issue it is more likely that additional sources of information will be sought. Indeed, this is an intuitive relationship and was predicted in chapter three. Finally, Prime Ministerial attempts to maintain harmony make it more likely that additional sources of information would be sought, although there was no a priori reason to expect this relationship. It is perhaps more coincidence than causal and would not survive with the gathering of more observations (see ‘future research’ section below).

*Responsiveness to Information:*

Two variables predict the likelihood that the core executive, on receiving information suggesting that policy should be changed, would indeed alter course. Firstly, this is more likely to happen when core executive actors use resources against each other. Indeed, as

with the use of resources by the Foreign Secretary, it appears that resource use by core executive members acts to reopen decision making and allow the core executive to change direction. Secondly, this is more likely to happen when the Prime Minister displays concern with maintaining harmony among colleagues. The qualitative analysis would suggest that the causal direction of this relationship may be backwards: the Prime Minister attempts to maintain harmony when policy is changed in order to 'settle down' the core executive rather than policy being changed because the Prime Minister tries to maintain harmony.

*Specification of Costs, Risks, and Implications of Preferred Policy Choice:*

Several variables predict this quality of decision making factor. When collective Cabinet responsibility is invoked, it is less likely that costs, risks and implications of a choice will be specified. This supports the general impression derived from the qualitative analysis that collective Cabinet responsibility serves to still the doubts of ministers who do not think the policy being proposed is particularly wise, and might not give their assent if the matter were not made one of collective responsibility. Secondly, the results from model two indicate that the use of resources by the Prime Minister against the Foreign Secretary makes the specification of costs, risks, and implications less likely. Finally, the Falklands dummy variable is significant and in a negative direction: the qualitative analysis supports the conclusion that the core executive did not often specify costs and risks associated with their preferred policy of the task force.

## **Discussion and conclusions**

### *Main findings*

In this section I take the opportunity to reflect upon some of the main findings of the study in terms of the importance of institutional and individual factors in the British core executive.

Firstly, the study reveals something about the nature of the Prime Ministership, a role which, as noted in chapter one, is somewhat under specified and open to interpretation by its occupants and their colleagues. In this study, the Prime Ministership emerges as a complex mixture of power and constraint. Under all circumstances, the Prime Ministership is not a position of command in a direct sense - the Prime Minister cannot give binding orders and others within the core executive always have some avenue to influence policy decisions. Indeed, evidence of Prime Ministerial constraint could be found across the cases. Attlee was constrained due to the huge presence of the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, and would have found it difficult to stake out a policy course different than that which the Foreign Secretary advocated. Here, of course, Attlee's personal characteristics proved important: as a relatively non-assertive leader, he was happy to delegate policy to the Foreign Secretary.

The case of Eden during Suez decision making perhaps indicates a Prime Minister deploying the full extent of resources available to him, and Eden began from an advantaged position due to his reputation for mastery in foreign affairs. Eden was able to confine some of the most difficult aspects of decision making to the Egypt Committee, and through this device maintain at least a veneer of consensus. After he had fastened onto the Challe scenario for invading Egypt, Eden ramped up the secrecy surrounding

decision making, and his use of this resource was successful. However, Eden could not implement the scenario entirely on his own initiative, and had to secure support in a decisive meeting of the full Cabinet. Here is perhaps the distillation of the complex nature of Prime Ministerial power: Eden had to seek support from colleagues, but he could also manipulate the terms under which he made the appeal. Thus he was less than forthcoming about his knowledge of Israeli plans, relied on a heavily skewed presentation of the circumstances and the options, and invoked the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility. Still, however, he had to make the threat to resign in order to secure his policy preference.

A curious mix of command and constraint was also evident for Thatcher during the Falklands crisis. Thatcher could make policy bilaterally at times, exclude her problematic Foreign Secretary from decision making meetings, and only present issues to the Cabinet when they had become *fait accompli*. However, at crucial moments, such as after the sinking of the *Belgrano* and the attack on HMS *Sheffield*, she required the support of the full Cabinet for her policies. Additionally, however much she disagreed with Francis Pym, she could not afford his resignation as so was required to at least formally keep open the diplomatic processes which he supported. This one of the most significant findings from the study is that even in foreign affairs, where one would expect the leader to have the most free hand, Prime Ministerial power is both contingent and constrained.

The *site of decision* (Cabinet, Cabinet Committee, Other) also proved to be an important factor in explaining policy outcomes. The Korean case was run primarily through the full Cabinet. This allowed actors such as Nye Bevan, who would perhaps

have been excluded from a smaller decision making group due to the nature of their departmental portfolio (he was Minister for Health), to exercise an important influence on key decisions. In the case of Suez, Eden's 'division of labor' between the Egypt Committee and the full Cabinet allowed him to maintain a veneer of unity under the decision of 27<sup>th</sup> July to use force as a 'last resort' by keeping operational discussions predominantly confined to the smaller Egypt Committee. However, he was not entirely successful in this, as full Cabinet members increasingly expressed concerns as to what was being agreed to in the smaller group. The predominant site of decision switched after the Challe plan was accepted, with ad hoc meetings becoming more prominent. During the Falklands crisis, the small 'War Cabinet' was the main site of decision making. An interesting dynamic exists in both the Suez and Falklands crises: although the full Cabinet was not the major site of decision in either, when a particularly consequential decision had to be made, the Cabinet was at least given a pro forma opportunity to consider the matter. Both Eden and Thatcher were very careful to prepare the ground for this beforehand, and strategically utilized the norm of collective Cabinet responsibility to shape the outcome, but the fact remained that Cabinet was not entirely bypassed in either case.

As reported above, site of decision also impacted the likelihood of objectives being specified, the likelihood of a previously rejected policy being reconsidered, and whether additional sources of information will be sought.

A number of variables might best be grouped under the rubric of *conflict within the core executive*, whether between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, civil service and Ministers, or actors in the core executive generally. The Prime Minister-Foreign

Secretary relationship emerges as crucial within the core executive. The utility of combining institutional and individual factors is clear in this regard. Both the distribution of resources between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister shape this relationship. In the instance of Attlee-Bevin, the Foreign Secretary was very well-resourced and the Prime Minister was inclined towards delegating (low need for power, medium self confidence) foreign policy making to him, leading to a situation we might term 'Foreign Secretary dominance'. In the case of Eden-Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary was weak, deferential, and faced with an assertive Prime Minister (medium need for power, high self confidence). This led to a situation which we might term 'Prime Minister dominance'. In the Thatcher-Pym relationship, the Prime Minister was weak in resources but personally assertive, while the Foreign Secretary had independent standing. This led to a situation we might term 'Prime Minister - Foreign Secretary competition'. These are obviously crude characterizations, but nevertheless emerge as interesting findings. Equally, the links between this relationship and the quality of decision making variables were significant (see above), especially the degree to which use of resources by the Foreign Secretary against the Prime Minister served to 'open up' decision making in regard to the consideration of multiple policies and the likelihood of revisiting a previously rejected policy.

Other conflict variables were also important, and indicate the importance of utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods. Neither the frequency of civil service challenges to ministers nor the frequency of core executive actors using resources against one another varies significantly across the three cases. Nor do the variables emerge as strong predictors of quality of decision making factors in the multivariate

analysis. Nonetheless, these variables were important parts of the qualitative explanations of some decisions. The use of resources by Nye Bevan, and then the counter use by Hugh Gaitskell towards the end of the Korean crisis was the main determinative factor in the decision to support the US 'brand China' resolution at the UN. Additionally, the quite remarkable entrepreneurial performance of Harold Macmillan during the Suez crisis contributed to the confusion surrounding the US position in regard to British use of force.

*Norms of the core executive* also emerge as important. The use of the secrecy norm varied greatly across the cases, never invoked in the open decision making process of the Korean and Falklands crises, but very prominent during Suez. The secrecy norm was obviously crucial in terms of the latitude it gave Anthony Eden to exclude crucial actors within the core executive who might have been expected to oppose or expose the Challe plan. The norm of collective Cabinet responsibility also emerges as crucial. Again, it is by far most prominent during Suez decision making. Collective Cabinet responsibility served here to prevent a fracturing of the government, but at the cost of a genuine expression of the views of the Cabinet – one that would have restricted Eden's freedom of action in regard to the use of force quite severely. Consideration of this variable again indicates the importance of the multi-method framework for inquiry adopted here. Although the norm was invoked only twice during the Falklands crisis, both instances were crucial in that Thatcher required full Cabinet support for her policy at a sensitive moment when its chances of failure were apparent.

In terms of quality of decision making, the norm of secrecy has a significantly negative effect on the degree to which on the degree to which objectives of policy are specified and the degree to which multiple policies are considered. The norm of

collective responsibility reduces the likelihood that the costs and risks of policy will be specified.

In terms of the *Individual characteristics of the Prime Minister*, the degree to which the Prime Minister perceives multiple dimensions to an issue and is flexible in terms of changing policy views – those behavioral variables associated with the individual characteristic of conceptual complexity, prove especially important. Indeed, in the Falklands crisis especially, the crucial decisions were shaped by Thatcher's 'black and white' view of the issue, from which she refused to move. In the case of Attlee and Eden, their relatively higher complexity was one contributory factor towards a decision making process that considered multiple policies and, especially in the case of Suez, went through several changes of direction. Additionally, the importance of the conceptual complexity of the Prime Minister was apparent in the analysis of determinants of quality of decision making: higher complexity Prime Ministers promote more open decision making in terms of the likelihood of previously rejected policies being considered and additional sources of information being sought, and more thorough decision making in terms of the likelihood of objectives of policies being specified.

### **Implications for foreign policy analysis**

- *Leadership Trait Analysis is a valid and useful Technique*: This study provides strong support for the validity and the utility of Hermann's *Leadership Trait Analysis* technique. The application of the technique to post-WWII British Prime Ministers, to my knowledge the most extensive application to a logically-grouped sample of political leaders, was successful in that the technique was shown to



- reliably discriminate between individuals on six of the seven variables which comprise its conceptual basis. In addition, in most instances these variables could be operationalized in a manner which was demonstrated to have significant impact on the process, outcomes, and quality of decision making in empirical cases.
- *Individuals and Institutions matter*: The study has provided evidence that analysis of foreign policy should proceed from a mixed conceptual framework which recognizes the important of leaders and their personality, but also situates these leaders within the wider institutional environment within which decisions are made. Mono-causal frameworks, which posit direct links between personality and political outcomes or, conversely, are situationally or institutionally reductionist, are unsatisfactory.
  - *Multi Method Inquiries are the goal*: It is perhaps especially important that the field of foreign policy analysis endorses the general move towards methodological diversity within the same study. This is not the same as endorsing without caveat King, Keohane and Verba's 'unified logic of causal inference', which argues for the subsumation of all methodology under the assumptions of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches capture important parts of the causal relationships between institutions, individuals, and the process, outcome, and quality of decision making. Indeed, the qualitative work captures links with outcomes that would have been quite difficult to investigate quantitatively, and the quantitative work captures links with quality of decision making variables that are readily

amenable to quantification. However, those variables which did not seem important from the quantitative results were sometimes extremely significant when placed within the proper context through the qualitative work. This is to say that, in foreign policy crises especially, one must be aware of dynamics of path dependence and the disproportionate importance of some decisions and occurrences in relation to others: issues which sometimes violate OLS assumptions, and argue for the preservation of qualitative data on variables of interest. By the same token, the ability to reliably and simultaneously estimate the relationships between multiple variables provided by regression techniques is especially important in foreign policy analysis, which commonly works with contingent, multivariate conceptual frameworks.

#### *Future research*

An obvious path for future research would be the collection of more observations on the variables developed in this study through the analysis of more cases. Indeed, the number of observations in this study is quite small given the number of variables included in the multivariate analysis. Additionally, the linkages uncovered through the qualitative analysis can be tested against new cases not utilized in their generation. Case selection for future research would want to add cases where the use of force was not the result of decision making – as noted in Chapter three this was a constant across the three cases in terms of ultimate policy outcome and a weakness of the research design. In other respects, the case selection criteria developed in chapter three should be followed in order to ensure that the new cases are comparable. Indeed, future studies will have the

advantage in that data on the individual characteristics of all post-1945 Prime Ministers is now available (chapter two).

A second important path of future research will be to generate more observations concerning the impact of each individual leader. A deficiency of the research design here is that only one case in which each Prime Minister was involved was selected. While, therefore, Thatcher behaved in the Falklands crisis in a manner consistent with what we might expect from a low complexity leader, multiple studies of Thatcher's performance in foreign policy crises from throughout her time in office will determine whether this linkage holds in more than one case.

In conclusion, this study has attempted to illuminate the complex and contingent nature of decision making in the British foreign policy core executive. The structure of the core executive is an important factor in determining the processes and outcomes of decision making, in so far as that structure dictates that core executive actors are in relationships of irreducible mutual dependency. Each has resources, but none, even the Prime Minister, has the resources to make policy unilaterally. The crucial factors in understanding decisions, therefore, are the relative distribution of resources within the core executive and the strategies of individual agency core executive actors employ both to increase their resources and to translate those resources into policy influence. Understanding individual agency requires, in turn, understanding the personality and style of key actors, in particular the Prime Minister. In short, decision making in British foreign policy is a function not of institutions or individuals separately, but of the interaction between the two.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### *Archival Documents*

Files used in this study kept at the Public Record Office, Kew, are designated as follows: PREM (Prime Minister's Office); CAB (Cabinet Office); FO (Foreign Office).

Series of these documents used are listed below, while references to specific documents within these series can be found in the chapter endnotes.

### *Korea*

CAB 128/17  
 CAB 128/18  
 CAB 131/8  
 CAB 131/9  
 FO 37/183014  
 PREM 8/1405

### *Suez*

CAB 128/30  
 CAB 134/1216  
 CAB 134/1217  
 PREM11/1098  
 PREM 11/1152

### *Government Documents*

Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure for Ministers*, London: HMSO, 1992.

*Falkland Islands Review. A Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors*. Chairman: the Rt Hon. The Lord Franks, London: HMSO, January 1983

*Third Report From the Foreign Affairs Committee. Session 1984-85. Events Surrounding the Weekend of 1-2 May 1982*. Report together with the Proceedings of the Committee; Minutes of Evidence; and Appendices. London: HMSO, 22 July 1985.

*Books and Articles*

Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York: Norton, 1969.

Attlee, Clement R. A. *As It Happened*, New York: Viking Press, 1954.

Axelrod, Robert, *The Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Barker, Elisabeth, *Britain Between the Superpowers 1945-1950*, London: Macmillan Press, 1983.

Bennett, Andrew and George, Alexander L. "Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci" in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* ed C. Elman and M.F Elman. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001.

- "Research Design Tasks in Case Study Methods". Paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, October 17-19 1997.

Bovens Mark and t'Hart, P. *Understanding Policy Fiascoes*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1996.

Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, London: Richard Cohen Books, 1996.

Brown, A. H. "Prime Ministerial Power (Part I) *Public Law* (1968): 28-51.

"Prime Ministerial Power (Part II) *Public Law* (1968): 106-118.

Bullock, Alan. *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, London: Heinemann, 1983.

Burch, Martin, "The Prime Minister and Whitehall" in *Churchill to Major: The British Prime Ministership Since 1945*, edited by D. Shell and R. Hodder-Williams. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995: 104-136.

- and Holliday, Ian. *The British Cabinet System*. New York: Prentice Hall, 1996

Carrington, Lord. *Reflect on Things Past*, London: Collins, 1988.

Carlton, David. *Britain and the Suez Crisis*, New York: Blackwell, 1989.

Crossman, Richard H.S. *The Myths of Cabinet Government*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.

- Dalyell, Tam, *Thatcher's Torpedo*, London: Woolf, 1983.
- Dillon, G.M. *The Falklands, Politics and War*, London: Macmillan, 1989.
- Dunleavy, Patrick and Rhodes R.A.W. "Core Executive Studies in Britain". *Public Administration* 68 (1990): 3-28.
- Dyson, Stephen Benedict. "Drawing Policy Implications from the "Operational Code" of a 'New' Political Actor: Russian President Vladimir Putin", *Policy Sciences* 34 (2001): 329-346.
- and Libia Lorena Billordo, "Using Words as Data in the Study of the French Political Elite", *French Politics* 2 (2004): 111-123.
- Eden, Anthony. *Full Circle*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960.
- Edwards, George C. and Wayne, Stephen J. *Studying the Presidency*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983.
- Etheridge, Lloyd. "Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory", *American Political Science Review* 72 (1978): 434-451.
- Foot, Michael. *Aneurin Bevan: A Biography*, New York: Atheneum, 1963.
- Fowler, Norman, *Ministers Decide: A Personal Memoir of the Thatcher Years*, Chapman, London, 1991.
- Freedman, Lawrence. *Britain and the Falklands War*, New York: Blackwell, 1988.
- Gavshon, Arthur L. and Desmond Rice, *The Sinking of the Belgrano*, London: Secker and Warburg, 1984.
- George, Alexander, L. "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Leadership and Decision-Making", *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (1969): 190-222
- . *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980.
- . "Case Studies and Theory Development" Paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, October 15-16 1982.
- Giddens, Phillip, "Prime Minister and Cabinet" in *Churchill to Major: The British Prime Ministership Since 1945*, edited by Donald Shell and Richard Hodder-Williams, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

Gordon-Walker, Patrick, *The Cabinet*, London: Cape, 1972.

Greenstein, Fred I. *Personality and Politics: Problems of evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization*, (Chicago: Markham, 1969).

Haig, Alexander. *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*, New York: Macmillan, 1984.

Haney, Patrick J. *Organizing for Foreign Policy Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.

t'Hart, P. *Groupthink in Government*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994.

Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon, *The Battle for the Falklands*, London: Joseph, 1983.

Hennessey, Peter. *Cabinet*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

- , *Whitehall*, London: Fontana, 1990.

Herek, Gregory M, Janis, Irving L and Huth, Paul. "Decision Making During International Crisis: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (1987): 203-26.

Hermann, Margaret G. "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders", *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (1980): 7-46.

- . "Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis" in *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, ed. J.M. Post (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003): 178-214.

- . and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry" *International Studies Quarterly* 33: 361-387.

Hill, M. J. *The Sociology of Public Administration*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972.

Holsti, Ole. "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy" in *Enemies in Politics*, eds D. Finlay, O. Holsti and R. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962): 25-96.

Hoyt, Paul D. and Garrison, Jean A. "Political Manipulation Within the Small Group: Foreign Policy Advisers in the Carter Administration" in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking*, edited by P. t'Hart, E.K. Stern, and B. Sundelius, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

Janis, Irving L. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.

- . *Crucial Decisions*. New York: Free Press, 1989.

- . and Mann, Leon. *Decisionmaking*. New York: Free Press, 1977.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Keohane, Robert O and Nye, Joseph S, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.

King, Anthony. "Executives" in *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol.5, ed. F. Greenstein and N. Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975: 173-255.

- . "Introduction: The Textbook Prime Ministership" in *The British Prime Minister*, edited by A. King, London: Macmillan, 1985: 1-11.

King, Gary, "The Methodology of Presidential Research" in *Researching the Presidency*, edited by George Edwards, John Kessel and Bert Rockman, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.

King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O and Verba, S. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Krasner, Stephen D. "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective". *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1988): 66-94.

Kyle, Keith. *Suez*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Laver, Michael, Benoit, Kenneth and Garry, John. "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Text Using Words as Data", *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 311-331.

Lawson, Nigel, *The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical*, Bantam: London, 1993.

Leach, Henry, *Endure No Makeshifts: Some Naval Recollections*, London: Casemate, 1993.

Lee, J.M, Jones, G.W. and Burnham, June, *At the Centre of Whitehall*, London: Macmillan, 1998.

Leites, Nathan. *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.

Lloyd, Selwyn. *Suez 1956: A Personal Account*, London: Cape, 1978.



Lowe, Peter, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-1", *The English Historical Review* 105 (1990): 624-653.

Macdonald, Callum, *Britain and the Korean War*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

Macmillan, Harold. *Riding the Storm 1956-1959*, London: Macmillan, 1971.

Madgwick, Phillip. *British Government: The Central Executive Territory*. London: Phillip Allen, 1991.

Mahdasian, Sarkis, "State, Trait, or Design? A Critical examination of Assumptions Underlying Remote Assessment". Ph.D. diss. Washington State University, 2002.

March, James G and Olsen, Johan P. *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: Free Press, 1989.

-. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life". *The American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 734-749.

McCrae, Robert R. and Costa, Phillip T. Jr. "Personality Trait Structure as a Human Universal", *American Psychologist* 52 (1997): 509-516

McEldowney, John F, *Public Law*, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994.

Milner, Helen V, *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Moe, Terry M, "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory", in *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, edited by G. Edwards, J. Kessel, and B. Rockman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993, 337-385.

Morgan, Kenneth O. *Labour in Power 1945-1951*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946.

Norton, Phillip. "Prime Ministerial Power" *Social Studies Review* 3 (1988): 108-115.

Nott, John. *Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Memoirs of an Errant Politician*, London: Politicos, 2002.

Nutting, Anthony. *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez*, New York: C. N. Potter, 1967.

Parkinson, Cecil, *Right at the Centre: An Autobiography*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1992.

Pika, Joseph. "Moving Beyond the Oval Office: Problems in Studying the Presidency" *Congress and the Presidency* 9 (1981-1982): 17-36.

Ponting, Clive, *Whitehall: Tragedy and Force*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986.

Preston, Thomas. "The President and His Inner Circle". Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1996.

- . *The President and His Inner Circle*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Prior, James, *A Balance of Power*, Hamish Hamilton: London, 1986.

Rasler, Karen A., Thompson, William R. and Chester, Kathleen M. "Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability Problems", *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (1980): 47-66.

Rhodes, R.A.W. "From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive", in *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* edited by R.A.W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy. London: Macmillan, 1995: 11-37.

. and Dunleavy, Patrick. *Prime Minister, Cabinet, and Core Executive*. London: Macmillan, 1995.

Richardson, Louise. *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Rose, Richard "British Government: The Job at the Top" in *Presidents and Prime Ministers*, edited by R. Rose and E. Suleiman, Washington, D.C." American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

Rosenthal, Uriel, t'Hart, Paul and Kouzmin, Alexander "The Bureaupolitics of Crisis Management". *Public Administration* 69 (1991): 211-233.

Schafer, Mark. "Issues in Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance", *Political Psychology* 21 (2000): 511-527.

Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, HW and Sapin, Burton. *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1962.

Shell, Donald, "The Office of the Prime Minister" in *Churchill to Major: The British Prime Ministership Since 1945*, edited by D. Shell and R. Hodder-Williams. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995: 1-30.

Smith, Martin. J. *The Core Executive in Britain*, London: Macmillan, 1999.

Stern, Eric and Verbeek, Bertjan. "Whither the Study of Governmental Politics:", *Mershon International Studies Review* 42 (1998).

Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret. *Man-Milieu Relationships Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Taber, Charles. "Problems of Empirical Inference in Elite Decision Making", *The Political Psychologist* 5 (2000): 3-9.

Thatcher, Margaret. *The Downing Street Years*, New York: HarperCollins, 1993.

Verbeek, Bertjan, *Decision Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.

Walker, Stephen G. "The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21 (1977): 129-168.

- "Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance", *Political Psychology* 21 (2000): 597-601.

Wallace, William. *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975.

Walt, Stephen M, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Waltz, Kenneth N, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979.

Wendt, A, *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Willetts, David, "The Role of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit", *Public Administration* 65 (1987): 443-452.

Wilson, Harold. *The Governance of Britain*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976.

Winter, David G. "What Makes the Candidates Run?", *Psychology Today*: 46-49.

- "Leader Appeal, Leader Performance, and the Motive Profiles of Leaders and Followers: A Study of American Presidents and Elections", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (1987): 196-202.

- "Presidential Psychology and Governing Styles: A Comparative Psychological Analysis of the 1992 Presidential Candidates" in *The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing and the Psychology of Leadership* ed. S.A. Renshon, (Boulder, CO:

Westview, 1995): 113-134.

- "Personality and Political Behavior" in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by D.O. Sears, L. Huddy and R. Jervis, New York: Oxford, 2003: 110-145.

Young, Hugo, *One of Us*, Macmillan: London, 1991.

Young, Michael D. "Automating Assessment at a Distance", *The Political Psychologist* 5 (2000): 17-23.

Ziller, Robert C. *The Social Self* (New York: Pergamon, 1977)

APPENDIX:

EXAMPLE OF CODE BOOK WITH VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATIONS AND  
EXAMPLES OF CODING DECISIONS FROM FALKLANDS CASE.

CASE:

OCD #:

QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF STATE OF DECISION MAKING PROCESS  
(INCLUDING DECISIONS TAKEN, STATE OF ISSUE ETC)

Each pamphlet represents one “occasion for decision”. Each occasion for decision contains information which is used to answer the 28 yes/ no questions in this booklet.

- All questions should be answered yes/no, with none left blank.
- Information in this space on the front of the booklet will contain both a summary of the major happenings within the occasion for decision, as well as material to answer some of the questions
- The photocopied sheets inside the booklet contain information useful to answer the questions.
- Some of the information may be useful for only one question, some may be useful in answering multiple questions

1) Is a decision taken on the issue in Cabinet? Yes No  
*Sometimes referred to as "full Cabinet" in order to distinguish it from sub-Cabinet committees. To answer yes, not only must the issue be raised and discussed in Cabinet, but a decision must be taken.*  
"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 4: "She (Thatcher) had come increasingly to take key decisions in sub-Committees and at bilateral meetings from which her opponents could be excluded... At Friday's second Cabinet meeting, however, Mrs Thatcher knew she had to gain total Cabinet support" (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 76).

2) Is a decision taken on the issue in Cabinet committee? Yes No  
 In foreign policy cases, these will often be referred to as the "War Cabinet", or "...committee" (i.e. Egypt Committee, Overseas Defence Committee etc). Again, to answer yes, not only must the issue be raised and discussed, but a decision must be taken.  
"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 21: "On 8 May the War Cabinet took the crucial decision of the war; to send the landing force south from Ascension" (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 169).

3) Decision on the issue taken in another location/context/group? Yes No  
 Something of a residual category. Most commonly, these will be bilateral conversations/ meetings between decision makers, or multilateral ad hoc meetings.  
"Yes" Example, From Falklands OCD # 1: "The key decisions over South Georgia were taken in bilateral meetings with individual ministers rather than in the more deliberative forum of OD committee" (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 59).  
"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 3: "That evening, the group of ministers and officials who were later to form the core of the War Cabinet gathered again in Mrs Thatcher's study at No. 10" (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 69).

4) Is there evidence of CS challenging ministers? Yes No  
 Answer yes if any member of the civil service, or document/ idea originating with them, goes against the interpretation/ wishes/ orders of any minister. Delaying tactics or other types of behavior to frustrate ministers wishes also should be coded yes.  
"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 23: "From the start of the meeting, Parsons had to struggle to concentrate her (Thatcher's) mind on the need at least to clear the decks for war in the most advantageous manner...he sparred with her as few had dared. "Prime Minister", he would interrupt, "if I may finish what I was saying I think you might agree with me" (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 172).

PM= Prime Minister; FS= Foreign Secretary

5) Evidence of PM, FS disagreement on policy? Yes No  
 Answer yes if there is any evidence of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary viewing the issue differently, having different objectives, favoring different policies to reach the same objectives.  
"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 6: "The US Secretary of State Alexander Haig recalled that during some of his early conversations with the War Cabinet Pym muttered

*'Maybe we should ask the Falklanders what they think of a war'. He was heatedly challenged by Mrs Thatcher, who warned that aggressors will always try to intimidate those against whom they aggress" (Freedman, p. 76).*

6) Evidence of PM using resources against FS? Yes No  
 Answer yes if the Prime Minister makes some effort to prevail against the Foreign Secretary- lobbying other ministers, utilizing persuasive techniques, using sticks and carrots, basically deploying any of the authority and advantages of being Prime Minister against the Foreign Secretary.

"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 14: *"Ministers began assembling outside the Cabinet Room...I asked Willie Whitelaw to come upstairs to my study. I told him that I could not accept these terms and gave him my reasons. As always on crucial occasions he backed my judgment" (Thatcher, p. 207).*

7) Evidence of FS using resources against PM? Yes No  
 As above with PM and FS roles reversed.

"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 14: *"As we waited in the small anteroom outside the Cabinet room, Francis Pym came up to me and told me that he felt that Haig had worked up a set of proposals which were the best that could be hoped for and that he would recommend their acceptance" (Parkinson, p. 202).*

8) Other core executive actors use resources against each other? Yes No  
 As above for other ministers, civil servants, senior military officials.

"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 26: *"This pressure was reflected in conflicting leaks from the War Cabinet as the post-landing week progressed. On the first Sunday, ministers indicated to Lewin their desire to 'push forward as fast as possible out of the bridgehead'. Downing Street duly briefed the press that an attack on Port Stanley was expected 'in a matter of days'. On Monday, May 23, Nott responded to this overt pressure on his commanders by declaring an opposite line: 'There can be no question of pressing the task force commander to move forward prematurely' he told the Commons" (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 255).*

9) Is necessity for secrecy used to restrict information? Yes No  
 The British government has a long tradition of restricting information, even within high government circles, to the point that there is said to be a norm of central state secrecy. Answer yes if any one of Prime Minister, ministers, civil servants, etc make some reference to need for secrecy and use it to withhold information from some other core executive actor.

"Yes" Example From Falklands OCD # 3: *"At Cabinet there was a brief discussion of the situation of the Falklands. The Prime Minister described the situation as being very grave; but neither at that meeting nor at the subsequent meeting of OD, which concerned itself with our diplomatic proposals, did we reveal the intelligence information that had been received the night before. As was customary, signals intelligence of this kind...was treated on a 'need to know' basis" (Nott, p. 259).*

10) Collective Responsibility appears to stifle expression of policy doubts by minister(s)?

Yes No

The norm of collective responsibility refers to the convention that government ministers either support an agreed upon policy of the Cabinet or resign. This leads to a situation where commonly, a great degree of sometimes heated debate will occur prior to a policy decision, but once that decision has been taken in Cabinet, ministers are obliged not to reopen the debate, or do so at some risk. A major or controversial decision will often be brought to Cabinet as a “debate ending” tactic- where ministers are bound to the policy, and policy doubts become stifled.

“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 20: Thatcher seeks full Cabinet support in wake of sinking of destroyer *HMS Sheffield*: “As on 2 April, Mrs Thatcher went round her full Cabinet table, listening and ticking off names as she went” (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 168).

11) Does PM take proactive approach to issue/policy?

Yes No

Answer yes if the Prime Minister personally initiates or proposes to initiate a cause of action not in reaction to events but in order to “make something happen”. Additionally, answer yes if the Prime Minister personally seems impatient with progression of policy, wants “everything now”.

“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 2: “I said instantly, ‘If they are invaded, we have got to get them back’” (Thatcher, p. 179).

12) Does PM refer to more than one viewpoint/ dimension to issue? Yes No

Answer yes if Prime Minister personally refers to multiple viewpoints/ interpretations/ considerations to be taken into account, displays a differentiated or sophisticated understanding and approach to the policy situation. Answer no if the Prime Minister personally seems to have a “black and white”, one track approach.

“No” Example From Falklands OCD # 7: “I was becoming impatient with all this. I said that it was essentially an issue of dictatorship versus democracy” (Thatcher, p. 198) + “I knew that the only reason the Argentinians were prepared to negotiate at all was because they feared our task force” (Thatcher, p. 198).

13) Does PM change views during this OCI?

Yes No

Answer yes if the Prime Minister personally makes a major change in their interpretation of the situation, proposes a major change in the direction of policy. Answer no if the Prime Minister displays continuity with their previous views/ policy/ interpretation.

14) Does PM display “competitive” behavior, a concern for personal prestige or authority?

Yes No



“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 6: “She (Thatcher) was in a forceful mood, embattled, incisive” (Haig, p. 272).

“Yes Example From Falklands OCD # 14: “For the first time since 2 April, Thatcher felt the need of her full Cabinet’s support” (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 167).

15) Does PM challenge interpretation of situation/ policy recommendation offered by others? Yes No

*Answer yes if the Prime Minister rejects or challenges the views, interpretations, or recommendations of others. Answer no if Prime Minister concurs or makes no mention/ effort to disagree with others on policy issue.*

“Yes” Example from Falklands OCD # 4: “It was also on Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> April that I received advice from the Foreign Office which summed up the flexibility of principle characteristic of that department. I was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power. All these considerations were fair enough. But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking. You have to set out with an iron will to overcome them. And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen’s subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister” (Thatcher, p. 181).

16) PM shows concern with maintaining harmony among decision makers? Yes No  
*Does the Prime Minister make explicit mention of the need to sooth or manage other core executive actors. Does the Prime Minister seem to be making an effort to ensure that other actors are happy with policy course and process, or at least do not enter into open revolt?*

17) Are objectives of policy specified? Yes No

*Is explicit mention made of the goals which the policy is designed to secure, or do these goals remain implicit, or indeed is there positive evidence of a lack of consideration of what the policy is designed to do (i.e. action for the sake of action).*

“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 4: Thatcher in Commons on April 3<sup>rd</sup> stated the objective: “To see the islands returned to British administration” (Thatcher, p. 180-181).

18) Is more than one policy considered? Yes No

*Do any members of the core executive show evidence of considering more than one policy action.*

“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 7: “Mrs Thatcher convened the meeting at once. Though it was abundantly clear that her determination was as strong as ever, she and her ministers negotiated fully and responsibly every point of the draft we had produced with Galtieri and the junta” (Haig, p. 283).

19) Is a previously rejected policy reconsidered? Yes No  
 Do any members of the core executive seek to revisit or reopen consideration of a course of action which had been previously rejected, regardless of whether this reconsidered policy is actually adopted.  
“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 14: *“Francis Pym was now on his way back from the United States with new draft proposals...He thought that we should accept what was in the document” (Thatcher, p. 205-206).*

20) Are additional sources of information actively sought? Yes No  
 Do any members of the core executive actively solicit additional information in order to make a decision/ better understand the situation. Answer yes if there is active evidence of solicitation of information, not merely the receipt of multiple sources.  
“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 10: *“It was after very careful questioning of the Chiefs of Staff and the Attorney General and after long discussion that they were approved” (Thatcher, p. 201).*

21) Does new info suggest objectives or actions should be changed? Yes No  
 Does some new evidence suggest that the policy course which is being followed is failing, or inappropriate given new developments, or that a situation which was being monitored but not acted upon now requires greater attention.  
“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 9: *“In the early days of the task force, members of both the war and full Cabinets believed that, if the navy had to fight, they would achieve a walkover. As a result, when the chiefs of staff made their first formal presentation to the War Cabinet at the Ministry of Defence a week after the task force sailed, ministers were decidedly shaken by the warnings of the possible losses and casualties, by the news of Argentine naval strength, and by a predicted 50 per cent Harrier attrition rate. It seemed a sobering, even depressing, meeting” (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 107)*

22) Do policy objectives or policy actions change in light of new info? Yes No  
 If information does in fact suggest a change in actions is this in fact undertaken, or is the information ignored and the old course of action persisted with.  
“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 20: *“The impact of Sheffield’s loss was to reinforce rather than dampen the War Cabinet’s renewed enthusiasm for diplomacy” (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 167).*

(21 and 22 used to calculate ‘responsiveness to information variable’: coded 1 when info suggests policy change and policy is changed; 0 when info suggests policy change, but policy remains the same; missing data when info does not suggest policy change.

23) Is an attempt made to specify the costs, risks, and implications of the preferred policy choice? Yes No  
 Do members of the core executive consider what may be the results of their actions, particularly in terms of what hazards they may be exposing themselves to, what may be

the “knock on” effects for other policies and other parts of the world and so on. Or, is there a lack of attention to consequences and dangers.

*“No” Example From Falklands OCD # 4:* “The fleet in fact set sail with remarkably little information on the enemy...It was only in the second week of April that Cabinet ministers were taken to the defence ministry in Whitehall and received a full military briefing on the risks involved” (Richardson, p. 132).

*“Yes” Example From Falklands OCD # 20:* “*Questions now started piling in on Lewin. What were our defences against Exocet? Why did they appear so inadequate? Why was the fleet so close to the islands? Should the carriers not withdraw?*” (Hastings and Jenkins, p. 167).