

CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN BOLIVIA

By

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

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Abstract

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This thesis uses nonviolence and conflict theories to examine the history of conflict in Bolivia and how nonviolent tactics have helped lead to unification and democratization of the society. The history is explored as it relates to the indigenous majority of the Bolivian population and their struggle for recognition and power in government, particularly the Water Wars of 1999-2000 in Cochabamba. Also examined are the concepts of peace and violence in current peace literature as well as in modern urban Bolivian society. Despite long histories of violent coups and struggles, Bolivians have used nonviolent tactics successfully against violent governments. This thesis aims to examine these tactics and their effect on creating a sense of unity and democracy among a wide variety of groups.

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my grandmother Elba for showing me life goes on and to my mother and father for showing me the world.

INTRODUCTION

Anthropology, Conflict, and Nonviolence

Anthropologists have studied war extensively in various cultures, at various times, in various places. However, the study of peace has been mostly ignored. A large number of the studies done on peace and non-violence are done within political science or as part of religious studies (Sponsel and Gregor 1994:4). Very few of these have found their way into anthropology. Within academe and elsewhere, aggressive and violent behaviors are often assumed to be a normal part of human nature (Unnithan and Yogendra 1969:79) with nonviolence as the exception. The reality is that most power, political and social, is achieved through nonviolent means, even if not by conscious choice.

Most anthropological studies in the subject of conflict have centered on the study of violence. This may be simply because the most obvious forms of violence leave visible traces and have easily discernible results. Peace is difficult to study, partly because it is difficult to define, as what constitutes *peace* may be different according to culture, time, or context. Further meanings of peace will be discussed in the section on theory.

“Peace appears to be elusive not because relatively nonviolent and peaceful societies are so rare--- they are not--- but instead because so rarely have nonviolence and peace been the focus of research in anthropology and other disciplines, including even the field of peace studies” (Sponsel 2005).

Anthropology is a well suited medium through which to study peace. Leslie Sponsel, co-editor of *The Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence* identifies several ways in which an

anthropological undertaking of peace studies¹ may be beneficial to each discipline. One such compatibility is that both anthropology and peace studies pride themselves on their holistic attitudes. Both fields are interdisciplinary, and both are willing to apply theories on a global scale. Where anthropology can add more diversity to peace studies, peace studies can act as a “catalyst for rethinking anthropology, including its history, theory, data, and practice” (Fry 2005:12). As Fry puts it, peace studies would help curb “the systemic bias within the discipline [of anthropology]...a tendency to focus on violence and war almost to the exclusion of non-violence and peace, which can lead to a distorted view of human nature, ethnology, and ethnographic cases” (2005:14). A classic example of this may be the studies done of the Yanomamo in the Amazon. Many initial studies such as Napoleon Chagnon’s *Yanomamo: The Fierce People* concluded that the Yanomamo were a violent group. A considerable amount of attention was focused on the violent “resolutions” of conflicts. These claims have since been called into question by Tierney and others who state that violent behavior may have been intensified by Chagnon’s distribution of trade goods (Tierney 2000, Ferguson 1995). This may also be indicative of how an unrecognized bias towards inherent violence in humans may lead one to ignore his or her own role in contributing to and engaging in violent behavior.

Beyond this need to circumvent biases towards violence, anthropology may also have more to offer the field of peace studies by providing a useful method of gathering ethnographic data, through practices such as participant observation and ethnography. These can then be applied toward creating more successful resolutions to conflict by tailoring diplomatic efforts, negotiations, and government building to the culture(s)

¹ Peace studies examines the way peace is created and maintained. It also looks at the use of nonviolent tactics within struggles and conflicts. Anthropology offers the added dimension of examining how peace is conceived of within a culture and possibly how it can then be created and maintained in the context of that culture.

within which they will take place. There is also great potential to affect modern policies in conflict and development situations where conflicts arise over how to conduct operations.

Nonviolence and Democracy

The use of nonviolent action/political defiance has been linked with the creation of democracies and positive peace². As a rule, successful nonviolent action/strategy towards political ends in modern society requires the participation and cooperation of many people, often hundreds or thousands. Leaders of such movements must learn to work with and appeal to majority opinion both within and outside of the opposition group in order to gain more support. Due to the large scale nature of nonviolent action, individuals are often enlisted to be a part of resistance movements. In India, Gandhi's resistance strategy towards the salt tax was accessible to every single Indian, young or old, male or female, rich or poor. All Indians could go to the beach to make their own salt and defy the British Empire. This ability to incorporate all people in the resistance movement helps make people aware of the power they already hold and can give them the confidence to use it (Sharp 1990:17). Similarly in Bolivia, the Water Wars of 1999-2000 marked an increase in the communal consciousness that the government, indeed, even transnational companies, could not stand up to the people once they refused to cooperate. In many ways, the actions of the people involved in the Bolivian Water Wars led to the foundations for a new democratically elected president and a restructuring of government.

² As opposed to negative peace which is described in the *Conflict and Nonviolence Theory* section.

It is my hypothesis that the use of nonviolent action/political defiance in Bolivia during the Water Wars and during the National Revolution of 1952 helped pave the way for the democratic government seen today. I will show that the principles of nonviolent action were used by groups in Bolivia and that those actions created a sense of solidarity that led to a democratically elected government. The next part of my hypothesis is taken from the theory that the use of nonviolent action will also deter the further use of violence by breaking cycles of violence and enabling a nonviolent discourse. Recent events have shown that Bolivia is not free from the use of violence as a government sanction, and despite high hopes for a corruption free government, accusations of corruption and denial of rights continue to occur. However, this does not necessarily mean that positive changes toward democracy have not occurred.

The fieldwork conducted as part of my studies has two results. One is the exposition of things that would need to be overcome to allow future quantitative studies of nonviolent actions in Bolivia. A second result has been to gain a fundamental understanding of how people conceive of peace and nonviolence.

FIELDWORK AND METHODS

Douglas P. Fry makes the statement, “upon closer scientific examination, war might turn out to be no more ‘natural’ than slavery”, in the first chapter of his book *The Human Potential for Peace* (2005:2). His argument is that like the concept of slavery in the past, war and violent resolutions to conflict are usually treated as a “natural” part of human existence. Just as there are no “superior” races, there is no scientific basis for violence to be more “normal” than peace. In fact, humans spend the majority of their time involved in non-violent pursuits. Even so, nonviolence and peace are often treated as abstract concepts that can only be achieved by overcoming human nature. This bias has informed many research questions and skewed interpretations of data. Fry proposes “that the view that humans are fundamentally warlike stems much more from the *cultural beliefs* of the writers than from ‘phenomena observed in the physical world’—from data in other words” (2005:2). This outlook on violence and nonviolence spurred the question of why conflict occurs and what causes it to become violent? I decided not to focus my questions on a particular form of violence (such as individual vs. group) and decided to let my informants decide what form of violence they wanted to address. When asked for clarification, I would offer political violence as a lead. Despite my worry that this might be too leading, many respondents made links between individual violence and group violence.




Figure 1 Political map of Bolivia. Adapted from Goldstein (2004:58).

I went to Bolivia in the summer (winter there) of 2006 hoping to answer some questions about the nature of peace and what it would take to achieve it in a country that has long been the center for many violent rebellions and coups. In addition to the physical violence that sporadically dots Bolivian history, structural violence has been a constant occurrence since the Incan empire and the Spanish conquistadors. With the Conquistadors and Spanish colonialism came the seemingly never-ending extraction of natural resources at a high profit to foreign powers, with little to no profit for the people of Bolivia. In modern times, the colonialists have been replaced by transnational companies. Today, the government of Bolivia is claiming to want to change the status

quo by giving the people of Bolivia more power over their resources. My visit coincided with the creation of the first Constituent Assembly and the vote for autonomy in the provinces, one year after the election of the first indigenous president in Bolivia's history.

Bolivia is my mother's homeland and my land of birth. When I set out to undertake my fieldwork there, I hoped not only to conduct some interesting research, but I also hoped to connect to the family I had left behind as a child. I hoped that having a family connection might make it easier to obtain interviews and perhaps more in depth information. As I prepared to leave, I looked at pictures, tried to memorize names, and practiced turning my Spanglish into Spanish. My parents gave me some Bolivian currency (*Bolivianos/Pesos*) to start me off, and my siblings loaded me with gifts for the cousins and a list of items to bring back.

Boarding in Miami, I was not sure at first if I was even at the right gate, the sign said "Panama." After looking around, however, I recognized some of the traditional Bolivian dress (*polleras* and lace shirts) worn by some of the female boarding passengers and after a couple of hesitant questions I learned that the plane was indeed going to Bolivia, after a quick stop in Panama. Near the time of departure, there were still no attendants at the desk, and it was finally announced by an airport official (a woman that was actually just there helping another passenger, but had happened to get information) that the flight had been delayed over six hours due to "technical problems". People began to stir in a quiet anger and frustration. Apparently this was an all too common occurrence for the Bolivian national airline, Lloyd Aereo Boliviano (LAB)³. One woman approached the desk and, in a voice loud enough for everyone to hear, began voicing her complaints and asking questions.

³ As of this writing, LAB has been forced to stop selling tickets and stop service due to its vast debt and inability to provide services to its customers.

People crowded around the desk. It seemed that each family and group had at least one or two people at the desk gathering information. People began asking questions, all of them in Spanish. Many stood around to listen and comment. A few confronted the airport official with questions. The woman had few answers to give and after a call, another person appeared to help her. Why was the flight delayed? Why did this always happen? What was going to be done to accommodate them? How were they supposed to eat? (We were told that we were restricted from leaving the area unless we wanted to forfeit our tickets.) Particular attention was brought to the fact that there were children and elderly people waiting and that food or hotel rooms should be provided at least for them. One woman announced that she was going to call the police so people could demand their money back. Another person followed suit and also called the police. At this point a few people were on cell phones calling airlines, friends, and police. Within a few minutes two airport security men appeared and worked their way through the crowd to the counter where they began speaking in hushed tones with the airport personnel. Immediately people began asking them questions and voicing their complaints. The airport personnel and security stated lazily and somewhat angrily that there was nothing they could do, but they would speak on behalf of the people waiting, to try and at least get some food served. By this point, most of the passengers seemed to have accepted that there was little that could be done and they sat down to discuss the conditions of LAB with their groups and wait. Eventually it was announced that LAB had been contacted and food would be served. I also left the group and sat down, wondering how this may be indicative of what I already knew to be business as usual in Bolivian politics.

Loud, visible protests from the people met with apathetic, even angry responses by those in power. Demanded changes only occurred after numerous protests and

appeals. Forced negotiation is a common political process engaged in Bolivian politics. Protests or other forms of mobilization will occur in an attempt to engage the government in dialogue. The government then typically ignores or downplays these tactics as annoyances, often using violence. In response, protests and mobilizations intensify and begin to spread to other areas and groups. At this point in the cycle, the government agrees to negotiate and meet the demands of the protestors, with no intention of following through. As it becomes evident that promises are not being kept, mobilizations begin again, creating another cycle of protests and violence (Assies 2003:15).

Method

I spent a total of two months in Bolivia, most of which was spent in the department of Cochabamba. All my time here was spent in the provinces of Cercado (the location of the department's capital city Cochabamba) and Quillacollo. A week was spent in the department of Santa Cruz, where I conducted interviews both inside and outside the major urban area of the city of Santa Cruz.



Figure 2 Map of the provinces of the Department of Cochabamba. Adapted from Gordillo (2000:15).

Not long before I arrived in Bolivia, president Evo Morales made a statement that CIA agents were entering the country masquerading as college students and that people should be on the lookout for them. This particular point worried me since I really was a college student, but I was certainly not a spy for the American government. Having family in Bolivia really helped me overcome any suspicions that might have otherwise been cast on me. For most of my interviews I had my aunt, another family member, or a close family friend with me. In the city of Santa Cruz I attempted to conduct a few interviews in a Plaza on my own and discovered that without someone by my side to corroborate my story, people were much more likely to turn down my requests for

interviews. With someone by my side, however, people opened up and agreed to interviews with little need for drawn out explanations.

I used a written statement of consent, which at first worried me, since I did not want to alienate anyone who could not read. This did not end up being an issue and instead the statement proved to be very useful as most people read it over very carefully and then asked more questions concerning what the interview would be about. Some people wanted to see a list of questions before they continued, which was a request I was happy to oblige.

I went to Bolivia with an interview schedule of about eleven questions. One of the first things I did was go over the list with my aunt who was my primary informant and the person who introduced me to the majority of my interviewees. Her first response was that the part where I offered money in return for an interview had to go. Her argument was that it would look corrupt to go around offering people money for information, and worse, some people might be offended by the offer, since information should be free. I wondered if this would affect my ability to get interviews. I also worried about my role as a researcher, knowing that I would eventually benefit from the interviews. During my stay, though, I discovered that it was common for schools and universities to send their students out to interview people and gather opinions for class projects. It was not uncommon for someone sitting in a park to be approached by a young student⁴. After the first few interviews, I decided to make some changes to the questions, to eliminate some of the confusion people were having with my questions. Included in the appendix is a copy of the final set of questions used for most interviews in Spanish and in translation.

⁴ Formal and informal interviewees alike often expressed that they were pleased to see someone continuing her education and that they wished that they had been able to do the same. Many, especially women, stated that they were working hard to make sure that their children would be able to get degrees and as such were happy to help another young person with their educational efforts.

Before I even spoke I believe that I was easily discernable as a foreigner by my dress and physical appearance. I introduced myself as a student from the United States working on my master's thesis. My Spanish language skills are not perfect, particularly my grammar; so when I began asking follow up questions that were not on the interview schedule, it became more obvious that I was not a native speaker.

I conducted twenty formal interviews where individuals were selected mostly by my primary informant. Her method was to approach anyone who did not seem to be busy on the street or in the park. She also used her personal connections to get interviews with the director of the civic committee and an ex military business owner. A lot of my information came from informal interviews, as people seemed to be willing to give more honest reflections of their positions after the tape recorder was turned off. One man in particular kept his on tape interview answers very short, leaving me somewhat disappointed. Then when the recorder was turned off, he began a long winded tirade about the situation in Bolivia and its causes. I tried my best to remember these conversations and record them in my notes as soon as possible. Sometimes it would be a few hours before this could happen though, making these conversations more difficult to record.

Interviews

Leslie Sponsel argues that peace is a universal concept. One of the questions I asked my interviewees was what is peace? What does it entail and how do we achieve it? The direct translation into Spanish of the word peace is *paz*. The *Santillana* dictionary defines *paz* as “situación en la que no hay guerra, conflictos ni enfrentamientos” [a situation in which there are no wars, conflicts, or clashes] (1995:462). I thought that this was appropriate and began using the term in my interviews. One of the first things I began to notice as I started asking about peace was that most people took it as a religious question⁵. While some people equated the term with a state of social or political tranquility, peace was often defined as a religious concept that could only be attained at death, if at all. I began clarifying peace as social peace or political peace. While reviewing the interviews I realized that a more appropriate term would have been tranquility (*tranquilidad*) which was often used in place of the terms social peace or political peace.

Peace/tranquility was most often described in terms of what it was not and in terms of standards necessary to have it. According to all the interviewees peace is the lack of war, fighting, protests, and clashes of interest. Some went further to identify it also as a mutual respect resulting from open communication and education. So how can it be attained?

In nearly every interview I conducted and in many conversations I had, dialogue (*dialogo*) was identified as the key to achieving peaceful relations and resolving conflict.

⁵ Sometimes I was told that I looked like a German missionary, and was asked a few times if I was a missionary. This may also have influenced how some people perceived the question. It is not likely that this played a large role however since regardless religion is an important aspect in the life of many Bolivians.

In the case of one woman from the middle class business sector in Cochabamba, this meant talking *to* the people of the lower class and explaining to them “reality of the way things are”. For her, the middle class needed to be the mediator between what she saw as the two clashing parties, the lower and upper classes. She was a member of the comité civico and the only person I interviewed who expressed this view to me during formal interviews. It was a view that I heard expressed by other middle class people outside of interviews, though. When interviewing a working class woman, dialogue was also identified as key to achieving peace, but in addition to this she emphasized the need to learn to understand and respect individual differences. This requirement for peace was identified by nearly every interviewee. One older middle class man identified these (understanding, respect, dialogue) along with home, food, and clothing as the six most basic things for any person to live peacefully. With those six things, he said violence would not be necessary since violence resulted from a lack of one or all of them. Sources of conflict were identified as lack of respect, lack of education, lack of exposure to unfamiliar ideas, lack of basic necessities, politics, religion, jealousy, resentment, home life, and the rural lower classes⁶. In most cases, self-education was identified as the solution to these sources.

Understanding the concept of dialogue as the perceived most important aspect of conflict resolution, made me wonder: what form would this dialogue be expected to take, who would/should be involved, and how should it be initiated? These would all be questions for further research. It would be particularly interesting to see if these expectations differed according to socio-economic status and ethnic identification. With respect to dialogue, traditional systems of conflict resolution in the highlands take place

⁶ The rural lower classes were only identified in formal interview once, but mentioned as a source of conflict outside of interviews.

within the structure of the ayllu⁷ where dialogue is an important aspect of conflict resolution. The position of *jilakata*, the highest position in the ayllu, takes the role of mediator and judge in some conflict situations. He may draw upon past decisions for guidance but he is not restricted to these, and is likely to use dialogue to come to a solution that is specific to the context.

Sources of power were identified as government (political parties, politicians etc.), capital (money, economics), and religion. Money was consistently identified as important in determining who held power and how it is used. This is not unexpected in a country where the richest 20 percent of the population hold 63 percent of the national income and the poorest 20 percent hold a meager 1.5 percent of the income⁸ (UNDP 2006:337). The current president, unlike any other president in Bolivia's history, is originally from this poorest 20 percent. As part of his campaign, he has promised to keep the needs of the majority poor and indigenous at the forefront on the new government. This has led some members of the middle and upper class to express worry that now their needs and concerns will no longer be met. One such fear has been expressed towards the president's plan to redistribute land from some of the larger corporate land owners. Rumors soon circulated that anyone that owned more than one piece of land would be subject to loss of land. These rumors were expressed in my informal interviews and conversations. The president has denied that any such land seizure will take place, emphasizing that the only ones who would be affected by such a change would be companies that own large amounts of unused land. So far the government has not lived

⁷ See the *Ethnicity and Power in Bolivia* section for a description of ayllu.

⁸ For comparison, the United State's richest 20 percent holds 45.8 percent of the wealth while the poorest 20 percent holds 5.4 percent of the wealth (UNDP 2006:335).

up to this promise, and instead has used violent force to remove people who have moved onto some of these lands without government sanction.

More than anything, the interviews and conversations I had served to highlight the collective desire for peace and unification. Underlying this though was fear that things would return to violence and that the promises of the new government (for unification, justice, removal of corruption, etc.) would not be kept. For the most part, peace was seen as unattainable. Although dialogue was identified consistently as the surest path to peace, there was no clear statement of how to achieve this dialogue on the national scale.

Informants over the age of thirty identified politicians and politics in general as one of the more difficult obstacles to peace. Younger respondents tended to say that politics needed to change, and that new (non-political) people needed to get involved. The lack of faith people had in politics and politicians was clear in nearly every interview.

BOLIVIA: HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Ethnicity in Bolivia

Bolivia's history is filled with stories of rebellion. Since the early 1900s some of these rebellions have been labeled "Indian rebellions" by the privileged classes. But what exactly is meant by the term "Indian" in Bolivia? What about other ethnic groups? Ethnicity as it is perceived in Latin American often fits into a constructivist model that states that ethnic and racial identities are fluid and socially constructed. An individual can have multiple identities, changing over time (Madrid 2005:2). According to the CIA *World Factbook* the population of Bolivia is 55% *indigenous*, 30% *mestizo* (mixed indigenous and white), and 15% *white* (European descent), making it the country with the largest proportion of indigenous population in South America⁹. According to Conde Mamani, ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America, a commission of the United Nations) described Bolivia as having 74 to 76 percent of the population first nations/indigenous groups (Conde Mamani 2005). In either case, within a constructivist model these numbers are entirely subjective since in practice these groupings are more descriptive of one's sociocultural standing than one's ethnic background. It is also unclear as to whether these numbers are based on language or self-reporting. There is the added fact that the reporting of these statistics may be in part affected by political ideologies as we will see later. It is important to note that while sociocultural and political factors may be determining the way others define and group individuals,

⁹ The Afro-latino population in Bolivia appears to not be as large as in other Latin American countries with access to the ocean. When inquiring about the ethnic makeup of Bolivia, one of my informants told me that Afro-latino Bolivians were concentrated primarily in an area of the La Paz province. I have not found any official statistics to support or refute this claim.

personal statements of identity reflect a connection to beliefs/ideologies, practices, and histories of particular groups.




Figure 3 Bolivia's ethnic distribution according the CIA World Factbook¹⁰

People who may fit into the group labeled *indigenous* are called by many names in Bolivia. In a scholarly setting, they may be referred to by the generic term *indigena* (indigenous) or in an urban, or upper to middle class non-formal setting, they may be referred to by the more derogatory terms *indios* or *cholos*. Typically these terms apply only to those with lower socio-economic standing and rural populations. For example, those in the lower classes are sometimes referred to collectively as *cholos*. Although the term is not restricted by racial or ethnic heritage it describes any person of indigenous heritage who migrates to an urban setting, abandons their native tongue for Spanish, and adopts westernized urban customs. Sometimes this term is also used derogatively by those with higher socio-economic status to describe anyone perceived as lower-class, uneducated, and poor, regardless of ethnic heritage. Among those that may be identified as *cholos* however, there exists the term *cholita*, which is not considered derogatory and

¹⁰ Missing from this is any reference to the indigenous people of the lowlands (Tupi-Guarani, Pano, Uru-Chipaya, Chiquitano etc.) as well as other indigenous groups who are, especially recently, a significant part of the Bolivian political discourse.

is used to describe women who dress in the traditional layered skirt (*pollera*) and lace shirt¹¹.



Figure 4 Bolivian women of Cochabamba in traditional dress (i.e cholitas).

Colonialism has left a legacy that traditionally devalues indigenous identities and values European and mestizo identities. After the Bolivian National Revolution of 1952, there was a shift from the use of the term *indio* (Indian) to the term *campesino* (farmer/peasant). This shift was due to a conscious effort on the part of the Bolivian government (in control of the MNR party¹²) to classify indigenous people by socioeconomic status rather than ethnicity. The 1970s saw a rise in indigenous movements that included a revalorization of indigenous identities (i.e. the Indianista and Katarista movements¹³). Still, these movements were not entirely inclusive as they often

¹¹ The lace blouse and *pollera* were first adopted as an imitation of European dress during the colonial era.

¹² There is further discussion of this at the end of this section.

¹³ See the *History* section for more information on these movements.

alienated the indigenous identities of the lowlands¹⁴ (Grey-Postero 2007). Today those with indigenous heritage are often labeled by researchers and others as *campesinos* (peasants), *indigenas* (indigenous), *pueblos originarios* (original peoples) or by one of the various indigenous identities such as *Quechua* or *Aymara*¹⁵. Recent political movements in Latin America have stressed the importance of indigenous identities and the need for their participation in government.

“These movements have put pressure on Latin American governments to recognize indigenous traditions, grant autonomy to indigenous areas, and create state institutions and programs to cater to the needs of the indigenous population.” (Madrid 2005:5)

Despite this increase in indigenous activism and “revalorization” of indigenous identities, many Bolivians do not self-identify as indigenous. This is particularly interesting since such a large percentage of the population has indigenous heritage and speaks indigenous languages. When asked, many Bolivians will self-identify as *mestizo*, a term that usually refers to those of mixed indigenous and European heritage. The reasons for this will be explored a little further on in the discussion of the term *mestizo*.

The terms *blanco* and *q'ara* (white), in Spanish and Quechua respectively, refers to those with European/Caucasian ethnic backgrounds. *Criollo* is another term traditionally used to describe those with European heritage in Latin America. Usually the term refers to people with European ancestry born in Latin America. Given the large mestizo population, and common self-identification as mestizo, the term *criollo-mestizo* as used by Conde Mamani (2005), will be used to describe the privileged middle to upper class urban population.

¹⁴ Historically there are large cultural, political, and power differences between the indigenous groups of the highlands in the west, the *altiplano* and *los valles*, and those of the lowlands in the east, the *oriental*.

¹⁵ These last two are the most prominent groups in the highlands of Bolivia where my research was conducted, and represent language and cultural groups.

The term *mestizo* is used to describe a variety of cultural and ethnic identities. The standard definition of the term is a mix of European and Amerindian heritages. In practice it is used to describe any number of ethnic mixes and identities. In Bolivia during the past century it has been used for political ends, furthering its complexity. This term encompasses the way the majority of the Bolivian population self-identifies. After the revolution of 1952, the prevailing leftist political group, Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR- National Revolutionary Movement)¹⁶, used the term as part of their party ideology to place blame for the lack of advancement of the country on the *indio* which was described as the backward uneducated indian. *Mestizo* identity was offered as a medium between the *indio* and the *criollo* identities which at this point were both blamed for the problems of the state. When the MNR came to power in 1950s their ideology became the ideology of the state and the use of the term *mestizo* as the ideal became widespread. At the same time, the term *campesino* (peasant) began to be used as a way of assimilating the indian into the nation state as part of a sociopolitical class system with *criollo-mestizos* at the top. The *criollo-mestizo* and *mestizo* identities were offered as the “substance of the nation”, the point from which the people could become more modern and advanced by identifying with their European heritage (Ströbele-Gregor 1994:107-8). *Indios* were to be “modernized” and assimilated into the ideologies of the dominant *criollo* groups by disvaluing their indigenous nation identities, and lumped into one group, *campesino*.

“...with their project of a ‘national’ culture—such as the model of *mestizaje*—the *criollo* power elites have

¹⁶ The MNR was created by urban intellectuals, students and middle class professionals in 1941 and did not at first seek broad support. The MNR was behind a 1949 uprising against the government, which they eventually lost. Despite this, the uprising led to a popular base of support which eventually led to the MNR winning elections in 1951 only to be ousted by a military coup shortly afterwards. (Grindle 2003:4). Later it was the party of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada “Goni”, president of Bolivia during the Water Wars.

attempted to establish their claim to dominance and hegemony by defining the ‘Indian’ cultures within the nation-state as backward, ‘uncivilized,’ and an obstacle to modernization.” [Ströbele-Gregor 1996:81]

This was the party ideology spread to rural areas during the 1950s through schools that taught only in Spanish and rejected native histories and identities. Name changes were encouraged. Traditional Aymara names such as Qhispi were changed to more European sounding names such as Quisbet, and other people were given European first names (Conde Mamani 2005).

Criollo-mestizos, as the ruling elite, have emphasized their supposed cultural superiority, marked by their European heritage and a discourse of modernity (aka. Western culture). Criollo elite have held power over the indigenous majority by subjugating rural indigenous populations through institutional and social discrimination that prevents upward mobility while at the same time downplaying the inequalities that exist (Ströbele-Gregor 1996:81). The MNR’s use of the *mestizo* identity as a unifying term described earlier is an example of this last phenomenon. By adopting one group name under which to categorize everyone, the MNR could gain support from more groups by identifying with all of them. This also allowed the MNR to deny accusations of racist policy since they could claim to identify with any group. Part of the reason that the term *mestizo* was so widely adopted and continues to be used to this day, is that identification with the term promises an upward social mobility and integration into a higher social class for many. Those from lower socioeconomic status who use this term today may use the term as a strategy for distancing themselves from the terms that would identify them with their indigenous heritage, which continues to be viewed negatively despite rising indigenous movements. For those who already hold a higher

socioeconomic status, using the term allows them to ignore the racism and discrimination against a large part of the society by identifying under a common name.

Ethnicity and Power in Bolivia

Power in Bolivia has been racially defined since the inception of colonialism in the sixteenth century¹⁷. Colonial conquest was a violent process against what are perceived as having been relatively peaceful towns. One author describes how colonialism is direct and structural violence against not only the indigenous people of Latin America but against all of humanity.

“For the Andean towns colonialism is based on racism, segregation, insulted humanity, exploitation, the pillaging and depredation of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources, and the contamination of the environment, all of which goes against the [indigenous nations] and against all of humanity and the planet” (Conde Mamani 2005).

Traditional social structures such as the *ayllu*, a sociopolitical kin group/community, continued to be in widespread use in the rural areas until well after the independence of Bolivia from colonial rule, some still surviving in their traditional state until the end of the nineteenth century (Conde Mamani 2005). These structures were threatened when the *criollo-mestizos* began usurping the lands owned by the *ayllu* and refusing to accept the validity of communal land claims. Today some are calling for the renewal of these structures, many of which continue in varied forms.

The *ayllu* is a concept that has been described in various ways throughout scholarly writings. Some describe it as a complex sociopolitical organization (Grey-

¹⁷ Conde Mamani (2005) and Urquidi (1966) write that this colonialism with all its violence continues to exist for indigenous peoples who live with widespread discrimination and are often denied political voice by the governments of the countries in which they live.

Postero 2007:159; Janusek 2004:28), a kinship group (Klein 2003:14; Yashar 2005:64, Stern 1987:39), the foundation of Andean social models (Conde Mamani 2005), or a “system of social organization” (Goldstein 2004:164). Its complexity has made it difficult to define because the ayllu is metaphorical, symbolic, practical, religious and corporate.

“Ayllu solidarity is a combination of kinship and territorial ties, as well as symbolism... [it] is a corporate whole, which includes social principles, verticality, and metaphor... [it] also refers to people who live in the same territory (*llahta*) and who feed the earth shrines of that territory” [Bastien 1978 xxiii-xxiv]

Governance of the ayllu is rotating; every head of household¹⁸ in the community is expected to participate at all levels (Ströbele-Gregor 1996:78). This form of rotating leadership, whereby everyone in the community is expected to participate has been likened to (but certainly not the same as) Western systems of democracy (Rivera 1990; Ströbele-Gregor 1996; Carter and Albó 1988). Similarities noted by Ströbele-Gregor include “the assembly as the highest decisionmaking body, direct control over public officials, clearly defined terms of office and functions” (1996:78). Dissimilarities arise out of the religious and ritual functions of the officeholders and assembly. For example, the highest office of the ayllu, the *jilakata*, is held for one year, during which time the officeholder will perform judicial, legislative, religious, and ritual functions (Ströbele-Gregor 1996:79).

Ayllu relate to communal land on a practical as well as religious level. The food produced on the land is part of the subsistence and economy of the ayllu. The land also

¹⁸ Women are not excluded entirely from decision making; Grey-Postero describes ayllu as having a “couple based (man and woman) system of authority (2007:159). However Ströbele-Gregor states that decision making assemblies are only be attended by heads of families; it is not clear whether or not this is based entirely on gender (1996:78).

plays an important part of the religious worldview (Bastien 1978). Prior to the Agrarian Land Reform of 1953, the criollo-mestizo elite usurped the communal ayllu lands to create haciendas. These haciendas formed the basis for a sort of feudalism which existed until the Revolution of 1952¹⁹. Indigenous groups fought for the rights to their land in different ways. Some groups opted to fight through rebellions: North of Potosi in 1882, Zárata Willka in 1899, Jesús de Machaca in 1921 etc (Conde Mamani 2005). Many of these uprisings were violently repressed by the elite. Other ayllu chose to fight for their land through the legal system claiming their right through titles given to individuals by the Spanish crown. All of these groups formed a unifying and legitimizing authority for indigenous groups in the face of criollo-mestizo hostility (Conde Mamani 2005). Later, these indigenous groups would be involved in MNR created *campesino* unions such as COB (*Centro Obrero Boliviano* - Bolivian Workers Central) and provided support for the creation of groups such as CSUTCB (*Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* - United Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) both of which will be discussed in more detail below.

¹⁹ Officially, the feudal system was terminated after the revolution, however in some areas haciendas continued to operate with little change for many years.

History

Indigenous activism, both violent and nonviolent, is not unusual for Bolivia; from 1780 to 1782, during what is known as the Great Rebellion, Tupáj Amaru and Tupáj Katari led indigenous uprisings against Spanish rule (Klein 2003:75). These two figures are reflected very differently in history. Tupáj Amaru is described as dignified, honorable, educated, princely, and diplomatic; Tupáj Katari is described as fearsome, crude, violent, barbarous, bloodthirsty, and extremist (Thomson 2003:120-21). Amaru was a member of the Andean nobility with ancestral claims to the Inka lineage. He was connected with the upper classes in the Cuzco area (modern day Peru). Amaru supported interethnic alliances, while calling for the removal of foreign (Spanish) rulers (Thomson 2003:121). Katari had no such claims to nobility. Instead he came from a peasant community in the southern Andes and was associated with race war. Both rebellions were in fact violent in nature. What changed was the way that historians chose to reflect both leaders. Tupac Katari (previously Julian Apaza) took his name from one of his heroes Tomás Katari. Tomás Katari was a leader in his community until removed from his position by local Spanish leaders in 1777 (Klein 2003:74). Over a period of four years, he used legal means to try and regain his position. “From formal petitions to the local royal court to a trip to Buenos Aires to speak with the Viceroy, Katari successfully fought his case at every level of government and usually won” (Klein 2003:75). Corrupt officials prevented him from retaking his position and instead killed another leader who was a powerful ally of Katari. Eventually, Tomás Katari was assassinated by Spanish leaders, leading to further violent responses by indigenous groups such as sieges of main cities (Klein 2003:75). The rebellions found little support outside indigenous groups, were

violently repressed and the leaders were killed and imprisoned. Social and economic situations changed little as indigenous people continued to live under the feudal system of haciendas. These rebellions may not have succeeded in gaining an independence from Spanish rule, but their legacy can be seen in the rise of indigenous nationalism during the 1970s and 1990s.

Throughout the Bolivian colonial narrative, the ayllu was considered an obstacle to modernization. During the early part of the nineteenth century, however, free indigenous communities (*comunidades*) enjoyed some government protection and recognition due to the dependency the government had on a tribute tax that it was only able to successfully collect from the *comunidades*.

“While such a tax was an obvious burden on the Indian population, it nevertheless committed the Bolivian government to protecting the free communities from white and cholo threats. The Bolivian congresses gave ongoing legitimacy to the community governments and their [communal] land titles, in contrast to official Bolivarian legislation that had challenged their very right to existence.” [Klein 2003:105]

While this only lasted until about the 1860s it shows that the concept of communal land and the ayllu continued to exist throughout the nineteenth century and was even partly legitimized during that time by government actions. During this time the majority of the work force lived as part of the *comunidades* making up approximately 51 percent of the rural population (Klein 2003:121). Indigenous resistance to attacks on their communal land rights weakened by the 1880s and the *criollo* elite demanded that free peasants hold direct individual titles to their land. Those that could not afford to buy these titles (most) lost their lands to the growing number of haciendas (Conde Mamani 2005). Rebellions continued during the 1910s and 1920s with indigenous leaders fighting for recognition and sovereignty for indigenous lands and peoples. By the 1930s what social unity there had

been between indigenous free communities was greatly weakened (Klein 2003:147) but not forgotten. In the decade after the Chaco War (late 1930s early 1940s), there would be movements towards restoring the ayllu and creating citizen rights that would incorporate indigenous people (Larson 2003:193).

The next great shift in power relations came with the Guerra del Chaco (Chaco War) of 1932-35 between Bolivia and Paraguay changed the way everyone viewed the government and society. Indigenous people were placed at the frontlines, and the criollo elite governed the war efforts (poorly) from safe distances. The result was the death and desertion of nearly 65,000 on the Bolivian side, about 25 percent of the forces (Klein 2003:182). In total nearly 100,000 people died as a result of the war. The elite were disappointed and embarrassed with the way the war had been handled and with the subsequent loss. Due to this and the perceived need for change, new, radical ideas were adopted into a revolutionary political movement that would eventually lead to the 1952 Revolution.

“The [Chaco] war shattered the traditional belief systems and led to a fundamental rethinking of the nature of Bolivian society.... The war also would create the climate for the development of one of the most powerful, independent, and radical labor movements in the Americas.” [Klein 2003:177]

The indigenous “peasant soldiers” returned from the war “politically radicalized and critical of prevailing political and economic relations in the country” (Goldstein 2004:62). Indigenous and working class groups began demanding reparations, and women of all levels of society began taking a more active role in politics (Larson 2003:191). Many of Chaco’s ex-combatants began migrating into the urban areas, creating fear in the urban criollo elite. Some of their fears were due to the memories of the violence of the indigenous rebellions of the eighteenth century.

The Revolution of 1952 transformed Bolivia nearly overnight. After only three days of barricades and fighting by workers and indigenous groups the MNR took control of the government. Upon taking power, the MNR instituted universal suffrage, nationalized industries, redistributed hacienda lands to the people through land reforms, and created free and universal education (Grindle 2003:3). Prior to the revolution, during the 1940s, all three of Bolivia's major political parties (POR²⁰, PIR²¹, and MNR) supported labor movements and nationalization, and attempted to incorporate indigenous populations into their political goals (Klein 2003:198); however their strategy was to do this through assimilation, making the only acceptable indigenous identity that of the *campesino* while demonizing traditional indigenous identities as the root of Bolivia's problems (Conde Mamani 2005). Indigenous organizations were renamed *sindicatos* (peasant unions) and incorporated into the government (Grey-Postero 2006:194). One such union promoted by the MNR was the COB (*Central Obrero Boliviana* – Bolivian Workers Central).

During the 1960s and 1970s indigenous activism was marked by the Indianista and Katarista movements as well as a surge in writing by Aymara intellectuals (Thomson 2003:120). The Indianista movement is less well known and was primarily concerned with the hostile effects of colonialism on indigenous identity (Thomson 2003:132). The Katarista movement supported the revalorization of traditional values and traditions, focused on racial, cultural and class oppression. They spoke in defense of heterogeneous cultural identity, accused the elite of oppressing indigenous populations, and provided reinterpretations of Bolivian history from indigenous perspectives (Ströbele-Gregor 1996:84). Kataristas became involved in trade unions and caused many to question

²⁰ *Partido Obrero Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Workers' Party)

²¹ *Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario* (Party of the Revolutionary Left)

popular political ideology and resulted in a new wave of autonomous organizations that survived despite efforts on the part of future dictatorships to control political organizations (Ströbele-Gregor 1994:108). One such organization to arise was the CSUTCB (Unitary Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers) which during the 1980s attempted to provide support for indigenous farmers and workers, but failed partly by focusing too much on commercial aid and not enough on maintaining cultural identity or on reclaiming native lands which were the primary concerns of many indigenous groups at the time (Hahn 1996).

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a rise in political unrest. During the 1960s different groups vied for power with the military eventually gaining control under General Barrientos in 1964. The Barrientos regime gained popularity with the rural populations by furthering land reforms, welfare programs, and rural education. At the same time it moved against union and labor movements resulting in numerous strikes and uprisings among workers. In June of 1967 striking tin miners were massacred by the government (Klein 2003:224). Further violence was carried out against labor parties but the union movement was not stopped, instead it went underground and continued to support resistance. By 1970 Bolivia had already seen two military coups since 1965 and in 1971 Colonel Hugo Banzer Suarez staged one of the bloodiest coups in Bolivia's history (Klein 2003:229). The response of the government to the increasing political turbulence in 1974 was to shut down all political parties and unions. Arrests, exiles, and disappearances became the common tools of the military dictatorship. Tin miners were particularly targeted and in October 1977 two in particular were arrested, beaten, tortured, and prevented from working or returning to their homes (Boots 1978:53). This along with the over 300 leaders in exile motivated one of the more impressive

demonstrations of nonviolent tactics in Bolivia. In December 1977 to January 1978, a group of tin miners wives²² held a successful 23 day hunger strike to secure a general amnesty for exiles, refugees and the release of political prisoners, in all numbering an estimated 19,000 (Boots 1978:59). Over the course of the fast, 1,380 people from all social classes joined in fasting. Sympathy strikes and demonstrations took place all over the country and as far away as Mexico (Boots 1978:55). The Banzer regime was forced to grant amnesty and return the miners their jobs.

The 1980s and 1990s indigenous movements gained momentum on national and international levels. By this point many indigenous groups were represented through trade unions and other political groups. In 1990 the group CIDOB (*Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente de Bolivia* – Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia) organized a popular march of 700 kilometers and 35 days from the Department of Santa Cruz to the capital city of La Paz (Ströbele-Gregor 1994:106). The march was called the *Marcha por Territorio y Dignidad* (March for Territory and Dignity) and brought attention to the demand for territorial rights (Grey-Postero 2006:195). Recently there has been a new surge of indigenous activism which has resulted in the election of the first indigenous president of Bolivia, Evo Morales.

During the Water Wars of 1999-2000, described in the following section, several political groups and unions joined forces with urban groups to form la Coordinadora. Groups such as FEDECOR, FDTFC, and CSUTCB provided both intellectual and physical support. Their struggle gained support of people from all social classes in Cochabamba, across the nation, and across the globe. The unity that was achieved

²² One of these women was the famous Domitila Barrios de Chungara, who detailed her life in her book *Si me Permiten Hablar...: testimonio de Domitila, una mujer de las minas de Bolivia* (Let Me Speak!: Testimony of Domitila, a woman of the Bolivian mines) transcribed and edited by Moema Viezzer (1978).

between rural and urban groups through the events of the Water Wars was unique in Bolivian history. As the history above has shown us, political groups in Bolivia until this point worked almost exclusively for their own gain, even when incorporating other groups. Water is as symbolic as it is necessary. The Water Wars appealed to all classes and due to the nature of the actions taken by resistance groups, nearly everyone who wanted to, could participate.

Also during this time we see the rise of the use of the Wiphala in popular public settings. The Wiphala is the Incan rainbow flag. There are various checkered versions of the flag symbolizing unique areas of the Incan empire.



Figure 5 On the left the Wiphala representing the Qulla-suyu area, of which Cochabamba is a part. On the right, the same Wiphala painted on a dancer's shoe.

These flags have been used by indigenous people across the Andes to symbolize unity. The differences in the flags, expressed by differences in the color of the center diagonal, allow this unity to be expressed while at the same time recognizing the uniqueness of each area. Today, these flags appear in public marches, parades, demonstrations, on walls, and on ceremonial/celebrational clothing.

“GUERRAS DEL AGUA” (WATER WARS) IN COCHABAMBA, BOLIVIA



Figure 6 The area of the Department of Cochabamba where the Water Wars took place. Adapted from Gordillo (2000).

Precursors of the conflict

Bolivia has historically held more foreign debt than it can repay, much of it incurred during government regimes that were not popularly elected. During the 80s and 90s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as they did with other Third World countries in debt, used their economic influence through loan conditions to pressure Bolivia into privatizing their industries (Shultz 2001; Finnegan 2002; Olivera and Lewis 2004). This included privatization of water and transportation. By 1999, as in other places, neo-liberal economics²³ and its support of privatization was not working well for Bolivia. As people grew poorer they saw their country's infrastructure sold piece by piece to foreign companies who seemed to care more about creating a profit than

²³ “The neoliberal economic model... seeks to incorporate the country into the global economy, open its doors to free trade, and offer conditions that will attract transnational enterprises” (de la Fuente 2003:98).

providing useful services to the people. One result has been the complete dismantling of the Bolivian railroad, which has seriously affected trade and transport.

“One by one the Bolivian government sold or leased off the national airline, the railroad, and the electric company, often with disastrous results. The Chilean purchaser of the railroad dismantled it for parts and shut it down” [Shultz 2003]

Foreign exploitation is not uncommon for Bolivia; from the conquistadors to the transnational corporations of the modern globalization era, this resource rich country has been drained by foreign interests and the lack of reciprocity has not gone unnoticed. During the Water Wars of 1999-2000 the people of Cochabamba rose up against a government and a corporation that were seen by many as an example of the greed and plundering conducted by so many other people and corporations in Bolivia's history. The government's refusal to incorporate local interest groups in planning and negotiations helped unite groups throughout Cochabamba and Bolivia.

Cochabamba is a major city located in the middle of Bolivia in the department of Cochabamba. The city itself lies nestled in a valley between the Andes mountains. It is the third largest city in Bolivia, with a population of about 500,000 inhabitants (INE 2001). Historically the area around it has been an important marketing and food production center (Klein 2003). Water shortages have been a problem in the city of Cochabamba since the 1960s. The only solutions offered and carried out were to drill wells outside the city. This posed problems for the rural areas surrounding the city because to provide water to the city would require that the rural areas run short of water themselves. This was a problem not just for the people living in those areas, but it also posed a problem for the country as a whole, since this was the area that produced the majority of the country's food (Assies 2003). FEDECOR (*Federación Departamental*

Cochabambina de Organizaciones de Regantes – Cochabamba Department Federation of Irrigators’ Organization) was one of the first groups to speak out against the drilling of wells in the area and represented the interests of the rural population. As things began heating up in 1999, they were joined by FDTFC (*Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Fabriles de Cochabamba* – Departmental Federation of Factory Workers of Cochabamba) which at that point was a powerful promoter of unions and labor. These groups would later join together under the umbrella organization, *La Coordinadora*.

Up until 1999 Cochabamba’s water was managed by the municipal water company, Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (SEMAPA) (Bechtel 2002). In September of 1999, the Bolivian government sold control of Cochabamba’s water systems to the only bidder, “Aguas del Tunari” which was a major subsidiary of Bechtel, a large U.S. corporation (Shultz 2003). The terms of the contract were extreme. It promised Aguas del Tunari a sixteen percent annual average profit for 40 years and required them to build a dam (the project name of which was Misicuni) within the first two years of the contract (Bechtel 2002). Negotiations surrounding the details of the contract were attended by representatives of Aguas del Tunari, the Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Investment, the Superintendency of Water, the Superintendency of Electricity, and the Prefect of the Province, as well as “the mayor of the municipality, the president of SEMAPA, and the president of Empresas Misicuni” (Olivera and Lewis 2004).

About the same time, October 1999, the Bolivian government passed Law 2029. This law gave the local water company (bought by Aguas del Tunari) control over private wells, collected rainwater, and other local water systems to the future contracted company (Olivera and Lewis 2004:9). Many of these local water systems had been built

and maintained by local people with local funds and had at no time required maintenance or service from the water company. According to the law, the company could still expect to collect money for their use. Law 2029 gave control of *all* water within the privatization contract's territory to the contracted company.

“The law prohibited peasants from constructing collection tanks to gather water from the rain. The rain, too, had been privatized. Law 2029 required people to ask for permission from the superintendent of water to collect rainwater.”
[Olivera and Lewis 2004:9]

In addition to the ridiculous water controls, Law 2029 made water payments “dollarized”, meaning that no matter what the inflation, the dollar amount paid to the companies would stay the same. This would be beneficial for the company but detrimental to the Bolivian people who earned in *bolivianos*, not in dollars. With the sixteen percent annual profit promised to Aguas del Tunari, prices were almost guaranteed to soar for Cochabambinos regardless of inflation. Through Law 2029 the government essentially gave the contracted company a very lucrative monopoly on all water in the area.



Figure 7 In private homes, rain and tap water are collected in containers such as the ones above.

Sources indicate that within weeks of the takeover water bills soared up to two-hundred percent or more in some cases, although Bechtel officially states that bills only increased thirty-five percent (Bechtel 2002).

“Within weeks, the company doubled and tripled water rates for the poor. Mothers living on minimum wage of \$60 per month were ordered to pay \$15 or more just to keep water running out of the tap. Faced, quite literally, with a choice between water or food, people took to the streets to demand that rates be lowered.” [Shultz 2001]

The issue of water was sensitive. Symbolically, water represented life. Many protestors argued that water could not be owned and that water was a public good (de la Fuente 2003:98). As prices soared, the people of Cochabamba had had enough. They fought to eventually cancel the contract between Aguas del Tunari and the Bolivian government through a series of protests and negotiations. While the intent of the majority of the protestors and their representatives was to conduct peaceful protests, the government responded with tear gas, soldiers, and both rubber and metal bullets. The government claims that violence was started by protestors and of course the protestors claim that the government started the violence. With the number of separate groups that had a stake in the conflict, it is possible that one of them felt the need to use violence despite calls for the opposite from the protest leadership. The violence eventually resulted in the death of one person and injuries to at least 100 more (de la Fuente 2003:99).

Who was involved in the conflict?

- *Aguas del Tunari – Bechtel (major shareholder)*

When the Bolivian government put control of Cochabamba’s water up for sale in 1999, only one bidder came to the table, Aguas del Tunari. It was a new company

composed of larger companies as shareholders. The U.S. corporation, Bechtel, was the largest shareholder. After just a few weeks in control, and the significant increase in water rates, Bechtel's role in the Water Wars was made public by international media and as a result both Bechtel and Cochabamba received a vast amount of international attention.

- *La Coordinadora*

“La Coordinadora” is short for “La Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida” (Coalition in Defense of Water and Life). It was formed in November 1999 during a meeting called by irrigation farmers to discuss the issues surrounding Law 2029 which severely restricted private water collection and use. Both during and after the Water Wars, the government attempted to discredit la Coordinadora in the public view (de la Fuente 2003:89). Through open communication with the public, la Coordinadora was able to maintain its credibility. Until the creation of la Coordinadora, there were various smaller groups each concerned with issues particular to their group, such as FEDECOR and FDTFC (Assies 2003:33-34). Although information was shared between groups, they did not work together on a grand scale until 1999. The FDTFC was one of the more powerful federation of unions in the Cochabamba area and was headed by Oscar Olivera a local shoe-factory worker. Later he became the head of la Coordinadora with Evo Morales and after the Water Wars, Olivera wrote a book in collaboration with Tom Lewis detailing the events of 1999-2000. Olivera and Morales were two of the more well known leaders of the Water Wars. Decisions for la Coordinadora were made by a group local leaders and community votes. During negotiations with the government, Olivera and Morales were chosen to represent the groups concerns.

Other locally powerful groups such as the Cocaleros joined the fight. Since the 1960s coca growers have gained political power through *sindicatos* in the Chapare region of the Department of Cochabamba (Healy 1991:87). Cocaleros held interest in the water debate since they were some of the farmers whose irrigation would be affected by drilling for water. Often labeled as drug traffickers by national and foreign governments, Cocaleros argue that coca is “synonymous with Andean culture”, a way of life and a plant full of nutrients and health benefits²⁴ for use in food and medicine (Healy 1991:93). The Cocaleros were headed by Evo Morales, later elected president of the republic.

Each group opposed the increased water prices, but until la Coordinadora there was little communication among the factions. The creation of this group brought a sense of unity to the opposition. As more people began protesting the privatization of water, La Coordinadora took the form of a representative of the various local groups.

“The Coordinadora initially represented mainly peasant farmers, irrigators, local water committees, and urban neighborhood water cooperatives.... [It] soon grew to include people who were connected to central public water mains, but who felt that the new rates were inflated, abusive, and unaffordable. The Coordinadora also involved unionized workers, primarily on an individual basis or those associated with the Fabriles [workers unions], who, because of their experience in labor struggles, contributed crucial tactics during the times of fiercest conflict” [Olivera and Lewis 2004:28]

Eventually the Coordinadora proved to be more than just a representative of water interests in Cochabamba; it also came to symbolize the people’s ability to unite through dialogue and mass action for the purpose of overthrowing oppression and resisting corruption.

²⁴ Its use as a medicinal herb is even sanctioned by the American Embassy in La Paz as a solution to the altitude sickness many experience at the high altitude airport.

The success of the Coordinadora and the people in eventually getting the Aguas del Tunari contract cancelled later inspired people to support the idea of an *Asemblea Constituyente* (Constituent Assembly) to help develop legislation. The *Asemblea Constituyente* was voted into existence in July 2006 and had its first session in August 2006. This is clearly a positive result of some of the consensus activities of la Coordinadora. Nonviolence theory states that conflict resolution should ultimately lead to a better understanding of how to work together to develop solutions (Sharp 2003).

“The Coordinadora is perceived as an instrument of popular self-unification...The participation it receives shows the confidence that citizens have in it as well as their understanding of it as a tool for action and collective protest. The Coordinadora has been converted into an example that promotes a different kind of social management from that of a traditional public enterprise.”
[Olivera and Lewis 2004:59]

The Coordinadora formed assemblies to hear and integrate the demands of the various groups they united. Representative members of workers groups, interest groups (environmentalists, intellectuals, members of water committees), and individuals outside of particular groups all attended the assemblies. The functions of the Coordinadora assemblies were to write communiqués and conduct strategic political analyses. Final decisions of the assemblies were made through huge town meetings of 50-70 thousand people (Olivera and Lewis 2004:38).

- *Bolivian Government*

The government of Bolivia has been notorious for its dictatorships, coups, and corrupt officials. By 1999 the Bolivian government had been democratically elected, but corruption was still rampant and power was still held by the criollo-mestizo elite. Much of Bolivia’s wealth from mining industries has either “disappeared” or been kept in the hands of the criollo elite who have historically held a large amount of power in Bolivian

politics. Government officials from various offices were present at the contract negotiations with Aguas del Tunari while other local interest groups were not included.

- *Civic Committee*

Civic Committees were created during the 1970s to act as an intermediary between the government and local groups, to speak on behalf of citizens. During that time they were one of the groups people used to oppose the military dictatorships. Formally they represent a wide variety of interests but in reality they primarily represent business interests of the criollo-mestizo middle class (Assies 2003:34). This group is specifically not supposed to be directly associated with the government. Their strength came from their disassociation with the government which gave them credibility. This credibility was lost during the Water Wars when it was slow to act in favor of the people, and when it was revealed that the Civic Committee of Cochabamba was present at the meetings detailing the privatization of the water company.

How did each individual or negotiation team/caucus define the conflict?

- *Aguas del Tunari – Bechtel*

From Bechtel's point of view, Aguas del Tunari took over the water system from an antiquated and inefficient municipal water control and promised to expand it and make it more efficient. They claimed that the municipal water company SEMAPA had not been doing its job (Bechtel 2002). For Aguas del Tunari the issue was that a contract had been signed and it needed to be upheld, regardless of the supposed (and from its point of view, greatly exaggerated) human costs. According to their contract and Law 2029, they owned all the water in the area, and people needed to pay their bills.

- *La Coordinadora - Coalition in Defense of Water and Life*

La Coordinadora saw the conflict as an opposition not only against the corporation Aguas del Tunari, but also as an opposition against the arrogance of foreign investors using Bolivia to make money at the expense of the Bolivian people. Water was not considered to be a marketable item; instead the members of La Coordinadora conceptualized it as a “natural gift” that should be distributed as a “public service” (Olivera and Lewis 2004:11). On the issue of the Aguas del Tunari contract specifically, Olivera had this to say:

“We [la Coordinadora] objected specifically to the concession of Cochabamba’s legal norms, and the contract guaranteed benefits only for the owners—not the Cochabambinos.... Aguas del Tunari expected the people to pay for the improvement and expansion of what had been their water system. But now the water and its improved distribution systems would be owned by private capitalists who had put up virtually nothing of their own.” [Olivera and Lewis 2004:11]

As the Coordinadora’s official name (Coalition in Defense of Water and Life) implies, this was not a war over just water, it was a fight for life, which in this struggle became synonymous with water. La Coordinadora’s success during the Water Wars lead to a new faith in the non-elite to govern themselves and a call to restructure a government that obviously did not put the needs of the majority first (de la Fuente 2003:99).

- *Bolivian Government – President – Ministers*

The Bolivian government was concerned with keeping foreign investors coming in, keeping money coming into the upper classes (who were the government) and supporting the World Bank’s demands for a neo-liberal economy. One of the concerns with canceling the Aguas del Tunari contract was that it might scare away potential foreign investors. This was of concern to the government for two reasons. One was pressures

from the World Bank and the IMF, which required Bolivia to privatize many of its industries. Without foreign investment, it was unlikely that this would happen within the necessary time span. Secondly, many members of the government were also involved in transnational and national business deals that would be helped by foreign investments.

Throughout the Water Wars, La Coordinadora maintained that peaceful demonstrations would be the focus of the group's efforts. The rationale behind this was that the people needed to maintain a nonviolent movement to prevent giving the government any reason to use force against them. With the national and international media watching, the government was much more likely to be careful about its actions. Oscar Olivera, spoke of the necessity of staying calm in the face of so much group excitement.

“I remember speaking to the people, gesturing to them to calm down by making downward motions with my extended hands.... They did not destroy the offices because social controls existed within the crowd to guard against the kind of destruction that would be detrimental to our cause.” [Olivera and Lewis 2004:39]

Proponents of conflict resolution often state that representatives from any group that is to be affected by the outcome of a negotiation should be present at negotiations to avoid breakdowns of negotiations and further conflict. The negotiations surrounding the contract with Aguas del Tunari had not included representatives from most of the people who would be affected by the contract. Instead, only particular interests within the ruling elite were represented. The resulting imbalances in power distribution and the blatant disregard for the interests of the majority were a dangerous mix leading to volatile emotions.

“Chiefly composed of the mayor and representatives of the local elite, [the Civic Committees'] members had played a role in facilitating the contract with Aguas del Tunari. Thus

despite their attempt to play an intermediary role in the face of popular discontent, we did not trust them. At the meeting which founded the Coordinadora, we refused to recognize the Civic Committee.” [Olivera & Lewis 2004:29]

Through the Coordinadora, the people rallied against the government, Aguas del Tunari, and the water contract. Meetings and public rallies were conducted by local leaders to determine the concerns of the people and to plan the direction of the movement. On December 1st 1999, la Coordinadora called for the “first mobilization of both urban and rural workers” (Olivera & Lewis 2004:30). Only a few were expected to appear at the protest, especially since there had been a historical tension between urban and rural workers, particularly when it came to the issue of water use in the area. To the surprise of organizers, thousands of people appeared at the protest representing neighborhood water committees, irrigators, and hundreds of people who usually did not involve themselves in labor movements. Organizers and protestors took advantage of the large turnout and came to a decision about how to confront the problem of high water rates and Law 2029.

“The protest evolved into an open town meeting at which we decided to give the government until January 11 to tear up the contract with Aguas del Tunari, to repeal the water law, and to reverse the rate hikes. We also pledged that, if the government did not respond, we would initiate an indefinite blockade of regional highways and roads.” [Olivera & Lewis 2004:30]

By January 11th, the government had still not responded to the demands of the protestors. As planned, la Coordinadora called for road blockades and a general strike. Not to be left out, the Civic Committee also called for a 24 hour citizen’s strike that day.

Transportation, factories, and shops all stopped working for the day. On January 12th 2000, the strike continued despite no longer having the support of the Civic Committee. In response to 60 workers who had been laid off the day before, 500 workers from the MANACO factory rode their bicycles downtown to keep the strike going by “snarling

traffic” and forcing shops to close (Olivera & Lewis 2004:31). Another impromptu town meeting was held where it was “decided that the government should send a commission to discuss the water issue” with la Coordinadora (2004:31).

On January 13th, the government agreed to send a commission to meet with the protestors and set a time to meet. Officials arrived hours later than planned, to which many people reacted with anger. To the people it was representative of the level of disrespect the government had for the concerns of the people. During negotiations tensions flared between the protestors and the police; the latter began tear gassing the crowds. Representatives Oscar Olivera and Evo Morales, now the president of Bolivia, left the negotiations saying that they “could not negotiate if the people were being repressed” (Olivera & Lewis 2004:31). There were some very real fears of serious violence surfacing at this point, as well. According to Olivera, the last time there had been major clashes between police and protestors was in 1982 when the government had massacred protesting factory workers in the main plaza. The possibility that the government would respond with violence again seemed imminent. Later that day, however, the government arranged to sign an agreement promising to revise the privatization contract and the water law. The sensitive issue of rate hikes was not revised, however, and when the agreement was presented to the people, they refused to pay their bills until the issue of the rate hikes was dealt with. Instead, they brought their bills to la Coordinadora, which collected them and symbolically burned them in the main plaza.

At this point negotiations between the two sides was at a stalemate. The government did not want to review the contract or the rate hikes. Instead it attempted to work through the Civic Committee so that it would not have to work with la Coordinadora (Assies 2003:26). The people believed that this was not nearly enough.

What came of it was “La Toma de Cochabamba”, the “Takeover of Cochabamba”, a peaceful retaking of the city, the water, and the rights of the people. On February 4th 2000, protestors headed towards the main plaza. The government had already prepared for the day by sending out special security forces and non-local police forces²⁵ (*dalmatas* from La Paz) to deal with the protestors. Again, thousands participated in the protests. As police began responding with tear gas, the urban population began providing support for the protestors in the streets. Baking soda, vinegar soaked rags, and papers to burn were supplied by homes and businesses all over the city to combat the tear gas. By the end of the day people were exhausted on both sides and organizers were unsure how much support they would have for the second day of protests. On February 5th, the people renewed their protests with vigor. Television crews and other media covered the events as they unfolded around the city. As people heard the news in their homes they responded with even more support for the protestors. On February 6th, the government signed an agreement freezing rate hikes, in addition to the already agreed upon issues of revision to the contract and the water law. The agreement also gave the government two months to enact the agreement before protests would resume again.

A month later, in March of 2000, the government still had not honored its agreements. The first popular referendum in the history of the nation, *Consulta Popular*, was called to poll the sentiments of the general population. The referendum asked: “(1) Do you accept the rate increase? (2) should the contract with Aguas del Tunari be annulled? (3) Do you agree with the privatization of water in Law 2029?” (Assies 2003:27). Nearly 50 thousand citizens cast their vote. Ninety-nine percent answered no to

²⁵ The use of non-local police is meant to keep personal concerns, such as friends and family in the crowd, from preventing officers from using “necessary force”. Cochabambinos resented the use of outside police and yelled at them, “Let our own police beat us. Not you!” (Olivera & Lewis 2004:35).

the first question, 96 percent voted for the annulment of the contract, and 97 percent answered no to the third question (2003:27). “This exercise of participatory democracy clearly stated that Aguas del Tunari had to go and that Law 2029, which enabled the privatization of our water, had to be changed” (Olivera & Lewis 2004:36). The government’s response was to reverse its decision to revise the water law or contract and instead they accused la Coordinadora of involving itself in the drug trade because of its association with the *cocaleros* (coca growers). This accusation, although obviously false to the many supporters of the movement, betrayed the government’s anxiety in the face of rising dissatisfaction.

By April 4th, there had still been no progress, and the government still refused to act. What followed were 8 days of blockades and mass protests. Unlike before, the government did *not* send out troops or police. On the final day over 100 thousand people appeared and succeeded in forcing Aguas del Tunari out and modifying the water law although this was not the plan the government had hoped for. Leaders of la Coordinadora had to force themselves into discussions that the government was holding concerning the blockades and protests.

“A delegation of ministers had come to Cochabamba to discuss the situation. As always, they ignored us—the Coordinadora—and chose only to meet with the Civic Committee. We determined to take over the prefecture, to surround both it and the police station because everybody except us—ministers, members of congress, mayors, business leaders, the Civic Committee, the unionized truck drivers—was already inside.” [Olivera & Lewis 2004:39]

When la Coordinadora leaders forced their way into the prefecture they were told that those inside would not negotiate with them. Discouraged, the leaders went back outside where protestors refused to let them leave until they had come to some agreement. La Coordinadora was stuck between the two sides. Three to four hours later the mayor of

Cochabamba negotiated approval for la Coordinadora to “attend a caucus of the Cochabambinos, consisting of the Civic Committee and others, so that those who lived in the city could arrive at a decision together (Olivera & Lewis 2004:40). However, at this caucus, the people were not adequately represented.

“But the Cochabambinos allowed into the meeting did not represent the desires of the ordinary people. They wanted an intermediary solution, they wanted to revise the contract with Aguas del Tunari, not to annul it, as we wanted.”
[Olivera & Lewis 2004:40]

Not long after being granted access to the caucus, the members of la Coordinadora were arrested on charges of sedition. With the help of the archbishop they were released on bond hours later, however it was already obvious that the government was willing to go to great lengths to silence la Coordinadora. The next day, the archbishop called for a meeting, and announced to the leaders of la Coordinadora that the government had agreed to break the contract with Aguas del Tunari (Olivera & Lewis 2004:41). It seemed as if finally the people would get what they had been fighting for.

A public meeting was held to announce the results of the meetings, at the end of which a Mass was celebrated. Halfway through the Mass, a priest approached Olivera and informed him that the government had lied about breaking the contract with Aguas del Tunari and was refusing to approve any of the agreements made at the meeting earlier. Immediately the police began searching for leaders of la Coordinadora in order to arrest them. Oscar Olivera, official representative of la Coordinadora, managed to escape the police. Tensions continued to rise.

On April 9th 2000, the government managed to contact leaders of la Coordinadora and arrange a secret meeting with two outside observers²⁶. At this point tensions were so high that Olivera stated, “These were the most anguished days of my life. I was not at all afraid of the government, of their bullets. I was afraid that the people would not agree with the decisions we might take. That was my fear” (Olivera & Lewis 2004:44). Olivera managed to meet with government officials and draft an agreement. This time the government made every effort to approve the agreement.

“We proceeded to negotiate the departure of Aguas del Tunari and the modification of the water law along the lines we proposed. A special convening of the congress with airplanes hired especially to ferry all the congresspeople to La Paz, was reluctantly called by the vice president for three days later, and the agreement was signed.” [Olivera & Lewis 2004:45].

The agreement stated that the municipal government would take charge of the water systems. The government did not want la Coordinadora in charge during negotiations, but when the agreement was presented to the people, they wanted la Coordinadora in charge.

“But we could not take it over—first for technical reasons, because the Coordinadora was not a legally established entity and the government could not just hand it over to us; and second, because it was not what we had fought for. Eventually we found a middle ground where a transitional board of directors was constituted, consisting of two members from the Coordinadora, two from the mayor’s office, and two from the unionized workers at the company. The mayor even went so far as to say that the city would not assume responsibility for the water company if the Coordinadora did not participate on the board.” [Olivera & Lewis 2004:45]

As viewed by Oscar Olivera, this was the end of the struggle. The agreement had been reached, and a plan had been set in place to make the necessary changes. Not everyone

²⁶ Although it was unclear exactly why the meeting was secret, it is implied that the government was trying to save face by not openly admitting to discussions.

was happy, however. Many people wanted to continue fighting, but Olivera and others feared a violent retaliation from the government if things were not resolved quickly.

Analysis

Nonviolent actions rarely take place in a setting where nonviolence is the only tactic used. Even the few times that nonviolence has been actively promoted and used on a large scale (Gandhi's struggle for Indian independence, Martin Luther King Jr.'s struggle for civil rights) violence was used by nonparticipating groups and individuals. These groups and individuals are then often held up as proof of the violent nature of the resistance. In addition to this, violence is often more likely to get coverage in both media and history, making it difficult to track just how much nonviolent actions have contributed. Bolivia's struggles have not been nonviolent movements, as we can see, even in the relatively nonviolent resistance organized by la Coordinadora, violence erupted resulting in death and injury. Despite this, the use of nonviolent tactics and organization was what resulted in the mass support for the cause in the face of violent repression by the government. The use of nonviolent action against the government has been met with widespread support in Bolivia before despite class differences²⁷. This time in 1999, the government was again faced with the use of nonviolent tactics, and once again they responded with violence which ironically²⁸ solidified public support in favor of the protestors.

Appendix I lists 198 methods of nonviolent action identified by Sharp. Many of these methods have been used in Bolivia in varying forms and at different times. During the Water Wars, at least fifteen of these methods were used by la Coordinadora and their

²⁷ See the *History* section for information on how a group of working class indigenous women used the fast as a nonviolent tactic against one of Bolivia's bloodiest regimes to gain amnesty for exiled and imprisoned workers.

²⁸ Although ironic, this is a common reaction to government use of violence against nonviolent groups and is one of the reasons nonviolent action, as opposed to violent action, is so effective in gaining large bases of support.

supporters. The government also used what would be considered nonviolent tactics against la Coordinadora although their use of nonviolence was mostly limited to stalling and obstruction. One example of this is when the government chose to arrive late for a highly publicized meeting with la Coordinadora.

La Coordinadora's list of nonviolent tactics includes: public speeches, declarations by organizations and institutions, group or mass petitions, slogans, caricatures, and symbols, banners, posters, and displayed communication, displays of flags and symbolic colors, prayer and worship, motorcades, assemblies of protest or support, protest meetings, and various forms of strike. The open/transparent nature of most of these actions (public speeches, group or mass petitions, strikes etc.) was more than the government had provided at any step of the process. When announcements were made, people judged its authenticity by the source. Claims against the protestors made by the government were not nearly as well accepted as those made by the protestors against the government, and why not? The only group that had not done anything to lose the trust of the public was la Coordinadora. It helped that la Coordinadora was supported by already trusted organizations such as FEDECOR and FDTFC. The open nature of the la Coordinadora's actions made them easy for national and international media to conduct interviews and get coverage of events.

It should be noted that although these actions are considered nonviolent by some nonviolence scholars (Sharp 1973, Ackerman and Duvall 2000), the people I interviewed in Bolivia did not see them as such. Strikes and mass protest meetings were identified by some as examples of violent political actions. When asked why these were violent, they responded that it was because strikes and protests usually resulted in violence, such as the violence that erupted between the police and the protestors in January 2000. I would

argue on the side of Sharp (1973; 1990) that this does not mean that nonviolent tactics were not being used. It does however indicate that nonviolence was not being used due to any general moral disagreement with violence, but rather than it was being used on practical grounds, because a violent response simply was not feasible. This does not mean, however, that the use of nonviolent tactics did not still have a positive impact.

The discussions and open meetings that were held by la Coordinadora led to open dialogue on the variety of issues facing Bolivia. People from different interest groups were meeting and discussing problems from their unique points of view *but most importantly* their concerns were being listened to. The result of the Water Wars made it clear that historically opposing groups could work together successfully toward common goals. This became part of the platform of Evo Morales and Álvaro García Linera when they successfully ran for the presidency and vice presidency respectively in 2005. So far the Morales government has instituted the Asamblea Constituyente, which actively seeks to incorporate all people previously disregarded by government. The government has also pushed for reforms to respect indigenous cultures and languages while at the same time providing more access to government officials.

Of course the government is still far from the ideal of unification and universal respect. The government still responds to some groups with violence and there are still accusations of corruption. The most important outcome of the use of nonviolent tactics in the Water Wars has not been the election of an indigenous president nor the Asamblea Constituyente. The most important outcome of the Water Wars has been an increased sense of community and the common knowledge that people can work together and succeed, even against a government that has historically ignored and abused the majority of people in Bolivia.

THEORY

Conflict and Nonviolence

Doctrines of nonviolence have traditionally been espoused by religious groups and individuals for both moral and political ends. As early as the seventeenth century the Religious Society of Friends, more commonly known as Quakers, led by George Fox, denounced violence in its Declaration to King Charles II. This denouncement of violence later became known as the Quaker Peace Testimony. “All bloody Principles & Practises we...do utterly deny, with all outward Wars, and Strife, and Fightings with outward Weapons, for any end, or under any pretence whatsoever” (Fox 1660). During the 1800s Quakers along with other Christian groups in the United States were active promoters of nonviolent action in the form of “peaceful universal reformation”, even creating the Society for Nonresistance and the journal *Nonresistance* (Tolstoy 1894). Quakers are not the only Christians to support nonviolence. Many Christians have pointed to “turn the other cheek” and “thou shalt not kill” in the Bible as proof that nonviolence is a Christian ethic. These writings and the writings of Tolstoy who outlined many of their ideas in *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, inspired Mohandas K. Gandhi’s own use of nonviolent action both in South Africa and in India (Gandhi 1993:137). Despite Gandhi’s prominence as a pioneer of nonviolent struggle, it was not until after his death that peace and nonviolence began to be researched academically.

Peace as a subject of research began gaining some recognition after World War II and gained momentum throughout the 1950s mostly in Europe. During this time peace was viewed as a research topic, but not a discipline in itself. It was not until the

1970s and after the Vietnam War that peace research began to gain popularity within the United States. It was also during this time that peace research became more introspective, with scholars such as Sharp (1973; 1990), Galtung (1975; 1987), and Boulding (1977) examining current literature and providing new directions for the field.

But how is *peace* defined? Before we can begin to properly address the study of peace, it is important to address the meaning of the term. Peace is often conceived of as an absence of conflict and aggression, a state of non-war. This definition of peace is widespread and is usually recognized, even by those who use this definition, as unattainable except within theoretical utopian schemes or within a religious context (i.e., peace after death). This definition has not been entirely absent from peace studies. Johan Galtung addressed the notion of peace within academic studies during the 1970s:

“Unfortunately, studies tend to be focused on wars as units of analysis rather than on periods of peace, and there is a tendency to define peace simply as ‘nonwar’. Thus, peace thinking has had a tendency to become utopian and to be oriented toward the future; it has been speculative and value-contaminated rather than analytical and empirical.”
[Galtung 1975:29]

Modern peace literature does not attempt to make such a claim. Instead it recognizes that there are different kinds of peace and that their conditions are not static.

The two specific types of peace that are generally referred to are *negative peace* and *positive peace*. These terms have been used by activists and scholars since the 1950s and 60s. Martin Luther King Jr. referred to these terms in his *Letter from Birmingham Jail*, calling *positive peace* “the presence of justice” and *negative peace* as “the absence of tension” (King 1963). In the 1970s Galtung expanded on these terms and defined *negative peace* as an absence of direct violence, but a lack of interaction. *Positive peace* is then defined as a state where cooperation exists with conflicts that occasionally result

in violence. He goes further to define a third type of peace, *unqualified peace*, which is essentially positive peace without violence (Galtung 1975:29). *Positive peace* may more accurately be defined as the absence of structural violence. *Structural violence* refers to the inequalities and injustices that are built into the political, economic, and cultural structures of a society cause bodily or psychological harm. Such structural inequalities and injustices may manifest themselves in statistics as a high malnutrition rate, high infant mortality rates, low literacy rates etc. Structural violence is not always easy to pinpoint, though. “Subtle”²⁹ racism, such as lower callbacks for resumes with names that are associated with particular ethnic identities, is a form of structural violence.

In addition to distinguishing among the different manifestations of peace, it is important to differentiate between peace and nonviolence. Non-violence is not a necessary aspect of all peace. Negative peace can exist without any attempt at non-violent strategies. However, positive peace and unqualified peace could not exist without non-violent solutions to problems that must arise. So what is non-violence? It is “an umbrella term for describing a range of methods for dealing with conflict which share the common principle that physical violence, at least against other people, is not used” (Weber and Burrowes). As such, there is a multitude of different approaches to non-violence. Gene Sharp, a leading peace studies scholar, compiled a list of 198 specific methods of non-violent action covering everything from boycotts and sit-ins to “overloading facilities” and “guerrilla theater” (1973:119-433). This understanding of nonviolence turns nonviolent tactics into strategies used similarly to violent war strategies. “Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging

²⁹ The term subtle is used here slightly tongue in cheek. It should be understood that while this form of racism may not be highly visible in the common discourse of racism (which generally treats racism as simply a black/white dichotomy of skin color), it does not mean that this form of racism is not still obvious as such.

of ‘battles,’ requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its ‘soldiers’ courage, discipline, and sacrifice” (Sharp 1990:9).

Common Misinterpretations of Nonviolent Action and Nonviolence

One common problem in peace studies and the promotion of nonviolence is how people perceive the word *nonviolence*. It is often mistaken for *pacifism* and non-action. *Pacifism* is the rejection of the use of violence due to moral, religious, or ethical beliefs. This is a form of nonviolence; however *nonviolence* is also used to describe the behavior of those who simply do not use violence in conflicts regardless of motive. In other words, pacifism is a morally based course of action while nonviolence may or may not incorporate pacifism in its course of action. This term is so often misapplied and misunderstood that the Albert Einstein Institution where Gene Sharp writes, recommends in its “Journalist’s Brief Glossary of Nonviolent Struggle” that the term not be used to describe specific actions and movements. Instead, they recommend the more descriptive terms *nonviolent action*, *nonviolent resistance*, and *nonviolent struggle*. In most cases of nonviolent struggle or political defiance, nonviolence is used because violence is simply not practical. In cases where a group is acting against an oppressive regime, the regime is almost always likely to have a superior ability to inflict physical damage on the dissenting group. It may also be the case that the use of violence by an opposing group gives the regime a valid reason to respond in kind, alienating potential moderate supporters. *Nonviolent action* is defined by the Albert Einstein Institution as:

“A technique of action in conflicts in which participants conduct the struggle by doing -- or refusing to do -- certain acts without using physical violence. It is an alternative to both passive submission and violence. The technique

includes many specific methods, which are grouped into three main classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention” [Albert Einstein Institution]

This is the same definition used for *nonviolent struggle* with the exception that nonviolent struggle implies that the opponent is particularly determined and resourceful. More recently the term *nonviolent struggle* when applied towards political ends, has been replaced with *political defiance* by some scholars to avoid the use of the term *nonviolent* altogether (Sharp 2003, Helvey 2004). *Nonviolent resistance* is a specific form of nonviolent struggle/political defiance in which noncooperation is the primary form of action against an act, policy, or government. Sharp defines nonviolent struggle as a “technique of action [that] uses social, psychological, economic, and political methods of applying sanctions, that is, pressures or punishments, rather than violent methods” (1990:1). These can take many forms including boycotts, strikes, protests, civil disobedience, and guerilla theater. Appendix I outlines nearly two-hundred different forms of nonviolent action.

Nonviolent Action/Political Defiance as a Foundation for Democracy

Nonviolent action has several effects that may promote the creation of democratic systems. The act of participating in nonviolent struggle may increase the self-confidence and morale of the population in their ability to challenge a regime's threats by providing people a way to wield power effectively against a regime. Tactics of noncooperation and defiance allow people to "resist undemocratic controls". Effective nonviolent strategy as defined by Sharp and others requires that the intentions and plans of a nonviolent movement must be transparent to promote trust and the image that the movement is powerful enough to speak out against the regime. Doing this requires in turn the "practice of democratic freedoms, such as free speech, free press, independent organizations, and free assembly" (Sharp 2003:32). Perhaps most important is that independent groups and institutions flourish under conditions of nonviolent struggle. "These are important for democracy because of their capacity to mobilize the power capacity of the population and to impose limits on the effective power of any would-be dictators" (Sharp 2003:23). Because nonviolent action requires such a large base of support, it does not allow individuals or small interest groups to gain power over the majority.

The Role of Power

The term *power* used here refers to *political power*, defined as a kind of *social power* used by government or people to achieve political objectives. Social power is the “capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through action by groups of people, which action impinges on other groups of people” (Sharp 1973:10).

Nonviolent struggle/political defiance is entirely dependent on a manipulation of power dynamics (Sharp 1990:3). It rejects the *monolithic theory* of power which assumes that governmental power is fixed and independent. Within the framework of monolithic theory, people depend on the government. Sharp notes that this concept of power is present in most cases of political power with the exception of the political stages of guerrilla war (Sharp 1973:10). Nonviolent action on the other hand assumes that the amount of power a ruler/elite has is related to how strong their sources of power are, thus power is best controlled at its sources. This is the *pluralistic-dependency* model which assumes that power is pluralistic and fragile. It cannot exist without groups supporting and reinforcing sources of power. This model views the government as dependent upon the people.

Sharp identifies six sources of power as authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctions (1990:4). *Authority* is essentially the “legitimacy” that a leader/ruler has among the population. Jaques Maritain describes it as the “right to command and direct, to be heard or obeyed by others” (1954:114-115). *Human resources* are the amount of manpower willing to cooperate with a leader/group. The amount of power a ruler can gain from this source is related to the percentage of cooperating people within the population. These people cooperate by

providing the ruler with the next source, skills and knowledge. *Skills and knowledge* of the human resources, if applicable to the needs of the ruler, allow them to further their goals more efficiently. *Intangible factors* are “psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith” (Sharp 1973:11). Such factors affect morale and willingness to cooperate with a ruler/regime and are also seen as key to the success of democratic systems. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Sharp both identify self-confidence and the rejection of feelings of helplessness as necessary for self-rule. *Material resources* as a source of power require that the ruler have control of and access to things such as land and property, natural resources, financial resources, an economic system, communication, and transportation. The extent to which a ruler controls these resources contributes to the extent to which a ruler can hold power. *Sanctions* are the means by which a ruler pressures subjects to obey. These can be social, economic, and physical pressures which commonly take the form of violence or threats of violence (Sharp 1973:19).

POWER




Figure 8 Sharp's Theory of Power. Original Caption: "This is a continual process which increases or decreases the ruler's power capacity. This process ends only when that power is disintegrated"

(Sharp 1973:37)

Each of these sources of power can be found in varying strengths and combinations which determine the power capacity of the ruler. The groups over which the ruler has power are identified as the general population, the ruler's agents and helpers, and foreign governments and people. The amount of cooperation each of these groups has with the

ruler determines how many and how much of the power sources are available to that ruler which in turn affects the rulers power capability or “political power”.

Political power is the “relative ability to control a situation, people, and institutions or to mobilize people and institutions for some activity” (Sharp 1990:3). This means that any group, official or non-official, can theoretically hold power. When Hitler moved millions of Jews into concentration camps, he held power both by being able to mobilize so many people into the camps, but also by mobilizing so many to help him. Yet when Danes worked together to successfully hide and save thousands of Jews in Denmark through an underground network, they also held power through their ability to control the situation albeit surreptitiously (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:223). The British, largely through the East India Company, held power when they collected large revenues from the Indian people including a salt tax. The government went so far as to prohibit even small scale merchants from making salt for local sale. When Gandhi marched to Dandi to make salt at the seashore, he made a powerful public statement and through his actions encouraged thousands of others to disobey the salt tax by making their own salt (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:86). At that moment, the Indian populace held power. British colonial rule was powerless to prevent thousands of people from simply walking to the beach and making their own salt. Gandhi’s strategy was particularly effective because it allowed anyone capable of reaching the shore the ability to participate in the action, meaning that he effectively removed the cooperation of many of the ruler’s general population, as well as many of the ruler’s agents and helpers (sympathizers). This sort of strategic nonviolence requires its proponents to first understand and then manipulate the standing power structures. Sharp acknowledges that it is not an easy thing to upset a ruler’s power. “The sources of rulers’ power are normally only threatened

significantly when assistance, cooperation, and obedience are withheld by large numbers or subjects at the same time, usually by social groups and institutions” (Sharp1990:8). The more people that are involved in the struggle, the more likely it is that the struggle will be successful.

John Bodley defines *social power* as “the ability of individuals to influence other people and events in order to maintain or improve their own and their children’s material opportunities” (Bodley 2003:4). In the context of Sharp’s theory, this ability would be the extent to which a ruler can “act on” the three groups (general population, agents and helpers, and foreign governments and people). This dynamic exists at all levels of human development. As the scale of society gets larger, power is concentrated in a smaller proportion of the population. As the scale gets larger and elites become proportionately fewer, they begin to control more power (Bodley 2005:210). Sharp’s theory states that this is due to the fact that relatively fewer people are in power but more people to be commanded in general means that there is more cooperation with the ruler and thus more sources of power available to the them³⁰. Essentially, the larger the scale, the more power that is available for a ruler or rulers to control.

“The power of scale is the reality that scale increases can be expected to mathematically produce disproportionate concentrations of power for those at the very top of any hierarchy in any power domain, while the costs of growth are likely to be socialized or borne by the society at large.”
[Bodley 2003:5]

This falls in line with various statistics and firsthand accounts pointing to the ever growing gap between the rich and the poor worldwide. According to Roger Burbach, a study released by the Economic Policy Institute and the Center on Budget and Policy

³⁰ Considering these two points of view, as scale increases, power increases in favor of a ruler or rulers, and as their power increases, so does the potential power of the people, for it is their cooperation that grants the power.

Priorities in Washington D.C. found that between the 1970s and the 1990s the population of the richest fifth in the U.S. received an average of 30 percent more real income while the lowest fifth received 6 percent less (2001:40). This trend continues at an alarming rate as we enter further into what is now recognized by many as the age of globalization.

In small scale societies most social power is achieved through nonviolent democratic means. In these societies, violence cannot be depended on to achieve power as most people at these levels are aware of their contributions and their share in power distributions. It is only at larger scales that violence becomes a viable tool for achieving and maintaining power. Fry corroborates and expands on this point by stating that:

“The worldwide archaeological record, data on simple forager societies, and cross-cultural studies combine to suggest that warfare is only a few thousand years old, arising along with social complexity and greatly intensifying with the birth of states, as economic and political motives for war moved to the forefront.” [Fry 2005:248]

According to this, occurrences of warfare may be correlated with the scale of the society.

The chances of warfare increase as the scale of societies increase.

Resolutions of Conflict

One approach to the study of nonviolence in anthropology is to study conflict management, or how people deal with conflict. Cross culturally, there are five “major approaches to conflict management” avoidance, toleration, negotiation, self-redress (self-help or coercion), and settlement (Fry 2005:23). Avoidance and toleration are the two most commonly used approaches, however the extent to which these are used, and the extent to which they are part of formal custom changes depends on the culture in question (2005:24-29). One example is in the case of settlement. Settlement strategies involve bringing in a third party as a “(1) friendly peacemaker, (2) mediator, (3) arbitrator, (4) adjudicator, [or] (5) repressive peacemaker” (2005:29). The *friendly peacemaker* is a “third party [that] merely separates or distracts disputants” (2005:23). The *mediator* simply “facilitates the negotiation process” (2006:23). The *arbitrator* “renders a decision, but lacks the power to enforce it” (2005:23). The *adjudicator* is a “third party [that] renders a decision and has the power to enforce it” (2005:23). And finally, the *repressive peacemaker* “uses force or the threat of force to stifle a dispute” (2005:23). As the scale/complexity of the culture increases, we find more examples of roles four (adjudicator) and five (repressive peace maker) whereas roles one (friendly peacemaker) and two (mediator) can be found in nearly every society (2005:29).

My interviews and conversations with Bolivians indicated that the strategy that was believed to be most successful for managing conflict was repeatedly identified as “dialogue” or negotiation that would then lead to a settlement.³¹ In the traditional highland cultures of Bolivia, conflicts are expected to be settled by an adjudicator.

³¹ See the Fieldwork and Methods section for a more detailed analysis of this.

Ströbele-Gregor describes one example of this role as it appears in the traditional office of *jilakata* which is a religious, ritual, judicial, and legislative position (1996:79). This position is held for one year and all heads of households are expected to hold the position at least once. Once in this position the *jilakata* is assumed to uphold customs and tradition, but they commonly reinterpret them according to the situation. This indicates that conflict is not expected to be dealt with according to a set rule or standard, but that resolutions should be tailored to the context of the conflict. Also inherent in this is that not only one member of the community holds the ability to adjudicate conflict.

Conflict resolution cannot be easily separated from its cultural context. “Culture is critical in shaping the manner in which people perceive, evaluate, and choose options for dealing with conflict” (Björkqvist and Fry 1997:245). While there are some worldwide similarities, each culture decides which aspects of conflict resolution are used and which are not. In addition to some of the more formal mechanisms discussed above, cultures have both formal and informal mechanisms for dealing with conflict such as teasing, witchcraft, gossip, and exclusion (Fry and Fry 1997:10). The extent to which these are used and the severity of each is entirely dependant on both the culture and the situation. Understanding these cultural differences will help create a more complete and inclusive understanding of conflict.

CONCLUSIONS

Nonviolence, like violence, cannot be understood outside of the context of its conflict. In Bolivia conflict between the indigenous majority and the criollo-mestizo elite have made the unification and effective democratization of the country a difficult goal to achieve. Trust between groups has been shattered by a history of corruption and violence but people remain hopeful, if somewhat doubtful, that through nonviolent means, such as dialogue, conflicts and issues can be resolved.

Members of the younger generations are fed up with politics as usual and in an attempt to find a solution many are turning to traditional concepts such as the *ayllu* and using symbols such as the *wiphala* to form a both a national Bolivian identity and a common pan-Andean identity that does not deny the individual identities of the communities in the Andes. The indigenous groups of the lowlands have been slow to be included in the communal identity shared by highland groups, however there have been conscious efforts to unite the historically and politically disparate groups. One example was the *Marcha por Territorio y Dignidad* (March for Territory and Dignity), organized by lowland groups to march from the lowlands to the capital city in the highlands. As the march continued it gained supporters and sympathizers from many of the highland communities it passed through. The current president, Evo Morales, has enjoyed more support from both the eastern lowlands and the western highlands than any other democratically elected president before him. This may indicate a common goal or perception of common goals across communities. The fact alone that an indigenous president has been popularly elected implies that indigenous groups are unifying, if not behind a common goal, at least behind a common platform. This sense of unity is in part

due to MNR led campaigns to create a homogenous indigenous group under the label *campesino*. While the MNR policies aimed to destroy individual community identities, they still provided government sanctioned vehicles of solidarity through the creation of peasant federations and trade unions. These organizations allowed communities to retain some of their original hierarchies and sociopolitical systems. This does not mean that these organizations were accepting of indigenous modes of organization, but their existence allowed indigenous communities a way of adapting to the changing political environment without losing their individual identities.

Later these organizations organized around a series of nonviolent actions (strikes, marches etc.) to gain even more solidarity. Through the dialogue that emerged, groups were able to synthesize their demands and their concerns and channel them through the umbrella organization of la Coordinadora and its leaders to enact changes such as the *Asemblea Constiuyente* which has given representation to more indigenous groups than ever before.

Bolivia has not been transformed overnight through the use of nonviolence. Neither has nonviolence been used as a resistance tactic on a national scale or long term as has happened in the United States civil rights movement or in India. As we have seen before though, the presence of violence does not remove the importance of the use of nonviolence in creating a society that is more likely to achieve active democracy. If we are to promote democracy or its ideals, the base of support must be created by the people, through the context of their history and their culture.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: THE METHODS of NONVIOLENT ACTION

(Adapted from Sharp 1973)

* - indicates forms of nonviolent action known to have been used in Bolivia. There are undoubtedly more methods that have been used, however at this time I am not aware of specific instances of their use.

I. THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION

FORMAL STATEMENTS

- *1. Public speeches
- 2. Letters of opposition or support
- *3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
- *4. Signed public statements
- *5. Declarations of indictment and intention
- *6. Group or mass petitions

COMMUNICATIONS WITH A WIDER AUDIENCE

- *7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
- *8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
- *9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
- *10. Newspapers and journals
- *11. Records, radio, and television

12. Skywriting and earthwriting

GROUP REPRESENTATIONS

- *13. Deputations

14. Mock awards

15. Group lobbying

*16. Picketing

*17. Mock elections

SYMBOLIC PUBLIC ACTS

*18. Displays of flags and symbolic colours

*19. Wearing of symbols

*20. Prayer and worship

21. Delivering symbolic objects

22. Protest disrobings

*23. Destruction of own property

24. Symbolic lights

*25. Displays of portraits

26. Paint as protest

27. New signs and names

*28. Symbolic sounds

29. Symbolic reclamations

30. Rude gestures

PRESSURES ON INDIVIDUALS

31. "Haunting" officials

*32. Taunting officials

33. Fraternalization

34. Vigils

DRAMA AND MUSIC

35. Humorous skits and pranks

36. Performances of plays and music

37. Singing

PROCESSIONS

*38. Marches

*39. Parades

40. Religious processions

41. Pilgrimages

*42. Motorcades

HONOURING THE DEAD

43. Political mourning

44. Mock funerals

45. Demonstrative funerals

46. Homage at burial places

PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES

*47. Assemblies of protest or support

*48. Protest meetings

49. Camouflaged meetings of protest

50. Teach-ins

WITHDRAWAL AND RENUNCIATION

*51. Walk-outs

52. Silence

53. Renouncing honours

54. Turning one's back

II. THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION

OSTRACISM OF PERSONS

- 55. Social boycott
- 56. Selective social boycott
- 57. Lysistratic nonaction
- *58. Excommunication
- *59. Interdict

NONCOOPERATION WITH SOCIAL EVENTS, CUSTOMS, AND INSTITUTIONS

- 60. Suspension of social and sports activities
- 61. Boycott of social affairs
- *62. Student strike
- 63. Social disobedience
- 64. Withdrawal from social institutions

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

- 65. Stay-at-home
- 66. Total personal noncooperation
- 67. "Flight" of workers
- *68. Sanctuary
- 69. Collective disappearance
- 70. Protest emigration (hijrat)

III. THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS

ACTION BY CONSUMERS

- 71. Consumers' boycott

72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods

73. Policy of austerity

74. Rent withholding

75. Refusal to rent

76. National consumers' boycott

77. International consumers' boycott

ACTION BY WORKERS AND PRODUCERS

78. Workers' boycott

79. Producers' boycott

ACTION BY MIDDLEMEN

80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott

ACTION BY OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT

81. Traders' boycott

82. Refusal to let or sell property

83. Lockout

84. Refusal of industrial assistance

*85. Merchants' "general strike"

ACTION BY HOLDERS OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

86. Withdrawal of bank deposits

*87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments

*88. Refusal to pay debts or interest

89. Severance of funds and credit

90. Revenue refusal

91. Refusal of a government's money

ACTION BY GOVERNMENTS

- 92. Domestic embargo
- 93. Blacklisting of traders
- 94. International sellers' embargo
- 95. International buyers' embargo
- 96. International trade embargo

IV. THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: THE STRIKE

SYMBOLIC STRIKES

- *97. Protest strike
- 98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

AGRICULTURAL STRIKES

- 99. Peasant strike
- *100. Farm workers' strike

STRIKES BY SPECIAL GROUPS

- 101. Refusal of impressed labour
- 102. Prisoners' strike
- 103. Craft strike
- *104. Professional strike

ORDINARY INDUSTRIAL STRIKES

- *105. Establishment strike
- *106. Industry strike
- *107. Sympathy strike

RESTRICTED STRIKES

- 108. Detailed strike

- 109. Bumper strike
- 110. Slowdown strike
- 111. Working-to-rule strike
- 112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in)
- 113. Strike by resignation
- 114. Limited strike
- 115. Selective strike

MULTI-INDUSTRY STRIKES

- *116. Generalised strike
- *117. General strike

COMBINATION OF STRIKES AND ECONOMIC CLOSURES

- 118. Hartal
- *119. Economic shutdown

V. THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION

REJECTION OF AUTHORITY

- 120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
- 121. Refusal of public support
- 122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

CITIZENS' NONCOOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT

- 123. Boycott of legislative bodies
- 124. Boycott of elections
- 125. Boycott of government employment and positions
- 126. Boycott of government departments, agencies, and other bodies
- 127. Withdrawal from governmental educational institutions

128. Boycott of government-supported institutions

129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents

130. Removal of own signs and placemarks

*131. Refusal to accept appointed officials

*132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

CITIZENS' ALTERNATIVES TO OBEDIENCE

133. Reluctant and slow compliance

134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision

135. Popular nonobedience

136. Disguised disobedience

*137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse

138. Sitdown

139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation

*140. Hiding, escape, and false identities

141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws

ACTION BY GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides

143. Blocking of lines of command and information

144. Stalling and obstruction

145. General administrative noncooperation

146. Judicial noncooperation

147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents

*148. Mutiny

DOMESTIC GOVERNMENTAL ACTION

149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays

150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTION

151. Changes in diplomatic and other representation

152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events

153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition

154. Severance of diplomatic relations

155. Withdrawal from international organisations

156. Refusal of membership in international bodies

157. Expulsion from international organisations

VI. THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTION

158. Self-exposure to the elements

*159. The fast

a) Fast of moral pressure

*b) Hunger strike

c) Satyagrahic fast

160. Reverse trial

*161. Nonviolent harassment

PHYSICAL INTERVENTION

162. Sit-in

163. Stand-in

164. Ride-in

165. Wade-in

166. Mill-in

167. Pray-in

*168. Nonviolent raids

169. Nonviolent air raids

170. Nonviolent invasion

*171. Nonviolent interjection

*172. Nonviolent obstruction

173. Nonviolent occupation

SOCIAL INTERVENTION

174. Establishing new social patterns

175. Overloading of facilities

176. Stall-in

177. Speak-in

178. Guerrilla theatre

*179. Alternative social institutions

180. Alternative communication system

ECONOMIC INTERVENTION

181. Reverse strike

182. Stay-in strike

*183. Nonviolent land seizure

184. Defiance of blockades

185. Politically motivated counterfeiting

186. Preclusive purchasing

187. Seizure of assets

188. Dumping

189. Selective patronage

190. Alternative markets

191. Alternative transportation systems

192. Alternative economic institutions

POLITICAL INTERVENTION

193. Overloading of administrative systems

194. Disclosing identities of secret agents

195. Seeking imprisonment

196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws

197. Work-on without collaboration

198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government

Appendix II: TIMELINE of WATER WARS

- 1999 **September** – Bolivian government privatizes Cochabamba water systems. Sold to Aguas del Tunari.
- October** – Bolivian government enacts law 2029
- November 12** – La Coordinadora forms.
- December 1** – First mobilization of both urban and rural workers called by la Coordinadora. Evolved into an open meeting
- 2000 **January 11** – Government still has not responded to demands. Civic Committee calls for a 24 hour strike and La Coordinadora calls for general strikes.
- January 12** – Strike continues, 500 factory workers join strike. Town meeting decides commission is needed to discuss water issue.
- January 13** – Government arrives late for meeting. Protestors and police clash.
- February 4** – La Toma begins. Riots turn violent. Urban population begins supporting rural protestors.
- February 5** – Protests continue.
- February 6** – Government signs agreement to freeze hikes. Two months to enact agreement.
- March** – Popular referendum held.
- April 4 - 9** – Deadline. “Last Battle” begins. La Coordinadora forcefully enters talks. Members arrested. Government contacts Coordinadora members and arranges for a private meeting. Congress convened to sign agreement. Municipal government takes control of water systems.

Appendix III: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Preguntas de Entrevista:

¿Como entiende la situación política en Cochabamba ...Bolivia... hoy?

¿Qué propuestas tiene para poder cambiar la situación política?

¿En su concepto quienes deberían participar de este cambio?

¿Qué piensa que puede pasar en los próximos meses?

¿Cuales son las estrategias más eficientes para hacer cambios sociales?

¿Por que?

¿Cómo entiende la violencia?

¿Quién usa la violencia?

¿Cómo entiende la palabra paz?

¿Como influye la cultura para que la gente Boliviana sea más pacífica?

¿Hay formas de hacer cambios políticos pacíficamente?

¿Hay ejemplos de cambios políticos que se han hecho pacíficamente en Bolivia?

¿Cuales son?

¿Hay algo mas que quisiera decir/añadir?

Preguntas Personales:

¿Dónde nació?

¿Dónde vivió el mayor tiempo de su vida?

¿Tiene hijos?

¿Donde trabaja?

¿Qué influye en sus ideas políticas?

Translation:

Interview Questions:

What is the current political situation in Cochabamba...Bolivia?

What suggestions do you have for improving the situation?

In your opinion who should participate in making changes?

What do you think will occur in the next few months?

What are the most efficient strategies for implementing change?

Why?

How do you define violence?

Who uses violence?

How do you define peace?

How does culture influence nonviolent tendencies in Bolivia?

Can political change be made peacefully?

Are there examples of how political changes have been made peacefully in Bolivia?

Such as?

Is there anything else you would like to say/add?

Personal Questions:

Where were you born?

Where have you lived the most time in your life?

Do you have children?

Where do you work?

Do any of these influence your political ideas?

Appendix IV: LIST of ACRONYMS

COB – *Centro Obrero Boliviano* - Bolivian Workers Central

CSUTCB – *Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* –
Unique Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia

ECLAC – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (also known as
CEPAL – *Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe*)

FDTFC – *Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Fabriles de Cochabamba* –
Departmental Federation of Factory Workers of Cochabamba

FEDECOR – *Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones de Regantes*
Federation of the Department of Cochabamba’s Irrigators Organizations

IMF – Internacional Monetary Fund

LAB – *Lloyd Aereo Boliviano* (the Bolivian nacional Airline)

MNR – *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* - National Revolutionary Movement

PIR – *Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario* – Party of the Revolutionary Left

POR – *Partido Obrero Revolucionario* – Revolutionary Worker’s Party

SEMAPA – *Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado* (the municipal water
company of Cochabamba)

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